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III

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A HANDBOOK OF MORAL THEOLOGY


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VOLUME III
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF

SECOND, REVISED EDITION



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INTRODUCTION

In the two preceding volumes of this Handbook we dealt with the general principles of Moral Theology (*Theologia Moralis Generalis*). We must now show how these general principles are to be applied to man's conduct as an individual and as a member of society (*Theologia Moralis Specialis*).

The will of God is the supreme and ultimate source of all obligation (*supremus debendi titulus*). Hence, strictly speaking, man has but one duty, namely, to obey the divine law. This law, according to St. Paul, "is charity, from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith."¹ St. Gregory the Great says: "The commandments one and all spring solely from love, and together constitute a single precept, because whatever is commanded, is founded upon charity."² And St. Thomas Aquinas: "All the commandments are fulfilled in the one law of charity."³

¹ 1 Tim. I, 5.

² Hom. in Evang., 27, n. 1:
"Omne mandatum de sola dilectione
est, et omnia unum praeceptum
sunt, quia, quidquid praecipitur, in

sola caritate solidatur." (Migne,
P. L., LXXVI, 1205).

³ Comment. ad Gal., c. 5, lect. 3:
"Omnia [praecepta] in uno prae-
cepto caritatis implentur."—IDEM,

This one supreme law embodies a vast number of particular precepts, of which some oblige man to perform acts referring directly to God, while others enjoin acts that refer to Him only in an indirect way, their direct end being either some external object, or man himself, or his fellow-men.

The division of duties just mentioned is identical with that contained in the Decalogue. The first three commandments embody man's duties to God; the following five, his duties to his fellowmen; the last two, his duties to himself.

We arrive at the same partition if we consider the divine commandment of charity as obliging us to love, (a) God, (b) our neighbor, and (c) ourselves,⁴ and if we ponder the Apostle's exhortation to "live soberly, and justly, and godly."⁵

Man is both an individual and a member of society, and hence his duties appertain to two different spheres. The three classes of obligations mentioned, therefore, may be considered from two distinct points of view, namely, (a) that of the individual and (b) that of society.

We may accordingly divide all man's duties into three separate series, with two subdivisions each, to wit:

De Perfect. Vitae Spir., c. 12: "Finis cuiuslibet praecepti est caritas, ut dicit Apostolus (1 Tim., I,

5)."—Cfr. *Summa Theol.*, 2a, 2ae, qu. 189, art. I, ad 5.

⁴ Cfr. Matt. XXII, 37-39.

⁵ Tit. II, 12.

I. Individual or personal duties, which man owes to himself (self-love or self-discipline—*sobrietas*) ; more particularly.

1. The care for his bodily and spiritual welfare;

2. The obligations arising from his vocation, occupation, and position in life.

II. Religious duties, which a man owes to God (charity, piety—*pietas*) ; particularly,

1. Individual obligations towards God;

2. Religious duties arising from one's position as a member of society.

III. Social duties, which a man owes to his fellowmen in justice (*iustitia*) or in charity, either

1. As an individual toward other individuals;
or

2. As an individual toward society.

To these three principal heads of duty we will devote the remaining volumes of this Handbook.

The present (Volume III of the whole Series) treats of Man's Individual and Personal Duties; particularly (Part I) The Care for His Bodily and Spiritual Welfare, and (Part II) The Obligations Arising from His Vocation, Occupation, and Position in Life.

PART I

INDIVIDUAL OR PERSONAL DUTIES

CHAPTER I

NATURE AND OBLIGATION OF CHRISTIAN SELF-LOVE

I. NATURE OF CHRISTIAN SELF-LOVE.—The duties which man owes to himself may be summarized in the proposition that he is obliged to love himself.

Self-love is so powerful an instinct of nature that it is impossible for man to act without it. Self-love not only follows logically from the universal commandment of charity, but is expressly inculcated in Holy Scripture as the standard and measure of that chiefest of all virtues. Matt. VII, 12: "All things therefore whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them." Matt. XXII, 39: "The second

[commandment] is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." ¹

The second Commandment inculcates *self-love*, not in the sense of that innate disposition by which man seeks his own gratification, welfare, and advancement, but as a moral virtue.

Self-love as a natural instinct is not capable of governing man's conduct so as to enable him to attain its object, *i. e.*, self-preservation. Moreover, in the debased state in which humanity unhappily exists since the fall of Adam and Eve, this natural instinct is perverted and tends away from, rather than towards, man's true end; in fact it has degenerated into inordinate selfishness, which, in the words of St. Thomas, is "the cause of all sin," ² because it leads to covetousness, pride, blasphemy, disobedience, ingratitude, incontinency, and many other vices. ³

Although the moral virtue of self-love derives

¹ Cfr. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, I, c. 25, n. 26: "*Modus diligendi præcipiendus est homini, id est, quomodo se diligat, ut prosit sibi. Quin autem se diligat et prodesse sibi velit, dubitare dementis est.*"—*Ibid.*, c. 26, n. 27: "*Quum præcurrat dilectio Dei eiusque dilectionis modus præscriptus appareat, ita ut cetera in illum confluant, de dilectione tua nihil dictum videtur; sed quum dictum est, 'Diliges proximum tuum tamquam teipsum,' simul et tui abs te dilectio non prætermissa est.*" (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 28 sq.).—Cfr. Terence, *Andr.*, IV,

3: "*Proximus sum egomet mihi.*"

² *Summa Theol.*, Ia 2æ, qu. 77, art. 4: "*Inordinatus amor sui est causa omnis peccati.*"

³ Cfr. 2 Tim. III, 1-3.—Cfr. St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XIV, c. 28: "*Fecerunt civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. Denique illa in se ipsa, hæc in Domino gloriatur. Illa enim quaerit ab hominibus gloriam, huic autem Deus conscientiae testis maxima est gloria.*" (Migne, P. L., XLI, 436).

its rule from the law of God, yet it is based upon or rooted in an instinct of nature.

Christian self-love, therefore, is a virtue opposed to selfishness and necessarily involves self-denial. "If any man come to me," says our Divine Saviour, "and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." ⁴ And again: "He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this world, keepeth it unto life eternal." ⁵

To love oneself, therefore, in the Christian and Catholic sense of the term, means to combat *selfishness* and to seek the glory of God rather than one's own gratification.

Two corollaries flow from this proposition, namely:

a) Man is not his own master, but has control over his actions only in so far as he does not violate the divine order;

b) He is in duty bound to regulate his conduct so as to be enabled to reach his divinely appointed end (*bonum*), and hence must avoid whatever is opposed to that end (*malum*).

2. THE DUTIES ARISING FROM CHRISTIAN SELF-LOVE.—The principal duty that springs from Christian self-love is that of preserving one's intellectual and moral personality. This

⁴ Luke XIV, 26.

⁵ John XII, 25.

means that every man must provide properly for the salvation of his soul and the welfare of his body. The moral and religious life knows no standstill, and hence every Catholic is in duty bound so to exert his mental and physical faculties as to reach what St. Paul calls "the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ,"⁶ and thus, by developing his personality, to achieve both his temporal and eternal destiny.

This constant striving after perfection is a duty which none may shirk and which, in importance and binding force, surpasses even the obligations we owe to our fellowmen. "For what doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his own soul?"⁷

"To govern oneself," says Seneca, "is to exercise the highest dominion."⁸

The virtue of Christian self-love inspires true self-respect because it is based on self-knowledge, humility, and a sincere desire to save one's soul and keep the body efficient for the attainment of

⁶ Eph. IV, 13.—Cfr. St. Jerome, *Epist.*, 54 (al. 10), n. 6: "*Arripe, quaeso, occasionem et fac de necessitate virtutem. Non quaeruntur in christianis initia, sed finis. Paulus male coepit, sed bene finivit. Iudae laudantur exordia, sed finis prodictione damnatur. Lege Ezechielem: Iustitia iusti non liberabit eum, in quacunque die peccaverit. Et impietas impii non nocebit ei, in quacunque die conversus fuerit ab impietate sua.*" (Migne, P. L., XXII,

552).—IDEM, *In Epist. ad Gal.*, II, c. 4: "*Beatus qui ambulat in virtutum via, sed si ad virtutes usque pervenerit. Nec prodest a vitiis recessisse, nisi optima comprehendas. Quia non tam initia sunt in bonis studiis laudanda quam finis.*" (P. L., XXVI, 381).

⁷ Matt. XVI, 26.—Cfr. A. Lehmkühl, S. J., *Casus Conscientiae*, Vol. I, 3rd ed., n. 376.

⁸ *Epist.*, 113, 30: "*Imperare sibi maximum imperium est.*"

its highest purpose by practicing temperance, diligence, and economy.

Opposed to self-love are, on the one hand, exaggerated self-esteem, selfishness, and egotism, which are destructive of charity, and, on the other, disregard for the dignity of human nature, indifference to spiritual things, and particularly that unnatural hatred of self which results from a wicked life and is almost invariably coupled with contempt for virtue, nay for God Himself, finally culminating in that terrible sin which in a previous volume has been described as "diabolical."⁹

"He that loveth iniquity hateth his own soul," says the Psalmist;¹⁰ and the angel told Tobias: "They that commit sin and iniquity are enemies to their own soul."¹¹

READINGS.—H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 72 sqq., Innsbruck 1914.—Th. Meyer, S.J., *Institutiones Iuris Naturalis*, Vol. II, n. 29-47, Freiburg 1900.—Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., *Theologia Moralis*, Vol. I, 11th edition, pp. 400 sqq., Freiburg 1910.—V. Cathrein, S.J., *Moralphilosophie*, 4th ed., Vol. II, pp. 46 sqq., Freiburg 1904.—E. Müller, *Theologia Moralis*, 7th ed., Vol. II, pp. 86 sqq., Vienna 1894.—F. A. Göpfert, *Moraltheologie*, Vol. II, 6th ed., pp. 1 sqq., Paderborn 1909.

⁹ Koch-Preuss, *Handbook of Moral Theology*, Vol. II, pp. 91 sqq.

¹⁰ Ps. X, 6.

¹¹ Tob. XII, 10.

CHAPTER II

THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BODY

I. THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF THE BODY.—The Catholic Church in her ethical teaching avoids two false extremes: she neither undervalues the body, nor does she overestimate it.

a) Against what we may term *false Spiritualism* the Church upholds the value and importance of the material element in man. She teaches that the human body is superior to the bodies of all other creatures because it was directly created by God and is (not so much the prison as) the organ of an immortal soul.¹ Through the body the soul exerts its activity and comes into contact with the material universe. In and through the body man exercises control over the lower creatures² and communicates with his fellowmen. There could be no social intercourse if men had no material bodies.

The human body was raised to its true dignity when the Son of God was made flesh and suffered

¹ Cfr. Saint Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.*, IV, c. 23 (Migne, P. G., XXXIII, 484).—Saint Bernard, *De Diligendo Deo*, XI, n. 30 sq.: "*Bonus plane fidusque comes caro spiritui bono, quae ipsum aut si onerat, iuvat, aut si non iuvat, ex-*

onerat, aut certe iuvat et minime onerat. Primus status laboriosus, sed fructuosus, secundus otiosus, sed minime fastidiosus, tertius et gloriosus." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXVII, 993).

² Gen. I, 25.

and died to redeem men from sin and its consequences. With the same body that endured the death agony on the cross, Christ rose from the grave, ascended into Heaven, and now sits at the right hand of God the Father, whence He shall come to judge the living and the dead.

Through the instrumentality of the Sacraments the body, having been redeemed by Christ, participates in the graces of the atonement and thereby becomes a temple of the Holy Ghost,³ destined to rise again after death and to be forever transfigured in Heaven. Hence every Christian is in duty bound not to "yield his members as instruments of iniquity unto sin, but to present them "as instruments of justice unto God." ⁴

b) The Catholic view of the body differs also from that of the *Materialists*, who unduly exalt, nay fairly worship, the flesh. The Church values the body only in connection with, and as ennobled by, the spirit, and commands it to be mortified. "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscence." ⁵ "Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth; fornication, uncleanness, lust, evil concupiscence, and covetousness, which is the service of idols." ⁶

³ 1 Cor. III, 16.

⁴ Rom. VI, 13; cfr. 19; 1 Cor. VI, 13, 20.

⁵ Rom. XIII, 14.

⁶ Col. III, 5 sqq.

To mortify the body does not, of course, mean to kill or maim it, but merely to subdue its sensual inclinations, so that it may become a fit companion for the spiritual and immortal soul—"bonus plane fidusque comes spiritui bono," as St. Bernard calls it,⁷—and that it may be gradually prepared for its final transfiguration in Heaven.

2. LIFE.—Of even greater value than the body is life.

a) Life ranks first among the blessings of the natural order because it is the foundation and an indispensable condition of all the rest. According to revelation, man's life on earth is intended as a preparation for the life eternal in Heaven. It is the period of sowing for the great harvest;⁸ the day assigned for laboring in the vineyard of the Master;⁹ the time appointed for trading with the God-given talents,¹⁰ for running the race and competing for the grand prize.¹¹ Again and again Holy Scripture tells us, "What things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap,"¹² and, "We have not here a lasting city," but should "seek one that is to come."¹³ If this terrestrial journey forms but a moment, as it were, of our total existence, which is for the most part to be spent in the world beyond, then that moment is

⁷ See note 1, *supra*, p. 9.

⁸ Luke XII, 23.—Cfr. V. Cathrein, S. J., *Moralphilosophie*, Vol. I, Freiburg 1911, 5th ed., pp. 119 sqq.

⁹ Matt. XX, 1-16.

¹⁰ Matt. XXV, 14-30.

¹¹ 1 Cor. IX, 24 sq.

¹² 2 Cor. IX, 6; Gal. VI, 8 sq.

¹³ Heb. XIII, 14.

extremely precious, and every fraction thereof possesses incalculable value for the welfare of the soul. What Christ said of Himself applies in a measure to every man: "I must work the works of Him that sent me, whilst it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work." ¹⁴

b) Life being a gift of such immense value, we are in duty bound to cherish it; or, as St. Paul says, we must "redeem the time." ¹⁵

a) Hence no man is allowed to destroy or curtail his life, even though it may have become a burden and is seemingly of no further value. By the aid of divine grace all temporal adversities and sufferings can be borne, nay made productive of supernatural glory. A life of suffering is not necessarily useless, but may be rendered highly meritorious by prayer, patience, and a good example, and thus become beneficial to the afflicted individual as well as to the entire human race. He who has to suffer much should frequently rec-

¹⁴ John IX, 4.—Cfr. St. Jerome, *Comment. in Evang. S. Matth.*, l. IV, c. 25: "*Post iudicii diem bonorum operum et iustitiae occasio non relinquitur.*" (P. L., XXVI, 185).—St. Augustine, *Serm.*, 93 (al. *De Verbis Domini*, 23), c. 10, n. 16: "*Dictum est, verum est, non fallaciter dictum est: 'Pulsate et aperietur vobis' (Matt. VII, 7), sed modo quando tempus est misericordiae, non quando tempus est iudicii. Non enim possunt confundi ista tempora, quam misericordiam et iudicium Domino suo*

cantet Ecclesia (Ps. C, 1). Tempus est misericordiae, age poenitentiam. Tempore iudicii illam habes agere? Eris in virginibus illis, contra quas clausum est ostium." (P. L., XXXVIII, 579).

¹⁵ Eph. V, 16; Rom. XIII, 13 sq.; Col. IV, 5.—Cfr. St. Augustine, *Serm.*, 16 (al. *1 inter Homil.*, 50), n. 2; *Serm.*, 17 (al. *28 inter Hom.*, 50), n. 7; *Serm.*, 167 (al. *24 De Verbis Apost.*), n. 3 (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 122, 138, 910).

commend himself to God, practice the virtue of resignation, cultivate good cheer, and never lose hope.¹⁶ Like St. Paul, he should offer the tribulations which he suffers "in the flesh" for the purpose of "filling up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ."¹⁷ Illness and suffering are by no means always a punishment for personal sins.¹⁸ Oftentimes they are graces in disguise, given by a merciful God to enable man to train his soul for Heaven. "Sufferings are lessons," runs an old saw,¹⁹ but they are also, in the words of a modern poet, favors from on high.²⁰ When borne for the love of God, "tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial, and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not: because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us."²¹

¹⁶ Matth. XVI, 24; XXVI, 39, 42; 1 Pet. IV, 22 sqq.—Cfr. Horace, *Carmina*, II, 3, 1: "*Aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem.*"—Seneca, *Ep.*, 78, 20: "*Quid porro? Nihil agere te credis, si temperans aeger sis? Ostendes morbum posse superari vel certe sustineri. Est, mihi crede, virtuti etiam in lectulo locus.*"

¹⁷ Col. I, 24.

¹⁸ Matt. IX, 2; Mark II, 5; Luke XIII, 1-5; John IX, 1-3.

¹⁹ Παθήματα μαθήματα.

²⁰ Luise Hensel: "*Leiden sind Gnaden.*"—Cfr. Ecclus. II, 3 sqq.; Phil. I, 29; 1 Pet. I, 17; Heb. XII, 7-11.—St. Ambrose, *Expositio in Evang. sec. Lucam*, I. IV, c. 41 (v. Koch-Preuss, *A Manual of Moral Theology*, Vol. II, p. 38, n. 11. Cfr.

St. Augustine, *Confess.*, I. II, c. 2, n. 4: "*Domine, qui fingis dolorem in praecepto* (Ps. XCIII, 20), *et percutis, ut sanes, et occidis nos, ne moriamur abs te.*" (P. L., XXXII, 677).—IDEM, *Enarrat. in Psalmos*, LXVIII, s. 2, n. 1: "*Et quando Dominus permittit aut facit, ut in tribulatione aliqua simus, etiam tunc misericors est.*" (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 854).—Seneca, *De Provid.*, II, 2: "*Omnia adversa [bonus vir] exercitationes putat.*"—IDEM, *ibid.*, V, 9: "*Ignis aurum probat, misericordia fortes viros.*"—Ovid, *Trist.*, V, 3, 75: "*Hectora quis nosset, si felix Troia fuisset?*"—P. W. v. Keppler, *Das Problem des Leidens*, 2d ed., pp. 12 sqq.

²¹ Rom. V, 3 sqq.

"We suffer with Christ, that we may be also glorified with him. For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." ²²

Thus, suffering may be made a source of joy. "In much experience of tribulation," says the Apostle, "they have abundance of joy." ²³

"The cross with its stern lines," writes Bishop Keppeler, "a cold, bare, branchless tree with rough-hewn stumps for arms, is indeed at first sight a sad and joyless thing to look at, so true an image is it of harsh contradiction, so good a symbol of bitter pain. Yet men find that the cross possesses a certain beauty. In its sturdy, clear-cut, well-proportioned form they see a picture of steadfastness, of aspiring effort, of opposition conquered and contradictories reconciled. The sight of a man hanging in agony upon the cross arouses, at first, no sense of joy, it is true. Yet there is a wellspring of joy in the sure faith that the Divine Hero bleeding on the cross is dying in the battle against the fiercest foe of joy and of salvation, and conquering as He dies. The cross becomes the symbol of victory and thereby the symbol of joy. Darkness and gloom are dispelled and everywhere is shed the glory of the Resurrection. In its light, the tree of the cross becomes the tree of life, of resistless power; the dried trunk is clothed with blossoms and fruit; and out of the crown of thorns spring forth roses. Thus also is it with the cross and the crucifixion in the life of each individual Christian. That a man should take up his cross daily; that he should not only bear his cross, but crucify the flesh, the old man—these are not forced

²² Rom. VIII, 17.

²³ 2 Cor. VIII, 2; cfr. Jas. I, 2-4; 1 Pet. I, 6-9; IV, 12 sq.

figures of speech, but stern demands which certainly do seem likely to lead far away from joy. Yet the battle to which they summon is waged not against joy, but against joy's worst enemies. The cross obliges us to renounce the apples of Sodom, the wild cherries of sin, which are really no joys at all, but it does not demand a total renunciation of legitimate natural joys; it only insists that they be used in moderation and with a good intention. Excessive enjoyment always begets disgust. Unrestricted activity and gratification of the sensual instincts does not add to the sum of joy, but ruins both joy and the man; it sins not only against morality but against hygiene, which is to-day sometimes regarded as the supreme standard. A life 'beyond good and evil,'—to use Nietzsche's phrase—unscrupulous poaching, complete loosing of the wild, natural instincts, whose advocate, protector, and prophet Nietzsche was unwillingly degraded into becoming by his less worthy disciples, the feeling of 'the beast of prey within man, the fair, ravenous, blond beast, lusting for prey and conquest,'—all this does not enrich, gladden, deepen, nor sweeten life. It delivers life over to the most wretched languor, to the hospital, the madhouse, to suicide,—'those graves of lust,'²⁴ so numerous in the world to-day."²⁵

Even Goethe realized that the spirit of austerity and self-sacrifice alone can provide the proper basis for a healthy, happy, cheerful life:

If thou hast not part
In death as well as birth,
A sorry guest thou art
Upon the gloomy earth.

²⁴ Numb. XI, 34.

²⁵ P. W. von Keppler, *More Joy*,

(tr. by Jos. McSorley, C.S.P.), pp.

76 sqq., St. Louis 1914.

"Man must die in order to grow. He must renounce selfishness, for it makes him poorer, not richer, and especially poorer in joy."²⁶

"Nothing," says a contemporary Protestant writer, "shuts in a life and shuts out satisfaction and joy like the self-considering temper and the self-centered aim. Such a life, though it may seem to itself self-developing, is in fact self-deceived. Instead of growing richer in its resources, it finds itself growing poorer. The more it cultivates itself, the more sterile it grows; the more it accumulates, the less it has; the more it saves, the more it is lost."²⁷

β) To long inordinately for death is contrary to the Christian concept of life, its value and purpose. The "desire to be dissolved and be with Christ," which St. Paul extols as "by far the better thing,"²⁸ must spring from an absolutely pure motive and be accompanied by complete resignation to the will of God. To wish for death in order to escape the dangers, vicissitudes, and tribulations of this earthly "vale of tears," is opposed to the teaching of Christ.²⁹ Life is a precious gift which should be conscientiously employed.³⁰ Though time is short, it is of sufficient duration to enable us to gain eternity by making good use of the fleeting moments given to us.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 79 sq.

²⁷ Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Christian Character*, p. 206.

²⁸ Phil. I, 23.

²⁹ Cfr. F. W. Faber, *Growth in Holiness*, Ch. IV.

³⁰ Phil. I, 24 sqq.; cfr. Sporer-Bierbaum, *Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, 2nd ed., n. 373.

"Nothing," says the Ven. Don Bosco, "torments the reprobates in hell more than the thought that they have idled away the time which they received for working out their eternal salvation; nothing so consoles the elect in Heaven as the reflection that they have employed their days for the honor and glory of God."

c) By commanding us to sanctify our bodies and to employ time for the purpose of gaining eternity, the Church does not, as some assert, "preach gloom and sorrow and demand of her followers that they forego all joy, thus making hypocrites of them." Both the Old and the New Testament bid man to be glad. "Be glad in the Lord and rejoice, ye just, and glory, all ye right of heart."³¹ "Let the just feast and rejoice before the Lord, and be delighted with gladness."³² Christ Himself says: "Ask, and you shall receive, that your joy may be full."³³ And again: "These things I speak in the world, that they may have my joy filled in themselves."³⁴ Even the "Preacher," who so frequently insists on the vanity of earthly things, counsels the "young man" to enjoy life,³⁵ though always, of course, in the fear of God and with due regard to His commandments.³⁶ Thomas à Kempis says: "There is no true liberty nor perfect joy but in the fear

³¹ Ps. XXXI, 11.

³² Ps. LXVII, 4; cfr. Luke X, 20.

³³ John XVI, 24.

³⁴ John XVII, 13.

³⁵ Eccles. XI, 9.

³⁶ Eccles. XII, 13; cfr. Ps. XCVI, 12; Rom. XIV, 17.

of God with a good conscience.”³⁷ The religion of Christ is by no means gloomy.

“Gloom is an alien and an enemy in Christian hearts,” writes Charles Stanton Devas. “If Christianity is the religion of sorrow, it is also, and pre-eminently, the religion of joy; the solution of this antinomy being that Christianity is the religion of love, and that in this world love and sorrow are linked by a mysterious partnership. Now Christian asceticism is no superstitious pain-worship, no offering to some pain-loving deity, some evil principle opposed to the good, as though life and health were not God’s good gifts; nor again has it ought in common, except sometimes the outward show, with the proud self-righteousness of the Hindu ascetic or Moslem dervish. Much rather Christian asceticism is a form of love; and love being the root of joy, it follows that Christian joyfulness is not in spite of asceticism, but its consequence. We are taught as an elementary truth that man is on earth for the one end of perfecting himself in the love of God. This is his purpose and probation. But only through labor, pain and suffering is love perfected. Christianity, then, has no mission to eliminate labor, pain, and suffering from this world (*pati et perpeti humanum est*, wrote Leo XIII), but to transmute them. They can be the means whereby we can obtain the subjection of the lower selfish life and of greedy individualism; the suppression of false self-assertion and of blind nature before the law of reason and of God. Christianity is frankly ‘the religion of suffering, of mortification, of self-sacrifice, of consuming love, of

³⁷ *De Imit. Christi*, I, 21 (ed. Pohl, Vol. II, p. 39): “*Non est vera libertas, nec bona laetitia: nisi in timore Dei cum bona conscientia.*”

—Cfr. Seneca, *Ep.*, XXIII, 3: “*Hoc ante omnia fac, mi Lucili: discere gaudere.*”—*IDEM*, *ibid.*, 4: “*Verum gaudium res severa est.*”

self-forgetting zeal, of self-crucifying union, . . . the religion of the cross and the Crucified.'³⁸ Joyous abandonment, generous self-sacrifice, these are the watch-words, and to become living images of the Divine Model of whom it is written that He pleased not himself."³⁹

"It is not true," says the Ven. Don Bosco, "that men are made sad by serving God. Who was more genial than St. Aloysius, or more joyful than St. Philip Neri or St. Vincent de Paul? And yet these holy men devoted their entire lives to the practice of virtue."

"The Catholic attitude towards modern intellectual life," says Father Joseph Laurentius, S. J., "requires no other weapon for its defence than an unbiased knowledge of Catholic principles. The Syllabus [of Pius IX] does not condemn progress, liberality, or culture as such; it merely rejects that which the enemies of the Christian religion have falsely decked out under these terms. A progress without God, without faith, without religion,—these are essential requisites of all true advance,—is no progress at all, but retrogression. A Liberalism detached from the principles of Christian freedom and justice, based upon State omnipotence and the tenets of an atheistic pseudo-philosophy, is a false Liberalism. A

³⁸ Cfr. St. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag.*, l. III, c. 8, n. 24: "*Hae sunt nebulae [Pelagianorum] de laude creaturae, laude nuptiarum, laude liberi arbitrii, laude sanctorum: quasi quisquam nostrum ista vituperet ac non potius omnia in honorem Creatoris et Salvatoris debitis laudibus prae-dicat. Sed neque creatura ita vult laudari, ut nolit sanari. Et nuptiae, quanto magis laudandae sunt, tanto minus eis imputanda est pudenda carnis concupiscentia, quae non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est* (I Ioa. II, 16): *quam profecto invenerunt in*

hominibus nuptiae, non fecerunt, quia et illa in plurimis sine ipsis est, et ipsae, si nemo peccasset, sine illa esse potuerunt." (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 606).—St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 28, art. 1-4; *Contra Gent.*, l. III, c. 112, n. 6.—J. Mausbach, *Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists Viewed in the Light of Principle and of Contemporaneous History*, (tr. by A. M. Buchanan), New York, 1914, pp. 131 sqq.

³⁹ C. S. Devas, *The Key to the World's Progress*, pp. 121 sq., London, 1906.

culture that excludes the true religion from education and science, and pursues materialistic aims, is a misnomer. Such tendencies are not only unacceptable to the papacy, but must be rejected by every believing Christian, be he Catholic or Protestant. True Liberalism and progress,—the kind that ennobles man, emancipates him from the slavery of passion and sin, and elevates him to the ideal atmosphere of faith, knowledge and virtue, and strengthens and fosters the family, community, State, both in a material and in a spiritual way,—such the Church is ever ready, nay eager, to enlist in her service.”⁴⁰

READINGS.—P. W. von Keppler, *More Joy* (tr. by Jos. McCsorley, C.S.P.), St. Louis 1914.—C. S. Devas, *The Key to the World's Progress*, London 1906.—Jos. Mausbach, *Catholic Moral Teaching and Its Antagonists Viewed in the Light of Principle and of Contemporaneous History* (tr. by A. M. Buchanan), pp. 215 sqq., New York 1914.

⁴⁰ Jos. Laurentius, S.J., in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, Vol. LXXI (1906), pp. 241 sqq., especially 250 sq.;—Cfr. Hettinger-Stepka, *Timothy; or Letters to a Young Theologian*, St. Louis, 1902, pp. 343 sqq.; G. Grupp, *Kulturgeschichte der römischen Kaiser-*

zeit, Vol. II, Munich, 1904, pp. 477 sqq.; Philip Kneib, *Die "Jenseitsmoral" im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen*, Freiburg, 1906, pp. 133 sqq.; the *Syllabus Errorum* of Pius IX, n. 57, with the commentary of F. Heiner, *Der Syllabus*, Mayence, 1905, pp. 267 sqq.

CHAPTER III

THE CARE OF THE BODY

I. THE CARE OF THE BODY IN GENERAL.—If the corporeal life of man is of such great importance for his eternal destiny, it follows that he must take good care of his body.

The desire to live (instinct of self-preservation) and to enjoy perfect health of mind and body is implanted by nature in every human being. “No man ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it,” says St. Paul.¹ Hence it is a natural duty to preserve life and health and to acquire and employ the means by which they may be prolonged and fostered.

Since, however, in consequence of the fall of our first parents, the sensual delight which men take in life and its pleasures easily degenerates into sinful enjoyment, the care of the body must be regulated by the precepts of Christian morality.

“By eating and drinking,” says St. Augustine, addressing God, “we repair the daily ruins of the body until Thou destroy both the food and the belly (I Cor.

¹ Eph. V, 29.

VI, 13). . . . This Thou has taught me, that I should come to take nourishment as I take medicine. But while I am passing from the uneasiness of hunger to the satisfaction of satiety, the snare of concupiscence lieth in wait for me; for the very passage itself is a pleasure, and there is no other way to pass but this, to which necessity obliges me. And thus, whereas health is the cause of eating and drinking, a dangerous delight comes in as an attendant, and for the most part endeavors to go before, that for its sake I should do what I pretend and desire to do only for the sake of health. Nor are both of these content with the same allowance: for what is sufficient for health is too little for delight, and many times it becomes uncertain whether it be the necessary care of the body that requires a further supply, or the voluptuous deceit of concupiscence that calls for this allowance. And the unhappy soul grows glad of this uncertainty, and prepares therein the protection of an excuse, being pleased that it does not appear what is exactly proportioned for the maintenance of health, that under the cloak of health she may indulge her pleasure. These temptations I daily strive to resist, and I invoke Thy right hand to my assistance, and refer my anxieties to Thee, for I have yet to seek for counsel in this matter.”²

² Cfr. St. Augustine, *Confess.*, I. X, c. 31, n. 34-44: “*Reficimus quotidianas ruinas corporis edendo et bibendo, priusquam escas et ventrem destruas* (1 Cor. VI, 13). . . . *Hoc me docuisti, ut quemadmodum medicamenta, sic alimenta sumpturus accedam. Sed dum ad quietem satietatis ex indigentiae molestia transeo, in ipso transitu mihi insidiatur laqueus concupiscentiae. Ipse enim transitus voluptas est, et non est alius, qua*

transeatur, quo transire cogit necessitas. Et quum salus sit causa edendi et bibendi, adiungit se tamquam pedissequa periculosa iucunditas et plerumque praeire conatur, ut eius causa fiat, quod salutis causa me facere vel dico vel volo. Nec idem modus utriusque est, nam quod saluti satis est, delectationi parum est. Et saepe incertum fit, utrum adhuc necessaria corporis cura subsidium petat an voluptaria cupiditatis fallacia ministerium sup-

Whatever God has created is good, and, broadly speaking, there are no material objects which man is *per se* obliged to renounce. St. Paul's assurance, "All things are yours,"³ is addressed to the faithful. Nevertheless the proposition is true only in a general way. The right of the individual to enjoy the good things of nature is limited in various ways.

1. It is limited, above all, by the particular needs of each. These needs are manifold and far exceed the essential requirements of life and health. They are measured by the personal necessities, bodily and spiritual, of each individual, by the degree of culture he has attained, by his position in society, the nature of his vocational duties, the climate, social environment, and many other factors.

2. The right of the individual to enjoy the good things of life is limited further by the social demands of the community in which he lives. Every member of society has a right to enjoy the things God has provided for the race as a whole. To waste or destroy them is against the law of nature, and to do so wantonly, without a just and

petat. Ad hoc incertum hilaescit infelix anima et in eo praeeparat excusationis patrocinium, gaudens non apparere quid satis sit moderationi valetudinis, ut obtentu salutis obumbrat negotium voluptatis. His tentationibus quotidie conor resistere et

invoco dexteram tuam ad salutem meam et ad te refero aestus meos, quia consilium mihi de hac re nondum stat." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 797).

³ 1 Cor. III, 22; cfr. 1 Tim. IV, 3-5.

sufficient cause, would betray a brutal disposition and be a crime against nature. To waste the means of subsistence, on the proper distribution of which the welfare of entire classes depends, involves an injustice against God and men.⁴

3. A third limitation arises from the purpose for which the good things of nature were created. The body must be nourished and fostered, not for its own sake, but that it may efficiently serve as the organ and companion of the soul. "We live not to eat, but we eat to live," says the wise Socrates. Only in so far as the good things of nature serve this higher purpose, is their use permitted. "I say to you, be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat, nor for your body, what you shall put on. Is not the life more than the meat, and the body more than the raiment?"⁵ "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscences."⁶ "Let not then our good be evil spoken of, for the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost."⁷

Good health is a necessary condition for the development of talent. Those who are sickly depend on others,

⁴ Is. LXV, 8; Luke XVI, 19 sqq.; John VI, 13.

⁵ Matt. VI, 25; cfr. Matt. X, 39.

⁶ Rom. XIII, 14.

⁷ Rom. XIV, 16 sqq.—Cfr. St.

Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.*, IV, c. 26 (Migne, *P. G.*, XXXIII, 490);

Juvenal, *Sat.*, X, 356: "*Orandum est, ut sit mens sana in corpore sano; fortem posce animum. . .*"

whereas robust men have courage to dare and do. Therefore suitable provision for the preservation of health is an essential part of character training.⁸

II. VARIOUS MEANS OF CARING FOR THE BODY.—The ordinary means of keeping the body efficient may be grouped together in two classes: those by which health is preserved and fostered, and those by which harmful and disturbing influences are warded off.

I. FOOD AND DRINK.—The chief means of preserving health are *food* and *drink*.

a) Mankind as such has unlimited control of the resources of nature. The Old Testament distinction between clean and unclean foods was purely disciplinary and ceremonial, and is no longer enforced under the New Law.⁹ "I know, and am confident in the Lord Jesus," says St. Paul, "that nothing is unclean of itself."¹⁰ This includes animal as well as vegetable foods, for Christ Himself teaches that not what enters into the mouth, *i. e.*, food and drink as such, but the inordinate use thereof defiles man.¹¹

There is no moral objection to the common practice of making food more palatable by artificial means, because to enjoy one's meals is not to indulge in sensuality or sybaritism. Man is

⁸ W. L. Pyle, *Personal Hygiene*, Philadelphia, 1917.

⁹ Gen. VII, 8; Lev. XI, 8; Matt. XV, 11; Mark VII, 15; Acts X, 15.

¹⁰ Rom. XIV, 14; cfr. Col. II, 16.

¹¹ Cfr. Matt. XV, 17-20; Mark VII, 15-23; Tit. I, 15.

in duty bound to take wholesome food and to be moderate in its use, *i. e.*, to eat neither too little nor too much for his physical well-being.

b) The use of food is limited by the needs of each individual, which differ according to age, climate, constitution, occupation, etc. Every man is allowed to take as much food as he requires to maintain himself mentally and physically efficient, and all are in duty bound to avoid excess because it disturbs the equilibrium of soul and body and makes the former the servant of the latter, whereas it ought to be its master.¹² Following the example of Christ and the Apostles, therefore, we should take our daily nourishment temperately and with gratitude to God, begin each meal with a blessing (*benedictio mensae*) and never forget to give thanks after eating.¹³

To eat or drink to satiety for mere pleasure (*ob solam voluptatem*) is morally illicit, even though it may not result in direct injury to the health.¹⁴ In the long run intemperance invariably revenges itself upon its victims.

On the sin of *drunkenness* in particular see Vol. II of this Handbook, pp. 79 sq. On the duty of self-denial, *infra*, pp. 72 sq.

¹² Cfr. Rom. XIII, 14; XIV, 17; cfr. Eccles. X, 17.

¹³ Matt. XIV, 19; XV, 36; XXVI, 27; Mark XIV, 23; Luke XXII, 17; John VI, 11; Acts

XXVII, 35; Rom. XIV, 6; 1 Cor. X, 31; 1 Tim. IV, 3-5.

¹⁴ *Prop. Damnata. sub Innocentio XI., prop. 8*: "Comedere et bibere usque ad satietatem ob solam volup-

Some believe that men were originally vegetarians and received permission to eat flesh meat only after the Flood. This opinion may be true or false, but we believe it has no basis in Holy Writ.

2. CLOTHING.—Another important means of preserving the health and warding off disease and other harmful influences is *clothing*.

a) Clothes are worn for a fivefold purpose: to protect the body against the inclemencies of the weather or climate, to adorn it, to cover nakedness and preserve modesty, to distinguish the sexes, and to mark differences in office, occupation, or social rank.¹⁵

b) In the choice of his garments the individual is to a considerable extent limited by season, climate, temperature, custom, fashion, and other factors.

Custom should not be disregarded entirely, and even erratic Dame Fashion may be followed to a certain reasonable extent. A person may dress well without being on that account guilty of vanity.¹⁶ For a man to dress like a woman, or *vice versa*, may be sinful or not, according to motives and circumstances. If done as a matter of necessity, or for any other good and sufficient cause, it is permissible; if the intention be

tatem non est peccatum, modo non obsit valetudini; quia licite potest (quis) appetitus naturalis suis actibus frui." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1158).

¹⁵ Gen. III, 7-11, 21; 1 Cor. VII, 34; XII, 23 sq.—Chas. S. Devas, *Political Economy*, pp. 153 sqq.

¹⁶ Cfr. 1 Tim. II, 9; 1 Pet. III, 3.

venially sinful, it is a venial, if grievously sinful, a mortal sin.¹⁷

The Church condemns vanity, wastefulness, carelessness, uncleanness as well as indecency in regard to clothing.¹⁸

For women to employ the arts of the toilet

17 C. 6, D. 30 (Concil. Gangr. a. 355, can. 18): "*Si qua mulier suo proposito utile iudicans, ut virili veste utatur, propter hoc viri habitum imitetur, anathema sit.*" (Decretum Gratiani, ed. Friedberg, Leipsic, 1879, p. 107).—St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 169, art. 2, ad 3; 1a 2ae, qu. 102, art. 6, ad 6.—H. Busembaum, S. J., *Medulla Theol. Mor.*, Tournai, 1876, l. II, tr. 3, c. 2, dub. 5, a. 2: "*Si femina utatur veste virili, vel contra, tantum ex levitate sine prava intentione aut periculo scandali et libidinis, veniale tantum erit, alias mortale, nullum vero, si ex necessitate.*"

18 Cfr. St. Jerome, *Epist.*, LII, n. 9: "*Ornatus ut sordes pari modo fugiendae sunt, quia alterum delicias, alterum gloriam redolet.*" (Migne, P. L., XXII, 535).—St. Augustine, *De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, l. II, c. 12, n. 41: "*Maxime advertendum est, non in solo rerum corporearum nitore atque pompa, sed etiam in ipsis sordibus luctuosis esse posse iactantiam, et eo periculosiorem, quo sub nomine servitutis Dei decipit. Qui ergo immoderato cultu corporis atque vestitus vel ceterarum rerum nitore praeferulget, facile convincitur rebus ipsis pomparum saeculi esse sector, nec quemquam fallit dolosa imagine sanctitatis; qui autem in professione christianitatis inusitato squalore ac sordibus intentos in se*

oculos hominum facit, quum id voluntate facit, non necessitate patitur, ceteris eius operibus potest conici, utrum hoc contemptu superflui cultus an ambitione aliquam faciat." (P. L., XXXIV, 1287).—

On wastefulness in the matter of dress and adornments, which is so conspicuous a fault of western nations, especially since the Industrial Revolution, Charles S. Devas (*Political Economy*, p. 154) says from the standpoint of the economist, that it is a source of "frequent ruin." The following remark of the author deserves reproduction also in a handbook of Moral Theology: "In many modern countries, by the disorganization of family life, notably by the absence of the housewife from home and by the want of training in household work, the proper care or repair of clothes has been neglected (as well as of the house-linen and household utensils): such neglect being no trifle; for since clothing will last twice as long if properly mended and cared for, the neglect of such care will compel a man, if he is to be clad as well as before, to spend on clothing nearly twice as much." The scarcity and high price of clothing consequent upon the Great War have checked this "depraved consumption" of clothing and household utensils, and it is to be hoped that the lesson will not soon be forgotten.

(*cultus muliebris*) out of vanity is not a mortal sin, but to do so in order to tempt men is grievously sinful.¹⁹

It should never be forgotten that the highest purpose for which clothes are worn is the preservation of modesty.* The moralist has no right to inveigh against the vagaries of fashion unless they endanger modesty or health or unless people spend more money on clothes than they can reasonably afford.

In some countries custom prescribes a definite attire for people according to profession, occupation, or social rank. Where such a custom exists, it should be respected. The clergy, in particular, have a prescribed dress (*habitus clericalis*), which is regulated partly by the general laws of the Church and partly by diocesan ordinances, which should be conscientiously observed.²⁰

Clement of Alexandria says that woman with her clothes puts off her modesty,²¹ but this sentiment, though quoted frequently in the writings of the Fathers,²² did not originate with Christian authors; it has been traced to Herodotus.²³

¹⁹ Cfr. Prov. VII, 10; 1 Cor. VII, 34; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 169, art. 2; Ovid, *Remed. Amor.*, 342 sq.

* Cfr. A. Vermeersch, S.J., *De Castitate*, Bruges, 1919, pp. 19 sq.

²⁰ *Conc. Trid.*, Sess. XIV, c. 6, de Ref.; Sess. XXIII, c. 6, de Ref.; *Codex Iuris Can.*, can. 136; Chas. Augustine [Bachofen], O. S. B., *Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law*, Vol. II, pp. 84 sq.; *Irish Eccles. Record*, 5th Series,

Vol. XI (1918), No. 606, pp. 475, sqq.

²¹ Αἱ δὲ ἀποδυσάμεναι ἅμα τῷ χιτῶνι καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ.

²² See, for instance, St. Cyprian, *De Habitu Virg.*, c. 19: "*Verecundia illic omnis exuitur, simul cum amictu vestis honor corporis ac pudor ponitur.*" (*Corpus Script. Eccles. Lat. Vindobon.*, Vol. III, p. 201).

²³ Herodotus, *Hist.*, I, 8.—Cfr. St. Jerome, *Adv. Iovinian.*, l. I, n. 48: "*Scribit Herodotus, quod*

3. HOUSING.—The *dwellings* in which men live have a powerful influence upon them, either for good or evil. Improper housing conditions injure the family and social life in general.

a) A text-book of Moral Theology is not the place to discuss the intimate connection existing between housing conditions on the one hand and the death rate and public morality on the other. The moral degeneration of the poor, especially among industrial workers crowded together in our city slums, is largely owing to lack of decent and comfortable lodgings. The workingman who does not feel at his ease at home is often led to frequent saloons and other even more objectionable places that supply the physical comforts for which he craves.

b) Of late years efforts have been made in practically all civilized countries to provide adequate dwellings for the laboring classes. These efforts deserve to be encouraged, but it would be still more praiseworthy if measures were taken to enable each individual laborer to acquire a home of his own. Leo XIII lays it down as one of the chief conditions of a satisfactory settlement of the labor question that the State induce as many as possible of the humbler class to become property owners.²⁴

"The family that has a home, 'be it ever so humble,' " says a modern American writer, "has an interest in com-

mulier cum veste deponat et verecundiam." (Migne, P. L., XXIII, 279).

²⁴ *The Pope and the People, Se-*

lect Letters and Addresses on Social Questions by Leo XIII, London, 1912, p. 208.

mon, an aspiration for life and good citizenship, which those cannot have who pay some one else to provide a roof under which they may sleep and eat, and who pack up and move to another place on the slightest pretext. . . . Whatever conveniences the best apartment house may afford, it can never possess the spirit and sentiment that are associated with the old cottage in the Green Mountain village or even the little home in West Philadelphia, where every house looks like the next one. Stephen C. Foster's melodies and John Howard Payne's 'Home, Sweet Home' reach every heart where the English language is known. But who could get sentimental about Apartment 10, on the sixth floor of 408 West 130th Street?"²⁵

The ideal is, says Devas, "that each family should be in the secure possession of a house neither unhealthy nor overcrowded, nor overcharged, and that adequate garden ground should surround it to enable the housewife and young children to find, with the plants, the animals, and the domestic industries, occupation and amusement at home."

Every industrious workingman should be enabled to purchase a decent home at a moderate price on easy time payments. In the big industrial centres cheap lodging houses should be provided for working people of both sexes to discourage the lodging of unmarried persons in small homes, which is a prolific source of physical disease and moral corruption. Adequate provisions of this kind are all the more necessary as the steadily increasing migration from country to city makes housing conditions among the city poor more unsatisfactory from year to year. The physical and moral evils arising from urban congestion should be counteracted by adequate legal measures, such as the careful inspection of

25 R. O. Hughes, *Community Civics*, Boston, 1917, pp. 86 sqq.

new buildings, strict enforcement of State and municipal ordinances, etc. Unsanitary and inadequate dwelling houses ought to be promptly condemned and the owners compelled either to make them fit for human habitation or devote them to some other purpose.²⁶

To adorn one's home and furnish it with all the comforts and conveniences within one's means, is morally licit and socially desirable, provided, of course, the important truth is not lost sight of, that man has no lasting habitation here below, but must "seek one that is to come."

Surely if St. Bernard could return and see the luxury with which some people surround themselves, he would repeat his famous dictum: "*Talia decent cives non exules.*"

c) Besides providing suitable dwellings for the poor, the municipal governments should see to it that the streets are cleaned regularly and in a sanitary manner,²⁷ that there is an abundant supply of pure drinking water, and that the air is kept free from contaminating smoke, gas, and other deleterious substances. Refuse should be collected and disposed of regularly and promptly and so as not to endanger the health of the community. Trees, shrubs, and flowers along the

²⁶ Devas, *Political Economy*, p. 147.—On the housing question there exists a vast literature, to which we can give only a few references: Chas. S. Devas, *Political Economy*, pp. 146-152; *New Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, New York, 1908; Sykes, *Public Health and Housing*, London, 1901; G. Haw, *No Room to Live*, London, 1900; Jacob A. Riis, *The Peril and Preservation of the Home*, New York, 1903; James Cornes, *Modern Housing in Town and Country*, London, 1905; Dorothea Proud, *Welfare Work*, New York, 1916; J. E. Hutton, *Welfare and*

Housing, London, 1918; Leslie Toke, *The Housing Problem*, London 1916; Herbert Lucas, S.J., in *The Month*, London 1918, Vol. CXXXII, No. 652, pp. 241 sqq.; J. Robertson, *The Housing Question*, London, 1919; E. E. Wood, *The Housing of the Unskilled Wage-Earner*, N. Y., 1919.

²⁷ On street cleaning see R. O. Hughes, *Community Civics*, pp. 45 sqq. The author justly says: "When we see children playing in some of our streets—the only playgrounds some of them have, poor things!—we wonder not that disease is common among them, but how they keep well at all."

streets and in open places, and ample breathing space in the form of public parks and playgrounds, not only beautify a town or city, but likewise make it more healthful and its inhabitants more contented.²⁸

Railroads, street cars, and other public conveyances demand careful supervision on the part of the authorities, both as regards the sanitary condition of the cars, barns, etc., and the welfare of the employees.²⁹

Industrial hygiene offers another vast field for communal supervision, to which we can refer only in a general way. The health of factory workers should be safeguarded in every possible manner,—the shops and workrooms should be properly aired, lighted, and heated, all dangerous machinery equipped with mechanical guards, the production of health-destroying articles, such as white phosphor matches, prohibited, and so forth.

Among the means that have been suggested, and to some extent applied, for the solution of the housing problem is the so-called *garden city plan*, which aims at organizing industrial communities in the suburbs or country, where, with many of the advantages of the city, healthful and more or less model factories and other forms of business may be conducted, and where the workers can occupy inexpensive but attractive, hygienic and comfortable homes, each with its little garden, and all surrounded, if possible, by a belt of agriculture, so as to combine as

²⁸ Cfr. Hughes, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 sqq., 99 sqq.

²⁹ The trouble with many of our street car companies is that they are handicapped by past crookedness of management. "A very serious and common evil has been the issuing of 'watered' stock—that is, stock that does not represent actual money invested in the business. When a company tries to pay inter-

est on a great deal of watered stock and keep its service up to date in addition, the task is not easy" (Hughes, *l.c.*, pp. 60 sq.), and, we may add, the employees are often made to suffer.—On the moral aspects of "stockwatering" see Thos. Slater, S.J., *Questions of Moral Theology*, New York, 1915, pp. 159 sqq.

many as possible of the advantages of the city with those of the country.³⁰

Other suggested means of housing improvement are the various schemes of *taxation reform*, especially the so-called *Single Tax*, to be levied on the value of land irrespective of improvements, and a heavy tax on all unearned increments on the value of building sites. These two schemes must not be confounded. While the *Single Tax* is unfair and impracticable,³¹ the *unearned increment tax* has many arguments in its favor and is being widely tested at present.³²

30 Bliss, *New Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, pp. 532 sq.; Wm. Webb, *Garden First in Land Development*, London, 1919.

31 See Arthur Preuss, *The Fundamental Fallacy of Socialism*, St. Louis, 1908 (contains an account of the famous McGlynn case); the *New Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, pp. 1114-19; C. B. Fillebrown, *The Principles of Natural Taxation*, Chicago, 1917; Young, *The Single Tax Movement in the United States*, Princeton, 1916; J. A. Ryan, *Distributive Justice*, New York, 1916, pp. 117 sqq.

32 Dr. Michael Cronin thus explains the rationale of the unearned increment tax (*Science of Ethics*, Vol. II, Dublin, 1917, pp. 290 sq.): "It is evident that unearned increments on land are not to be regarded as unlawful in any way. They are increments in value due to increased demand, and they are just as lawful as increases in the value of any other commodities due to increased demand. What is wrong about them is that they are so often excessive. . . . There is a just price which ought not to be exceeded by the seller, and this price, even after increment occurs, always bears some proportion to the

original value of the article. On the other hand, in the case of building sites, the price demanded is often a hundred times greater than the original value, and often no limit in the price demanded is observed except the limits imposed by the necessities of the buyers. This is altogether unreasonable and wrong. Though, therefore, what is spoken of as unearned increment in land is not unlawful, still in dealing with, and imposing taxes on, increments in the values of building sites, government ought to be given a very free hand. For, first, a good deal of money would thus accrue to the community; and, secondly, such a tax, particularly if it is made progressive, would help to prevent the extortions which at present are only too common in cities, extortions which go very far to prevent the erection of useful and necessary buildings of various kinds, and, as common sense will show us, the burden of which has in the long run to be borne for the most part by the poorer classes, in the increased rents they have to pay, increased food prices, and their diminished weekly wage."—An instructive discussion of the unearned increment tax by a Catholic author

4. RECREATION.—Another means of keeping the body healthy and strong is *recreation*.

a) Rest and recreation answer to a natural demand, the gratification of which cannot *per se* be illicit.³³ "*Iucundi acti labores*," says an ancient proverb, which we may render by, "It is pleasant to rest after work." Both body and mind at regular intervals need rest and recreation, which must, of course, be taken in accordance with the laws of reason and revelation. As bodily rest can be lifted into a higher sphere and made supernaturally meritorious by prayer, so, too, mental recreation can be supernaturalized by a good motive, moderation, proper regard for vocation, time, place, charity, modesty, and morality.³⁴

is found in *Distributive Justice*, by the Rev. John A. Ryan, D.D., Professor of Political Science at the Catholic University of America, who is both an economist and a moralist (New York, 1916, pp. 102-117). Dr. Ryan says that "the morality of this proceeding must be determined by the same criterion that is applied to every other method or rule of distribution; namely, social and individual consequences. No principle, title, or practice of ownership," he holds, "nor any canon of taxation, has intrinsic or metaphysical value. All are to be evaluated with reference to human welfare. Since the right of property is not an end in itself, but only a means of human welfare, its just prerogatives and limitations are determined by their conduciveness to the welfare of hu-

man beings. By human welfare is meant not merely the good of society as a whole, but the good of all individuals and classes of individuals. For society is made up of individuals, all of whom are of equal worth and importance, and have equal claims to consideration in the matter of livelihood, material goods, and property. In general, then, any method of distribution, any modification of property rights, any form of taxation is morally lawful which promotes the interests of the whole community, without causing undue inconvenience to any individual."

³³ St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 168, art. 2; Horace, *Carmina*, II, 10, 17; Ovid, *Ex Ponto*, I, 4, 21 sq.

³⁴ Eccles. III, 1, 4; Phil. IV, 4;

A good Christian will gladly sacrifice pleasure and amusement for the sake of higher blessings.

b) Most men obtain the rest and relaxation they require by social intercourse with their fellowmen. The means of *sociability* or *entertainment* are innumerable. Some of them are predominantly material in character, *e. g.*, banquets, games, sports, excursions, dances, balls, gymnastic exercises, etc.; whereas others are mainly spiritual, as, *e. g.*, the enjoyment of beautiful scenery or works of art, travelling, music, shows, etc. All amusements have an ethical bearing. Enjoyed at the proper time and in moderation, they are licit, but they become illicit if sought or indulged in inordinately, especially if they endanger morality, injure health or are sought entirely for their own sake. Inordinate fondness for amusement is contrary to the spirit of Christian mortification and injurious both to the temporal and the eternal welfare of man.

Needless to say, not all kinds of entertainment are suitable for all. Thus ecclesiastical custom and the canon law limit the amusements permitted to clerics so as to safeguard their honor and virtue, for, as the Council of Trent says, "*Omnia non pariter rerum sunt omnibus apta.*"³⁵

St. Ambrose, *De Officiis*, l. I, c. 20, n. 85.

³⁵ Cfr. *Conc. Trident.*, Sess. XXII,

De Ref., c. 1; cfr. St. Propertius, *Elegia*, IV, 9, 7.—Canon 138 of the New Code commands clerics to

Children will play, and it belongs first of all to the parents, local group, neighborhood or parish, and secondarily to the community or State, to see that their playing is directed properly and that facilities are afforded for it. The Church, too, has a mission in this matter. She cannot be

abstain from all things which are unbecoming to their state. It then proceeds to mention in detail what these things are: "They should not engage in unbecoming trades or occupations; they should not take part in games of chance when played for money; they should not carry arms unless there is just cause for fear; they should not indulge in hunting, and in that form of it which is called *clamorosa*, they should never engage; they should not enter public houses and other similar places without necessity or some other just cause approved by the Ordinary of the place." The occupations which are prohibited as unbecoming the clerical state are those which are commonly regarded as mean or sordid or which cannot be engaged in without serious danger of sin. In this connection canonists usually state that clerics are forbidden to be clowns, jesters, or actors in public theaters or in unbecoming plays. These are merely examples. The prohibition in regard to games of chance embraces only such as are entirely dependent on chance, *e.g.*, dicing (cfr. St. Alphonsus, *Theol. Mor.*, III, n. 900). Canonists and theologians are, however, agreed that clerics are not guilty of a grave sin in this matter unless they play very frequently (cfr. Sabetti-Barrett, *Comp. Theol. Mor.*, n. 587 sqq.). As to card-playing, Dr. J. Kinane says in a commentary on can. 138 in the *Irish*

Eccles. Record, Vol. XI, No. 6, p. 478: "Games which are dependent entirely or almost entirely on skill, and those which are dependent partly on skill and partly on chance, do not come within the scope of this prohibition. Most games of cards belong to this latter category, and, consequently, are not directly forbidden. It is hardly necessary to point out, however, that card-playing on the part of clerics may sometimes result indirectly in a serious violation of the natural law itself, if it leads them to neglect their duties, or gives scandal to others, or produces some other evil effect of that kind. Local legislation, too, may sometimes prohibit it directly." The regulation in regard to the carrying of arms must also be interpreted in the light of the old legislation on this matter, which was regarded by canonists as prohibiting only military arms intended for use against man. (Palmieri, *Opus Theol. Mor.*, IV, p. 335: "*Arma scilicet militaria quae publice more laicorum gerantur.*"). Regarding hunting, the quiet form of it (*venatio quieta*) is sinful for clerics only in so far as time is wasted, duties neglected, or scandal given in the indulgence of it. (Cfr. J. Kinane, *l. c.*, p. 479, and Chas. Augustine, O. S. B., *Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law*, Vol. II, pp. 86 sqq., St. Louis, 1918).

content with merely giving instruction, but must aim at the development of character. Character comes through self-expressive activity, and it is mainly in play that the child expresses his personality and his strongest interests. "The task of the teacher in either sphere [mental and moral as well as physical], says a recent American writer, "is that of so controlling and modifying the environment of the child as to call forth those reactions that are likely to form the desired habits of thought and conduct. In this training the reactions that are of greatest value are those that are most genuinely and completely self-expressive and, with children and youth at least, these are most readily discovered in the play life. Here we touch the springs of interest, and we may utilize that interest as a powerful factor in the accomplishment of our purpose. Play furnishes the teacher or parent the most immediate point of contact with child life." ³⁶ These and many other considerations, into which we cannot enter here, show the possibilities of wisely directed play as an influence in Christian training. As the same writer justly says, "the responsibility for providing adequate and proper play for the children and youth of any community is a moral duty that cannot be lightly evaded, and the

³⁶ H. W. Gates, *Recreation and the Church*, Chicago, 1917, p. 11; cfr. H. S. Curtis, *Education through Play*, New York, 1915; Jos. Lee, *Play in Education*, New York, 1915.

Church must take at least an intelligent interest therein.”³⁷

Both body and mind from time to time require recreation, in order that they may not be overtaxed and thereby lose their efficiency. Bodily recreation has a wholesome influence on the mind as well. Practically every mental exertion involves a strain on the body because the mind works through the bodily organs, and therefore recreation eases both body and mind, and produces pleasure, joy, and comfort. No man can exist without some sort of sensible pleasure, and the contention of the Stoics that pleasure is unworthy of human nature must be rejected as radically false. While it is true that recreation or pleasure may become sinful by inordinate indulgence, it is equally true that complete abstinence from all pleasure is apt to make men dull and morose and a burden to one another.

Social intercourse is a postulate of reason and a demand of nature, and if properly regulated, has a high ethical value. In itself social intercourse has its advantages as well as disadvantages, just like solitude, which, if observed according to the rules of ascetic theology, may be termed “the garden of the interior life.”³⁸

³⁷ Gates, *op. cit.*, p. 20.—Mr. Gates shows how certain churches have interested themselves with good results in the matter of providing play facilities for children

and youth. See also Hy. A. Atkinson, *The Church and the People's Play*, Pilgrim Press, 1915.

³⁸ Cfr. Mich. VII, 6; Eccles. IV, 10, 12; Prov. XVIII, 24; XXVII,

An important place among *social pleasures* belongs to those of the *table*. Significantly enough Jesus Christ represents the joys of Heaven under the figure of a banquet.³⁹ In the parable of the prodigal son He expressly mentions the meal which the father prepared in honor of his son's return.⁴⁰ He often accepts invitations to dinner,⁴¹ takes part with His Blessed Mother in the wedding feast of Cana,⁴² and institutes a banquet of love to serve as a memorial of His passion.⁴³ In the *agape* the Church recognized the ethical value of the common meal.⁴⁴ To partake of food in the company of others is therefore a morally good act, which becomes illicit only by abuse. Luxurious feasting leads to sins against temperance and purity.⁴⁵

17; Matt. X, 36; Luke IV, 42; V, 16; IX, 18.—St. Bernard, *Serm. in Cant.*, LXIV, n. 4: "*Quantos ex monasteriis spiritu ferventes eremi solitudo suscepit et aut tepefactos evomuit aut tenuit contra eremi legem, non modo remissos, sed etiam dissolutos? Sicque apparuit vulpeculam adfuisse, ubi tanta facta est vastatio vineae, id est, vitae et conscientiae hominis detrimentum. Cogitabat, si solus degeret, multo se copiosiores fructus spiritus percepturum, quippe qui in communi vita tantum spiritualis gratiae fuisset expertus. Et bona visa est sua cogitatio sibi, sed rei exitus indicavit, magis eandem illi cogitationem vulpem demolientem fuisse.*" (Migne, P. L., CLXXXIII, 1085).—Thomas à Kempis, *Lib. Spirit. Exercitii*, c. 4 (ed. Pohl, II, 336): "*Solitudo devotionis est mater, turba vero*

conturbat. Christus, qui non potuit impediri turba, declinavit a turba. Vita solitaria Deo et angelis grata, pacis semper amica."

³⁹ Matt. VIII, 11; Luke XIV, 15 sqq.

⁴⁰ Luke XV, 23.

⁴¹ Luke VII, 36 sqq.

⁴² John II, 1 sqq.

⁴³ 1 Cor. XI, 23 sqq.

⁴⁴ 1 Cor. XI, 20–34; cfr. F. X. Funk, *Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen*, Vol. III, Paderborn, 1907, pp. 1 sqq.; H. Leclercq in the *Cath. Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, pp. 200 sqq.; Keating, *The Agape and the Eucharist in the Early Church*, London, 1901; P. Batiffol, *Études d'Histoire et de Théologie Positive*, Paris, 1902, pp. 277–311.

⁴⁵ 1 Cor. X, 5–8; cfr. St. Jerome, *Epist.*, LIV (al. X), n. 10:

Games and *plays* may be divided into two classes: those which require skill and talent, and those in which chance plays the leading part. To the former class belong chess, billiards, and ten-pins; to the latter, dice and cards. In themselves both species of games are morally licit, even though played for money; for in many cases it is only by playing for stakes that sufficient interest can be maintained. But when playing degenerates into *gambling*, and is carried on purely for the sake of gain, it involves moral danger.

That gambling may not be illicit, theologians commonly require four conditions, which Father Slater states as follows: (1) What is staked must belong to the gambler and must be at his free disposal; (2) the gambler must act freely without unjust compulsion; (3) there must be no fraud in the transaction, although the usual ruses may be allowed; and, finally (4), there must be some sort of equality between the parties to make the contract equitable. If any of these conditions be wanting, gambling becomes more or less wrong. Besides, there is in all gambling an element of danger which is sufficient to account for the bad name it has acquired. In most people

"Nihil sic inflammat corpora et titillat membra genitalia sicut indigestus cibus ructusque convulsus."
(Migne, P. L., XXII, 555). Thomas

à Kempis, *De Imit. Christi*, l. I, c. 19 (ed. Pohl, II, 34): *"Frenagulam, et omnem carnis inclinationem facilius frenabis."*

gambling arouses keen excitement and quickly develops into a passion which is difficult to control. If indulged to excess it leads to loss of time and usually of money, to an idle and useless life spent in bad company and unwholesome surroundings, and to scandal, which is an occasion of sin and a source of ruin to others.⁴⁶

Dancing holds in social life a place that cannot be ignored. It appeals strongly to the desire to express in rhythmical motion the exuberant spirit and vitality of youth, and gratifies the craving for society and companionship. If indulged for the sake of recreation and social fellowship, it is, in the words of St. Francis de Sales, morally indifferent, *i. e.*, neither good nor bad in itself; but as now commonly practiced, it tends to evil and entails many dangers. The best dances are not above suspicion, and therefore dancing should be indulged but rarely and for a short time. Though the danger involved is often great,⁴⁷ it would nevertheless be wrong to

⁴⁶ *Cath. Encyclopedia*, Vol. VI, p. 375.—Cfr. *Conc. Trid.*, Sess. XXII, de Ref., c. 1; Sess. XXIV, de Ref., c. 12; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 168, art. 1-4; Funk, *op. cit.* (see note 44), Vol. II, pp. 209 sqq.

⁴⁷ Cfr. *Eccles.* IX, 4.—St. Augustine, *In Ps.*, XXXII, s. 1, n. 6: "*Observa diem sabbati, non carnaliter, non iudaicis deliciis, qui otio abutuntur ad nequitiam. Melius enim utique tota die foderent, quam*

tota die saltarent." (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 281).—IDEM, *ibid.*, XCI, n. 2: "*Melius est enim arare [die sabbati], quam saltare.*" (P. L., XXXVII, 1172).—IDEM, *Serm.*, IX, n. 3: "*Non quomodo Iudaei observabant sabbatum carnali otio, vacare enim volunt ad nugas atque luxurias suas. Melius enim faceret Iudaeus in agro suo aliquid utile, quam in theatro seditiosus existeret, et melius feminae eorum die sabbati lanam facerent, quam tota die*

condemn dancing absolutely. This form of amusement may be tolerated under the following conditions:

(a) All sinful intention must be excluded, and the participants must be earnestly resolved to render the danger of sin remote, and have a certainty, based upon experience, that they will be able to avoid sin;

(b) Young people attending a dance or ball should be accompanied by their parents or other reliable chaperons, and avoid being alone with persons of the other sex;

(c) They should dress modestly, and

(d) The dances must not be indecent or objectionable in themselves.⁴⁸

Systematic *bodily exercise* not only benefits health, but also occupies the mind in a useful manner, and hence the various forms of wholesome sport, *e. g.*, walking, riding, swimming, hunting, fencing, boxing, sleighing, skating, etc., are in themselves morally licit and often exert a wholesome influence upon the mind. They become reprehensible only when they exceed the right measure or are made the object of sinful desire or the occasion of sensual excitement, effeminacy, or dissoluteness, or are indulged in to the detri-

in maenianis suis impudice saltarent. (P. L., XXXVIII, 77).—Cfr. IDEM, *Tr. in Ioa.*, III, n. 19 (P. L., XXXV, 1404).

⁴⁸ A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., *Casus Con-*

scientiae, Vol. I, 3rd ed., n. 411-414; C. L. Souvay, C.M., in the *Cath. Encyclopedia*, Vol. IV, pp. 618 sq.

ment of vocational duties or of health. A sportsman who is not satisfied with amusing himself and benefitting his health, but wishes to triumph and be admired at any price, may easily fall into sin.⁴⁹

As regards *football* and other more *arduous athletic sports*, such as hockey, "track events," etc., their liceity must, of course, be gauged in each instance by the general principles of the moral code. In its early development in England football, for one, seems to have been decidedly brutal, if we can trust its characterization by a British writer of that day, Sir Thomas Elyot (1531), to wit, that it was "nothing but beastely fury and extreme violence, whereof proceedeth hurte and consequently rancor and malice to remayne with thym that be wounded, wherefore it is to be put in perpetual silence."⁵⁰ As to the present-day much improved status of this and other athletic sports, their all but universal adoption by reputable Catholic institutions everywhere would seem to relieve the individual devotee of athletics of fruitless scruples. Not so simple a matter, however, is the problem of the relation of athletics to morality as it confronts

⁴⁹ Cfr. H. W. Gates, *Recreation and the Church*, p. 51.

⁵⁰ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th ed., Vol. X, p. 617, s. v. "Football." Fifty years later, another writer, Stubbes, in his *Anatomie of*

Abuses (1583) even claims that "brawling, murther, homicide, and great effusion of blood" are not unusual experiences as a result of the game. (*Encyc. Brit.*, *ibid.*).

the authorities of educational institutions who have to decide upon a policy for all their subjects. A careful reading of the paper on "The Ethical Influence of College Athletics," by the Rev. Charles Macksey, S.J., in the Report of the Catholic Educational Association for 1906⁵¹ and the articles of Dr. James J. Walsh in *America*⁵² will no doubt prove instructive.

The early Christians condemned and avoided the dissolute diversions of their pagan contemporaries and followed the advice of the Apostle, "Rejoice in the Lord always; again I say, rejoice."⁵³ This did not, however, prevent them from indulging in suitable recreations. Clement of Alexandria admonishes his hearers to hunt or fish, to play ball, and to try their hand at boxing, and adds: "To exert one's strength in the right way and for the benefit of one's health, is commendable and manly."⁵⁴ The late Pope Pius X repeatedly admonished the young people of Rome to engage in gymnastic exercises, which, if carried on with moderation, he said, "promote not only the health of the body, but likewise the welfare of the soul."⁵⁵

⁵¹ Columbus, O., pp. 101 sqq.

⁵² "Athletics and Character," *America*, Vol. XIII, No. 8, p. 195; "Athletics and Health," *ibid.*, No. 7, p. 169; "Athletics in our Schools," *ibid.*, No. 6, p. 142; "Athletics and Scholarship," *ibid.*, No. 10, p. 245; "Why Have Competitive Athletics?" *ibid.*, No. 12, p. 293.—Against Walsh, R. E. Shortall, "Competitive

Athletics," *ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 24, p. 586.—On athletics in general, W. Camp, *Athletes All: Training, Organization, and Play*, N. Y., 1919.

⁵³ Phil. IV, 4.

⁵⁴ *Paedag.*, III, 16; cfr. K. Ernesti, *Die Ethik des Klemens von Alexandrien*, pp. 110 sqq.

⁵⁵ Athletics, may be made a means of self-discipline and progress in vir-

Besides the pleasures of the body there are intellectual and aesthetic pleasures which tend to refresh the entire human organism and inspire the mind with noble thoughts and impulses. "If thy heart were right," says Thomas à Kempis, "then every creature would be to thee a mirror of life and a book of holy doctrine. There is no creature so little and contemptible as not to manifest the goodness of God."⁵⁶

The *public library* is not only a great educational factor, but an important element in the recreational life of a community. Some of these institutions not only furnish abundant supplies of juvenile literature, but pay special attention to the wants of children by conducting "story hours" and other recreational features. Catholics should watch these features in order to prevent irreligious or immoral reading matter from getting into the hands of children and see to it that the public library authorities do not ignore Catholic literature or treat its productions in niggardly fashion. Good Catholic books, especially such reference works as the "Catholic Encyclopedia," ought to be placed on the shelves of every public library, and after putting them there, the

tue. "I knew one young man in college who used to pray regularly and earnestly for grace to control his temper when playing football, and who definitely recognized success in this respect as a victory in

his own struggle for Christian living." (H. W. Gates, *Recreation and the Church*, Chicago, 1917, p. 19).

⁵⁶ *De Imit. Christi*, l. II, c. 4 (ed. Pohl, II, 66): "*Si rectum cor*

organizations which have discharged this duty (local K. of C. councils, etc.) should duly advertise the fact and take care that the books are taken out and read. Many a librarian has started in with a will to do justice to Catholic literature, but lost his zeal when he observed that Catholic books gathered dust upon the shelves.⁵⁷

Modern *art*, unfortunately, overemphasizes the sensual element; but the moralist cannot content himself with warning against its extravagances, because, next to religion, art is undoubtedly the most effective means of influencing people for good. "Both religion and art," says Hettinger, "have come forth from God, the highest ideal; and although their field is different, both must necessarily lead back to God if the religion is true and if art has not departed from its ideal. As all else that serves the truth serves God, art also must serve Him in representing beauty; for beauty comes from God and leads back to Him."⁵⁸ Those who extol "art for art's sake" would confine its practice and enjoyment to a select group of intellectuals. This is not the Catholic idea. From the beginning of Christianity, art was employed for the edification

tuum esset, tunc omnis creatura speculum vitae et liber sanctae doctrinae esset. Non est creatura tam parva et vilis, quae Dei bonitatem non repraesentat."

⁵⁷ Cf. *Recreation and the Church*, Chicago, 1917, pp. 46 sqq; "One

Aspect of Our Public Libraries" in "Your Neighbor and You," by the Rev. Edw. F. Garesché, S. J., 2nd ed., New York, 1919, pp. 200-210.

⁵⁸ Hettinger-Stepka, *Timothy*, p. 203, St. Louis, 1902.

of the common people, and the most eminent philosophers, ancient and modern, have declared it to be an important factor in the service of morality. It is, therefore, false to say that art has no object beyond itself. Morality, whilst not the goal of art, should be its standard and load-star. The artist need not preach goodness, but neither should he attack it. His highest endeavor should be to use his talents for the honor of God and the edification of his fellowmen.

Modern aestheticians maintain that the *representation of the nude* is the highest ideal and triumph of art. This contention is opposed to the Christian view. The Church has never regarded the naked body in itself as unchaste, but she has always insisted on the great dangers involved in its representation, and consistently disapproved of the freedom and promiscuity with which nude sculptures and paintings are publicly exhibited.⁵⁹ The real lover of art will derive from its true ideals ever fresh impulses for the battle against pseudo-art. His slogan will be: Away with filth and obscenity, but all honor to the productions of genuine art! Msgr. Hettlinger, while rather austere in his attitude, is no doubt right in saying that the nude statues of

⁵⁹ "*Facile conceditur corpus humanum in se honestum et pulchrum, sed tamen aptum esse, quod in aliis sensum venereum excitet.*" (Noldin, *De Sexto Praecepto*, 11th ed.,

Innsbruck, 1913, p. 62.)—Cfr. D. A. Sertillanges, *Kunst und Moral*, Strasbourg, 1905, pp. 9 sq., 59 sq.; see also J. Jungmann, S. J., *Aesthetik*, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1886.

antiquity belong to the time of the decline of art, and that the decline of morality was its companion. The more carnal man is, the more carnal his art.⁶⁰

A popular way of taking a vacation is to go *traveling*. Pleasure trips taken for recreation or with a view to broadening one's education or gathering knowledge, are morally licit, and have this special advantage that they often cause people to appreciate their home better.

The *theatre* has been a bone of contention from the earliest times. The Church justly condemned the idolatrous and lascivious stage performances common in the first centuries of her history as "*pompa diaboli*." The Quakers and the Jansenists regarded the theatre as immoral because of its essential untruth. It is "a counterfeit of life," they said. Others, on the contrary, extolled the stage as a school of morality and an educational agency of the highest importance fit to supplant church and pulpit. Both views are extreme. The theatre can be no substitute for religion because its primary purpose is entertainment, though secondarily, of course, it may be turned into an educational and civilizing agency. Morality and miracle plays flourished in the Middle Ages. To-day, unfortunately, the stage, in all its forms, has sunk to an intel-

⁶⁰ Hettinger-Stepka, *Timothy*, p. 227; on "the ethics of art" see W. S. Lilly, *Right and Wrong*, 3rd ed., London, 1892, Ch. X.

lectual and moral level not far above that of pagan antiquity, and therefore cannot be approved unreservedly. Innocent plays may be recommended for the sake of lawful pleasure or recreation. But, as Noldin notes, "present-day theatrical representations are of such a nature that they nearly always constitute a more or less proximate occasion of sin, both against purity and against the faith." If the occasion of sin is merely remote, one may witness such plays for a reasonable cause; but if it is proximate, attendance at them is forbidden under pain of mortal sin, except for a very grave cause and with due safeguards. A sufficient cause for attending an objectionable play, according to the same eminent author, would be indignation on the part of a husband or parent in case of refusal to attend, but not a mere command or loss of the money paid for admission, nor (at least ordinarily) the good purpose for which the proceeds of the performance are destined, because to contribute to a good cause one need not attend an immoral performance; besides, the good end cannot justify the illicit means.⁶¹

⁶¹ On the attitude of the primitive Church see St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, *passim*; K. J. Hefele, *Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. I, pp. 28 sqq.; P. Wolf, *Die Stellung der Christen zu den Schauspielen nach Tertullians Schrift De Spectaculis*, Vienna, 1897.—On the later attitude

of Catholic theologians, St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 168, art. 3, ad 3; A. v. Berger, *Ueber Drama und Theater*, 3rd ed., Leipsic, 1900; J. T. Smith, *The Catholic Theatre*, New York, 1917.—On the Catholic origin of the modern theatre, cfr. M. Sepet, *Origines Catholiques*

Needless to add, actors, and *a fortiori* managers, who produce obscene plays or such as notably excite the passions or offend against religion, give scandal and are guilty of grievous sin.

The Catholic Church in the Middle Ages fostered and encouraged the drama. Even Luther favored theatrical entertainments in the schools. But the Calvinists, the Puritans, and other strait-laced Protestant sects condemned the stage, as did the Jansenists. The abuses and dangers connected with the theatre caused many Catholics to adopt the same unreasonable attitude.⁶²

du Théâtre Moderne, Paris, 1901; E. Michael, S.J., *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes im Mittelalter*, Vol. IV, Freiburg, 1906, pp. 400 sqq.; G. Crosse, *The Religious Drama in the "Arts of the Church"* (Anglican) Series, London, 1913; Brother Azarias, *An Essay Contributing to a Philosophy of Literature*, New York, 1890, pp. 108 sqq.—Noldin's teaching in his *Summa Theol. Mor.*, Vol. III, 11th ed., Innsbruck, 1914, pp. 512 sqq.; Cfr. Gury, *Compend. Theol. Mor.*, Lyons and Paris, 1850, Vol. I, n. 233.

⁶² How this attitude has gradually changed can be seen, *e.g.*, from the writings of Father John Talbot Smith. We will also quote a characteristic passage from Herbert Wright Gates's *Recreation and the Church*, Chicago, 1917, pp. 67 sq.: "In almost any of the arguments against the theater, written twenty-five years or so ago, one finds the statement that clean and respectable plays cannot be made profitable, therefore stage managers will not present them. The same argument is occasionally used to-

day as an excuse by managers who prefer to present the unwholesome type. Granted that the argument was true twenty-five years ago; who was to blame? Was it alone the people who patronized the immoral play, or the manager who presented it, or may not some share be justly borne by those who, through indiscriminate condemnation of the theatre as a whole and through their refusal to support the better type of plays, helped to make the statement true? But what is the condition of affairs to-day? By degrees we have come to see that the stage may not be all bad, and Christian people and cultivated men and women are lending their support to its elevation. As a result the person who says that the good play cannot be made financially successful is either indulging in a deliberate falsehood or is ignorant of the facts. The truth is that the plays which meet with the largest and most enduring success are those that have genuine merit, and many of them are of very high educational and moral value." And he con-

The attacks of writers like Juan Mariana and Bossuet were one-sided and extreme. As Father Baumgartner has pointed out, the Catholic courts of Europe in the sixteenth century and later continued to foster the drama, and the Jesuits produced many plays in their schools and colleges. The same eminent writer adds: "In view of the present condition of the stage, theatre-going cannot be generally and unreservedly recommended; yet it would be far more advisable and more fruitful to restore the theatre to its rightful purpose by diligent coöperation, than to take a merely hostile attitude, and by a policy of abstinence to prevent some of the most flagrant abuses of dramatic art, while leaving the theatre itself in the control of our adversaries."⁶³

In connection with the theatre it behooves us to say a few words about its even more widely spread and more thoroughly commercialized step-daughter, the *motion-picture show*. The fact that three-fourths of our school children attend the "*movies*"—at least half of that number as often as once a week—and that statistics from several cities show the average weekly attendance to be equivalent to, or more than, the entire population of the respective city, gives some indication of the magnitude of the problem. Mr. Ellis P. Oberholtzer, the secretary of the Pennsylvania State Board of Censors, estimates that the number of moving picture houses throughout the United States is at least 15,000 and states that most of the films shown in these theatres are highly

cludes with the pertinent question: "What would be the further result if all those who have the culture essential to good taste and the character requisite to courageous action were actively to demand and support the best and resolutely refuse

to tolerate the shady and suggestive performance?" Here is where good people often commit a grievous sin of omission.

⁶³ Alex. Baumgartner, S.J., in the *Staatslexikon*, 2nd ed., Vol. V, pp. 680 sq.

objectionable and becoming more so from year to year. Seventy-five per cent. of all the pictures shown, according to the same competent authority, are devoted to violence and crime and twenty per cent. to vulgar comedy. Accordingly but five per cent. of the films manufactured and put on exhibition are good, yet all of them are being viewed every day by hundreds of thousands of people, including many children.⁶⁴ In view of the evil thus caused many careful and conscientious students of the problem have come to the conclusion that a remedy must be found and that "there is no effective remedy to exclude the evils from the motion picture business except impartial pre-publicity inspection, and this means legal censorship."⁶⁵ The U. S. Supreme Court in the case of the Mutual Film Corporation vs. Industrial Commission of Ohio⁶⁶ has declared that such a censorship is neither unreasonable nor a mere wanton interference with personal liberty. The self-constituted National Board of Censorship (now called National Board of Review) was created by, and is a tool in the hands of, the film manufacturers. A number of cities in the United States now have local censorship of moving pictures, the most notable being Chicago, where the censorship has worked effectively in spite of many difficulties.⁶⁷ State Censorship laws are in operation in Ohio, Kansas, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. In no city or State where the legal censorship of motion pictures has been tried has it been abandoned, and the number of cities and States exercising such control is constantly growing.⁶⁸ Whether

⁶⁴ Cfr. the Catholic *Fortnightly Review*, St. Louis, Mo., Vol. XXV (1918), No. 12, p. 177.

⁶⁵ Edward V. P. Schneiderhahn, *Motion Pictures: Influence, Benefit, Evils, Censorship*, St. Louis, 1917, pp. 1 sq.

⁶⁶ 236 U. S. 230; reproduced by Schneiderhahn, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 sqq.

⁶⁷ Cfr. *Fortnightly Review*, St. Louis, XXV, 14, p. 209.

⁶⁸ Cfr. Schneiderhahn, *Motion Pictures*, p. 40.

legal censorship is the only, or the most effective, means of counteracting the evils incident to the moving picture business is a question we can not undertake to decide. No doubt censorship has its drawbacks and, as even such an ardent advocate of it as Mr. Oberholtzer admits, it does not reach all objectionable films. But it eliminates what is absolutely indecent and directly suggestive of the immoral, and that is pure gain. Next to an official censorship with power to enforce its decrees and proper legal safeguards against abuses of that power, the best protection against the universal "cinema peril" is a strong public opinion ready to resent every infringement of morality or good taste. To this end it is recommended that the clergy and prominent citizens should frequent the "movies" as a matter of duty and give a lead in denouncing whatever may be wrong.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Besides Schneiderhahn's pamphlet, already quoted (see note 65), and the reports and lists of films censored by the National Board of Review, and those of the various State boards, especially that of Pennsylvania, the student of this problem may profitably consult Orrin G. Cocks, "Applying Standards to Motion-Picture Films," in the *Survey*, Vol. XXXII (1914), pp. 337 sqq.; John Collier, "Censorship in Action," *ibid.*, Vol. XXXIV (1915), pp. 423 sqq.; Dorothy Hurlbert, "Moving Pictures," in the *Library Notes and News*, published by the Minnesota Public Library Commission, Vol. IV (Dec., 1914), pp. 132 sqq.; F. R. Willard, "The Motion-Picture and the Child," in *Education*, Vol. XXXV (Feb., 1915), pp. 350 sqq.; "The 'Movie' Problem" in the *Fortnightly Review*, St. Louis, 1919, Vol. XXVI, Nos. 1, 2, 4, 8, 11 sqq.—On "The Cinema Peril" in Great Britain and Ireland

see the paper by John Ryan in *Studies*, Dublin, Vol. VII (1918), pp. 112 sqq. Mr. Ryan *inter alia* adverts (pp. 116 sq.) to the view of that considerable body of men and women (mostly non-Catholics) who hold that films depicting plots that hinge mainly on sins against the Sixth Commandment and upon matters to which decent men would not venture to allude in the presence of ladies, are quite permissible for grown-up people and that it is only necessary to exclude children when they are shown. "This," he says, "is not the Catholic view, nor is it the view of High-Church Anglicans, nor is it the view of the bulk of evangelical Christians that sin can be depicted for the delectation of even grown-up people. Religious-minded folk of all denominations are aware that men and women have but a brief lease of life, and that lease given them for the elevation of their minds and souls. This is

A word about *public dance halls* may not be amiss here. Reports from various American cities (as summarized by Mr. Gates)⁷⁰ show a wide range of conditions. In most places the dance halls are now under a fair degree of supervision, but almost every city has some where moral conditions are bad and certain to work harm. In judging of the moral character of a dance hall the important questions to be asked are these: What is the general character of the place? Is it connected with a bar-room, or is liquor sold on the premises? If not, are pass-out checks given, and are these used for the purpose of visiting nearby bar-rooms, as is usually the case? What is the character of the attendance? Do girls and young women come alone and do they leave alone? Are parents or chaperons present? Is there police supervision, and if so, of what character? Is there evidence of dancing without introduction or acquaintance? Are there any evidences of drinking or intoxication? What is the conduct of the dancers as to boisterousness, close holding, immodest attitudes and actions? What hours are observed?⁷¹

the idea underlying Herrick's beautiful lyric to Daffodils:

Stay, stay
Until the hasting day
Has run
But to the even-song;
And, having prayed together, we
Will go with you along.
We have short time to stay, as you;
We have as short a spring;
As quick a growth to meet decay
As you or any thing.

You cannot touch pitch without being defiled, and if you dally with sin, you will not remain untainted. . . . Life is full of ghastly spectacles, of sad sights and painful

remembrances. Why should the picture house add to them? Every high-minded man strives after higher things, for human life is but a film rushing through the cinematograph of time. It is each man's business to see that this film of his will stand examination by the Censor at the last public enquiry. *Quis ascendet in montem Domini, aut quis stabit in loco sancto eius? Innocens manibus et mundo corde!*" On a recent Catholic attempt at self-help in the matter of the "movie" problem see Anthony Matr  in the *Fortnightly Review*, St. Louis, Mo., Vol. XXVI, No. 13, p. 199.

⁷⁰ *Op. cit.*, see note 53.

⁷¹ A subtle influence that must

Public playgrounds, of adequate size and properly equipped,⁷² are a factor for good, but adequate supervision is necessary if the facilities provided are to serve their full purpose and abuses are to be prevented. "The Church will often find one of its most fruitful fields of service in the task of educating public opinion to the point at which it will duly appreciate the value of recreational work for its children, and not only justify but demand the expenditure of adequate funds for public playgrounds and their proper equipment."⁷³

As the individual and the family require their hours of recreation and pleasure, so the people as a whole demand *community festivals* and *entertainments*. Here, too, nature and reason draw certain lines which must not be overstepped, either with regard to number or kind. Ours is a pleasure-seeking generation, and a goodly number of the amusements offered to the public furnish occasions for sin and crime and thus prove a serious injury to the welfare of the family as well as the nation at large.

A good rule with regard to amusements of all kinds is that laid down by Don Bosco: "When you play or otherwise divert your mind and recreate your body, occasionally raise your soul to

not be overlooked is exercised by long hours of dancing in a close, overheated atmosphere. This means fatigue, and fatigue means weakened powers of self-control. (H.

W. Gates, *Recreation and the Church*, p. 48).

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 52 sqq.; cfr. Arthur Leland, *Playground Technique and Playcraft*, New York, 1909.

⁷³ Gates, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

God and offer up to Him all your joys and pleasures for His greater honor and glory.”⁷⁴

5. RECOVERY OF HEALTH IN SICKNESS.—The duty of caring for the body entails the obligation of restoring it to health in case of *sickness*. This means that a sick man must employ natural medicaments or engage the services of a competent *physician* and obey his orders.⁷⁵ Besides employing these natural means of recovery, the devout Christian will pray to God, confide in His help, suffer patiently, and employ the days of his illness for the improvement of his character and in the practice of the virtues peculiarly indicated by his condition, and, finally, if necessary, ask for the holy Viaticum and Extreme Unction, which are specially instituted for the benefit of the sick.⁷⁶

For the rest, it is well to recall to mind frequently the words of Thomas à Kempis: “Whilst thou art in health, thou canst do much good; but I know not what thou wilt be able to do when ailing. There are few who mend their ways in sickness, just as those who go much on pilgrimage seldom become holy.”⁷⁷

⁷⁴ See *Salesianische Nachrichten*, Trent, 1906, p. 241.

⁷⁵ Is. XXXVIII, 9 sqq.; Ecclus. XVIII, 20 sq.; XXXVIII, 1 sqq.; 2 Chr. XVI, 12; on the teaching of the Fathers on this point see A. Harnack in *Texte und Untersuchungen*, Vol. VIII, 56, Leipsic, 1892.

⁷⁶ Jas. V, 14-15; Luke XVII, 15-

18; John V, 14; cfr. Pohle-Preuss, *The Sacraments*, Vol. IV, 2nd ed., St. Louis, 1918, pp. 1-51.

⁷⁷ *De Imit. Christi*, l. I, c. 23 (ed. Pohl, II, 46): “*Multa bona potes operari, dum sanus es: sed infirmatus nescio quid poteris. Pauci ex infirmitate meliorantur: sic et qui multum peregrinantur, raro sanctificantur.*”

6. MAN'S RELATION TO BEASTS.—This is an appropriate place to add a few words regarding man's relation to brute beasts.

a) The irrational brute, so far as man is concerned, does not differ essentially from other created objects, for, like them, it does not carry its purpose within itself, but is ordained for the benefit of man, who is "the crown of the visible creation." The brutes have been given to man by God as a means which he may employ according to his good pleasure, though never in opposition to the precepts of the moral law of nature, as re-inforced by Sacred Scripture.

God gave man "dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts of the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth,"⁷⁸ permitting him to use them all as "meat for himself."⁷⁹ But He also instructed man to treat the dumb beasts with consideration. "The seventh day thou shalt cease [to work], that thy ox and thy ass may rest."⁸⁰ And He expressly forbade cruelty to animals. "Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of his dam."⁸¹ "Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out thy corn on the floor."⁸² The Lord Himself "giveth to beasts their food,"⁸³ and "provideth food for the raven when her young ones cry to Him and wander about because they have no meat."⁸⁴ In His mercy, when sparing Ninive, He thinks also of the innocent beasts.⁸⁵ Jesus Christ illustrates the loving care which the Heavenly Father takes of man by pointing out how He provides for the birds of the air, "for they neither sow,

⁷⁸ Gen. I, 26 sqq.

⁷⁹ Gen. IX, 3.

⁸⁰ Ex. XXXIII, 12, 19.

⁸¹ Ex. XXXIV, 26; Lev. XXII,

27 sq.; Deut. XIV, 21.

⁸² Deut. XXV, 4; 1 Cor. IX, 9.

⁸³ Ps. CXLVI, 9.

⁸⁴ Job XXXVIII, 41.

⁸⁵ Jon. IV, 11.

nor do they reap, nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feedeth them." ⁸⁶ "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing?" He says, "and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father." ⁸⁷ And again He asks: "What man shall there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if the same shall fall into a pit on the sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up?" ⁸⁸

b) Under the natural as well as the positive divine law, man in his relation to the brute beasts has first of all the duty of treating them mercifully and in accordance with the dictates of reason. From the fact that these creatures, though lacking intellect and consciousness, have sensual perception and feeling, arises the further duty to treat them with sympathy and not to hurt them more than necessary.

It is no sin for man to kill dumb animals. For, as St. Thomas shows, "by the natural order of divine providence they are referred to the use of man, and hence man may employ them without injustice, either by killing them or in any other way. God said to Noë: 'As green herbs have I given you all flesh' (Gen. IX, 3). Wherever in Holy Scripture there are found warnings against cruelty to dumb animals, as in the prohibition of killing the mother-bird with its young (Deut. XXII, 6, 7), the object is either to turn man's

⁸⁶ Matt. VI, 26.

⁸⁷ Matt. X, 29.

⁸⁸ Matt. XII, 11; cfr. Luke XIII, 15; XIV, 5.

mind away from practicing cruelty on his fellow-men, lest from practicing cruelties on dumb animals he should proceed to do the like to them, or because harm done to animals turns to the temporal loss of man, whether the author of the harm or some one else; or for some ulterior meaning, as the Apostle expounds the precept of not muzzling the treading ox."⁸⁹

Hence it is cruel and immoral to kill, vex, or in any wise torment dumb animals without a reasonable cause, or more than is necessary for the attainment of a legitimate purpose. *Cruelty to animals* is a sin against God and man, especially if indulged in habitually, for the reasons mentioned in the above-quoted passage from St. Thomas. As a rule one who has no heart for dumb animals will not pity his fellowmen, as the annals of crime abundantly testify.

On the other hand, sentimentalism (*indigna affectatio*) with regard to brutes, *e. g.*, surrounding dogs, cats, birds, etc., with luxuries and treating them with the affection due only to human beings, is opposed to Christian ethics and positively pagan whenever it savors of zoolatry (brute worship).⁹⁰

⁸⁹ St. Thomas, *Contra Gent.*, I. III, c. 112. (The Pauline passage referred to is 1 Cor. IX, 9). Cfr. E. Wasmann, S.J., *Instinct and Intelligence in the Animal Kingdom*, St. Louis, 1903; M. de Rambures,

L'Eglise et la Pitié envers les Animaux, 2nd ed., Paris, 1903.

⁹⁰ Cfr. *Pastor Bonus*, Treves, 1895, pp. 199 sqq.; 1897, pp. 82 sqq.

The various *societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals* have a laudable purpose, but unfortunately too much of their literature and work is permeated by the false notion that the brute beast is substantially the equal of man. To say, as some of the advocates of this movement do, that "every living being has a right to exist and be happy," is not in conformity with Catholic theology. Strictly speaking, only rational beings endowed with personality have rights. Man's duty to avoid unnecessary cruelty to animals is not based on any right of the latter, but on the will of God forbidding us to torture his irrational creatures, on the property rights of our fellowmen, which we must respect, and on our own rational nature, which commands us to abstain from anger, cruelty, and similar vices.⁹¹

The last-mentioned consideration is of special importance, because, as we have said before, a man who mistreats dumb animals will, as a rule, also abuse his fellowmen. The brutality of many a ruffian may be traced to acts of cruelty to dumb animals practiced in youth.

Bull-fights are a favorite diversion of Spaniards and Latin Americans. The Church authorities formerly condemned these exhibitions,⁹² but the prohibition is no longer in force.

⁹¹ See C. Gutberlet, *Der Kosmos*, Paderborn, 1908, p. 521.

⁹² See esp. the Const. of Pius V, "*De Salute*," Nov. 1, 1567.

The modern bull-fight, as described by Father Ramon Ruiz Amado, S.J., in the "Catholic Encyclopedia,"⁹³ as a rule does not involve the shedding of human blood, and is no more, in fact is less brutal than our prize-fights.⁹⁴ In consequence most present-day moralists, following the famous "Doctor Navarrus," Martin de Azpilcueta, who stood alone in his day,⁹⁵ now hold that bull-fights, as held in Spain, are not forbidden by the natural law.⁹⁶ But clergymen and religious may not attend them.⁹⁷

c) Dumb animals were created for the service of man and hence he may kill them for food, deprive them of their liberty for the sake of profit or pleasure, tame or train them, and inflict

⁹³ Vol. III, p. 52.

⁹⁴ An influential American newspaper said a few years ago, apropos of some criticisms of the bull-fights held in Madrid in honor of King Alfonso's coronation, a month or two before the Fitzsimmons-Jeffries prize-fight at San Francisco, Cal.: "The killing of bulls by trained toreadors is not the pleasantest spectacle in the world, although it calls for courage, dexterity and endurance, and has, besides, the mercy of the *coup de grace*, but it is certainly more decent than a fight to the finish between two bruisers, to see which a boxing club in any city of the United States can pack the biggest hall in the place with men who have paid \$10 for a seat at the brutal show. Let us not be hypocrites. Hypocrisy is worse than brutality. And when it

comes to a test of brutality, with our burning of negroes, our lynchings, and our prize-fights, we Americans need not throw any stones."

⁹⁵ On Azpilcueta see Vol. I, p. 62, of this Manual. The reference is to his *Enchiridion sive Manuale Confessariorum et Paenitentium*, Würzburg, 1586, ch. XV, pp. 334 sqq.—Cfr. *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, 1903, No. 7, pp. 244 sqq., "*Urteile über Stiergefechte*."

⁹⁶ Cfr. Gury-Ferreres, *Compendium Theol. Mor.*, Barcelona, 1906, Vol. II, n. 56.

⁹⁷ Cfr. Ferreres, *Comp. Theol. Mor.*, 9th ed., 1919, Vol. II, n. 110; Plenary Council of Spanish America, n. 650. On the whole subject see P. Amado's excellent article in the *Cath. Encyclopedia*, Vol. III, pp. 51 sq.

pain upon them for the purposes of scientific experimentation.⁹⁸ There can be no reasonable doubt that *vivisection*, *i. e.*, the dissection of living animals for the observation of, and experimentation on, normal or morbid physiological processes, is morally licit if it serves a good purpose, inflicts no more pain than absolutely necessary, and is confined to proper limits, preferably within medical or hygienic institutes. "By the natural order of divine providence," says St. Thomas, "the dumb animals are destined for the use of man, and hence man without injustice uses them, either by killing them or in any other way."⁹⁹ Experts are all but unanimous in holding that vivisection is very useful, nay under certain conditions, absolutely necessary for the progress of science. True, in using brutes for his own benefit, man cannot avoid hurting them, but neither does nature spare them the pains of hunger and cold or preserve all of them from a cruel death.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Cfr. Gen. IX, 3; Deut. IV, 19; Ps. VIII, 8; 1 Cor. III, 22; Jas. III, 7.—St. Jerome, *Adv. Iovinian.*, l. II, c. 5-6 (Migne, P. L., XXIII, 290).

⁹⁹ *Contra Gent.*, l. III, c. 112, n. 7: "*Per hoc excluditur error ponentium, homini esse peccatum, si animalia bruta occidat; ex divina enim providentia naturali ordine in usum hominis ordinantur, unde absque iniuria homo eis utitur occidendo vel quolibet alio modo.*"

¹⁰⁰ The literature on vivisection has grown to vast proportions. A brief and instructive treatise is that by Dr. L. Senfelder, "Vivisection (Moral Aspects of)," in the *Cath. Encyclopedia*, Vol. XV, pp. 494-496. —See also, against vivisection, Tait, *The Uselessness of Vivisection upon Animals as a Method of Scientific Research* (1883); for vivisection, Heidenhain, *Die Vivisektion* (1884), an exhaustive and valuable treatise.

Many believe that *parrots* learn to "talk" more easily if their tongues are loosened. This is a cruel mistake against which these birds ought to be protected.

All *birds* with but few exceptions deserve to be protected by law, first because they are useful and secondly because they beautify and enliven nature.¹⁰¹

Where agriculture, fishing or hunting is endangered by the multiplication of noxious birds or mammals, man has a right to kill them, but he should not completely exterminate any species, because to do so would be to contravene the laws of nature and to violate the demands of humanity. In the economy of nature *beasts of prey* have a well-defined purpose, *viz.*: to destroy other animals which are sick or weakly and therefore unsuited for the propagation of their kind.¹⁰²

7. LUXURY.—We must not leave this part of our subject without briefly considering the cognate topic of *luxury*.

"Luxury," says Professor de Laveleye in his classic work,¹⁰³ "consists in the consumption of what has cost great labor to produce, for the satisfaction of spurious needs." After so defining luxury, he condemns it unreservedly, saying: "Luxury is pernicious to the individual and fatal to society. Primitive Christianity reproved it in the name of charity and humility; political economy condemns it in the name of utility, and justice condemns it in the name of equity."

101 Cfr. M. Hiesemann, *Lösung der Vogelschutzfrage*, Leipzig, 1907.

102 Cfr. *Natur und Offenbarung*, 1910, pp. 5 sqq.

103 Emile de Laveleye, *Le Luxe*, Verviers, 1887.

This view has been re-echoed by not a few modern writers, but it is extreme and cannot be adopted by the Catholic moralist without some decided reservations.

a) To acquire and use the good things of nature over and above one's necessary requirements is not in itself sinful. On the contrary, as civilization advances, man produces more and is entitled to use more than in the primitive stages of society. That political economy condemns all luxury in the name of utility is not true. Luxury may be distinctly advantageous to society because lavish expenditures on the part of the rich usually benefit the poor, by furnishing employment, developing arts and sciences, and elevating the educational status of the nation. From the standpoint of the moralist, also, not every luxury must be regarded as extravagance, because ethical considerations may refine and ennoble a pleasure which would otherwise be purely physical. Every man has a right to enjoy the comforts and luxuries proper to his state of life, provided he can reasonably afford them. On the other hand there is such a thing as indulging in luxuries beyond one's means, or in a manner unbecoming to one's station in life, or beyond the bounds of reasonableness, or for the mere love of pleasure, or to shine and excite envy in others. To indulge in luxury in this sense

is immoral and contrary to social justice and progress, for it deprives society of good things without sense or reason, gives a bad example to others, provokes concupiscence and discontent, excites envy and hatred in the hearts of the poor, and, finally, is often a means of, or an occasion for, sins of vanity, impurity, and dishonesty.

b) Hence we must distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable luxury (extravagance). To live according to one's station in life and one's means is not reproved by the Gospel, which, though it extols voluntary poverty, does not impose it as a duty on all, but merely counsels it to those who feel called to relinquish earthly pleasures and comforts for the sake of the higher treasures of the spiritual life. On the other hand it is immoral to be extravagant, *i. e.*, to use the good things of life without stint or measure, without benefitting any one, nay with detriment to the important and necessary duties of one's state, or in the service of sensuality and for the emancipation of the flesh.¹⁰⁴ Such immoral extravagance is only too

¹⁰⁴ W. D. P. Bliss and R. M. Binder, *The New Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, New York, 1908, pp. 736 sq.—As practical tests of extravagance, Msgr. H. Parkinson proposes these two questions: (1) Whether the expenditure is out of proportion to income; (2) whether it is out of keeping with the person's condition in life, or with his

office, or the circumstances of time, place, or custom. If so, we have extravagance. Thus a simple luxury for one may be an extravagance for another, and a simple luxury at one time may assume the character of an extravagance at another. (*A Primer of Social Science*, American edition, by T. J. Shealy, S.J., New York 1913, p. 198).

common among the wealthy now-a-days and often assumes the proportions of a grievous sin that cries to Heaven for vengeance. There is no denying the fact that even the poorer classes not infrequently live beyond their means.¹⁰⁵ The desire to shine and impress others is not only silly in itself, but a source of economic hardship and unhappiness. How many families of the middle class sacrifice health and comfort in order to be able to look down upon their neighbors from the cushions of an expensive limousine! How many stint themselves to "keep up appearances"! Such conduct is worse than foolish, it is wrong and anti-social.¹⁰⁶

Opposed to decent comfort and a reasonable measure of luxury corresponding to one's state of life and means are, on the one hand, parsimony, *i.e.*, undue sparingness in the expenditure of money, and, on the other, ostentatiousness and pomp.

Frugality or *thrift* is called by Sam Smiles the daughter of wisdom, the sister of temperance, and the mother of liberty. An ancient proverb says that "thrift is in itself a good income," and another, that it is "the philosopher's stone." Roscher, the famous German economist, makes bold to assert that "he who has begun to save is no longer a proletarian."

¹⁰⁵ Cfr. Prov. XIII, 7; Seneca, *Ep.*, XCIV, 27: "*Illa Catonis: Emas, non quod opus est, sed quod necesse est. Quod non opus est, asse carum est.*"—Poor Richard somewhere says that if a man constantly buys what he does not need, he will soon

have to sell that which he needs.

¹⁰⁶ Cfr. 1 Tim. II, 9; Tit. II, 3; 1 Pet. III, 3 sqq.—On the economic aspects of extravagance see Parkin-son, *A Primer of Social Science*, pp. 199 sq.

The Catholic Church is not opposed to luxury in the sense of reasonable comfort. On the contrary, cleanliness, nourishing food, comfortable dwellings, neat clothes, are necessities which she demands for the poor as well as the rich, and nations that live in conformity with the moral law will always find ample means to satisfy these needs. What the Church reprobates and combats is that extravagance which withdraws many of the good things of life from those who need them, to satisfy the "spurious needs of the idle rich."¹⁰⁷ As long as there is inequality of possessions, the Church will continue to insist on the difference between various states of life and recommend to the poor a wise economy in the gratification of demands that are not strictly necessary.¹⁰⁸

III. VIRTUES TO BE PRACTICED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CARE OF THE BODY.—The virtues that should be practiced in connection with the care of the body are mainly three, *viz.*: cleanliness, modesty, and temperance.

I. *Cleanliness* is not merely a natural and necessary function and a conventional custom; it is likewise a moral duty, the performance of which, in accord with reason and the moral law, may become a virtue. A clean body, clean clothing, and a clean domicile are fundamental requisites of good health and constitute, as it were, the lowest rungs on the ladder of civilization. Bod-

¹⁰⁷ See Laveleye's definition of luxury, *supra*, p. 64.

¹⁰⁸ C. S. Devas, *Political Econo-*

my, pp. 133 sqq.; P. Norrenberg, *Frauenarbeit und Arbeiterinnenerziehung*, Cologne, 1880, pp. 68 sq.

ily cleanliness should be the reflex and symbol of interior or spiritual purity. Its conscious disregard is a moral defect, first, because it denotes carelessness and neglect, and second because it sets aside due regard for the necessities of social intercourse.

Cleanliness has been practiced more or less at all times. Even the "dark" Middle Ages had their public bathing houses and it was regarded as a work of mercy to erect free baths for the poor. If cultivated to excess, cleanliness may degenerate into effeminacy. It was a reaction against the immorality connected with frequent washings of the body that led to the disregard for cleanliness shown by some medieval ascetics, even saints, whose conduct must consequently not be condemned as a reversion to barbarism. Abstention from the ordinary means of cleansing the body was with them not an end in itself, but merely a means to an end, namely, to purge man from his sinful inclinations.¹⁰⁹ It was in this sense that Pope Nicholas I declared that bathing is never allowed as a means of sensual indulgence, but as a bodily necessity may be practiced at any time.¹¹⁰

2. *Modesty* is a decent reserve or propriety of manner and regard for the rules of taste and good breeding. It differs according to person, time, place, and social environment, and is not necessarily identical with moral goodness.

¹⁰⁹ Linsenmann, *Lehrbuch der Moralthologie*, p. 276.

¹¹⁰ *Responsa ad Consulta Bulgarorum*, n. 6: "Non negamus hanc vi-

delicet discretionem servantes, ut si quidem pro luxu animi atque voluptate quis lavari appetat, hoc fieri nec reliquo quolibet die concedamus, si

As a Christian virtue modesty consists in the habitual avoidance of whatever is apt to arouse the sexual passion, either in oneself or in others. There is a natural chastity, or unconscious innocence, which, in connection with inborn modesty, constitutes a powerful vehicle for the most beautiful of all virtues, *i. e.*, physical and interior purity.

Needless to add, the duty of modesty, *e. g.*, in regard to participation in social amusements, theatrical performances, etc., does not bind all men in the same way, but differs according to state and profession.

Politeness is not strictly a virtue, though the lack of it often indicates a moral defect. As a rule the more polite a man is, the more truly amiable will he be. He who lacks tact and politeness is offensive to persons of good breeding and delicate taste.¹¹¹ However, being but a natural instinct or a by-product of careful training, politeness to be supernaturally meritorious, must be hallowed in the spirit of the Gospel and accompanied by humility, obedience, and charity. It goes without saying that a truly noble character will not stoop to untruth or affectation.¹¹²

Our books of *etiquette* contain many useful rules and

autem pro necessitate corporis, hoc nec quarta nec sexta feria prohibemus." (Mansi, *Conc. Coll.*, XV, 405).

¹¹¹ Cfr. W. Wundt, *Ethik*, Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 188 sqq.

¹¹² Cf. Seneca, *De Ira*, l. II, c. 28: "*Aut dulcedine urbanitatis pro-*

cautions; but true politeness is spontaneous. "There is a politeness of the heart," says Goethe, "which is akin to charity and inspires good conduct."

Newman's definition of a *gentleman* may be quoted here: "It is almost a definition of a gentleman to say that he is one who never inflicts pain. . . . He is mainly occupied in merely removing the obstacles which hinder the free and unembarrassed action of those about him; and he concurs with their movements rather than takes the initiative himself. . . . The true gentleman in like manner carefully avoids whatever may cause a jar or jolt in the minds of those with whom he is cast. . . . He is tender towards the bashful, gentle towards the distant, and merciful towards the absurd; he can recollect to whom he is speaking; he guards against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may irritate; he is seldom prominent in conversation, and never wearisome. He makes light of favors while he does them, and seems to be receiving when he is conferring," etc.¹¹³ In connection with this oft-quoted passage Father Arthur Barry O'Neill, C.S.C., points out a fact that is frequently overlooked,—namely, that Cardinal Newman never intended his portrait of a gentleman to be that of a *Christian* gentleman. The Christian gentleman, says Father O'Neill, is of a different and far more perfect type. His essential qualities are interior—they spring from faith and love of God. The exterior qualities which Newman enumerates are transient, unless they are permeated with the charity of Christ.¹¹⁴

lapsus est aut fecit aliquid, non ut nobis obesset, sed quia consequi ipse non poterat, nisi nos repulisset. Saepe adulatio, dum blanditur, offendit."

¹¹³ *Idea of a University*, London ed. of 1893, pp. 208 sqq.

¹¹⁴ *Clerical Colloquies*, New York, 1917; cfr. the *Catholic Fortnightly Review*, St. Louis, Mo., Vol. XXIV, No. 6, pp. 83 sq.

3. *Temperance* may be defined as rational self-control, especially in the use of food and drink. The brute beast blindly follows instinct in satisfying its desire for nourishment, but man is able to control and regulate his appetite according to the dictates of reason and law. The preservation of life and health, not sensual pleasure, is the motive which should govern a Christian in the use of food and drink. Guided by this motive, he will choose the food best adapted for that purpose and never notably exceed the quantity necessary for its attainment. Temperance or wise moderation in the use of material things, especially food and drink, keeps the body in good health, strengthens the mind and will, and protects man from the evil effects, moral as well as social, of overindulgence. An important rule with regard to the virtue of temperance is: "Deny yourself something licit now and then, in order that you may be able to abstain from the things which are forbidden."¹¹⁵

"Temperance is not inborn, but must be acquired by practice," says Father Cathrein, "whence it follows that every man is in duty bound to practice self-denial now and then, so that the senses may get accustomed to the control of reason. If you allow a horse free rein at all times, you will have no control over him in the hour of peril. Sensuality in this respect resembles a horse. He who has never learned to deny his flesh the pleasures for which it craves, will sooner or later succumb to its whims. Self-denial—at least to a certain extent—is not a specifically Christian virtue, but a postulate of pure

¹¹⁵ Cfr. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, l. V, c. 11: "*Saepe ii, qui in potestate sunt, dum sese a licitis retinere nesciunt, ad illicita opera*

et inquieta dilabuntur. Solus enim in illicitis non cadit, qui se aliquando et a licitis caute restringit." (Migne, P. L., LXXV, 688).

reason. 'Sustine et abstine' was a maxim of the ancient pagan philosophers."¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Victor Cathrein, S.J., *Moral-philosophie*, Vol. II, 4th ed., p. 54.
—Cfr. *Epicteti Fragmenta*, n. 179:
"Itaque, inquit [Epictetus], si quis
haec duo verba cordi habeat eaque

sibi imperanda atque observanda
curet, is erit pleraque impeccabilis
vitamque vivet tranquillissimus.
Verba duo haec dicebat ἀρέχου καὶ
ἀπέχου."

CHAPTER IV

NEGATIVE DUTIES IN REGARD TO LIFE AND HEALTH

The life of the body is indeed a precious thing, but it is by no means the greatest of blessings,¹ and consequently the duty of preserving and safeguarding it does not bind absolutely. There are circumstances in which it may be necessary or advisable to sacrifice one's life. This is the case, for instance, when the duty of conserving life cannot be reconciled with some higher obligation, or when superior spiritual blessings must be purchased at the expense of life, either by the individual, or by the multitude. Hence man has the right, nay, under certain conditions he is in duty bound, to give up his life for the sake of a higher good.

This duty must now be more closely determined, both negatively and positively.

No man is allowed without a just cause (*sine iusta causa*) to destroy his own life or health, or to expose himself to the danger of certain death, or seriously to mutilate his body.

I. SUICIDE (*suicidium*, ἀντοχειρία)² is the direct

¹ Cfr. Matt. X, 28, 39; XVI, 25 sq.; Mark VIII, 35-37; Luke IX, 24; XVII, 33; John XII, 25.

² St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 64, art. 5; Sporer-Bierbaum, *Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, 2nd ed., tr. 5,

and intentional compassing of one's own death. This need not always be the immediate object of the will. If I will an action, I will its evident effect; and therefore, were I to refuse food, or, out of bravado, to leap from the top of a sky-scraper into the street below, I should be guilty of suicide, even though self-destruction was not my direct object. In suicide a man somehow *aims* at direct death.

Suicide is plainly forbidden by the fifth commandment: "Thou shalt not kill,"³ "either another or yourself," as St. Augustine explains; "for he who kills himself kills none other than a man."⁴ The Lord God alone "has power of life and death."⁵

Suicide is also forbidden indirectly because of the immoral motives that usually inspire it, *e. g.*, unbelief, cowardice, false notions of honor, an excessive craving for glory, wealth, etc., or that dullness of mind which results from overindulgence in carnal pleasures and usually ends by making its victim incapable of further enjoy-

n. 366-407; St. Alphonsus, *Theol. Mor.*, l. III, n. 366-374 (ed. Gaudé, Vol. I, pp. 622 sqq.); M. Inhofer, *Der Selbstmord*, Augsburg 1886; E. Federici, *La Prevenzione del Suicidio*, Venice 1901, pp. 37 sqq.; K. A. Geiger, *Der Selbstmord im klassischen Altertum*, Augsburg 1888; M. Cronin, *The Science of Ethics*, Vol. II, Dublin, 1917, pp. 52 sqq.; A. Van der Heeren in the *Cath. En-*

cyclopedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 326 sqq.; A. O'Malley, *The Ethics of Medical Homicide and Mutilation*, N. Y., 1919, pp. 7 sqq.

³ Ex. XX, 13; cfr. Deut. XXXII, 39.

⁴ *De Civitate Dei*, l. I, c. 20: "Restat, ut de homine intellegamus, quod dictum est: 'Non occides,' nec alterum ergo, nec te. Neque enim, qui se occidit, aliud quam hominem occidit." (Migne, P. L., XLI, 35).

⁵ Wisd. XVI, 13.

ment.⁶ Seneca enumerates several *causae frivolae* that lead to suicide and mentions circumstances in which it is morally illicit to seek refuge in death.⁷

a) Suicide is diametrically opposed to the strongest instinct of nature, that of self-preservation. "The tendency to persevere in life," says Goyau, "is the necessary law of life, not of human life only, but of all life."⁸ Hence it must always remain a difficult psychological problem why so many people commit this unnatural crime. In the light of recent investigations there can hardly be a doubt that most of those who compass their own death do so in a state of mental de-

⁶ A. Van der Heeren in the *Cath. Encyclopedia*, Vol. XIV, p. 328; H. Rost, *Der Selbstmord als sozial-statistische Erscheinung*, Cologne 1905, pp. 23 sqq.; H. A. Krose, S.J., *Der Selbstmord im 19ten Jahrhundert*, Freiburg, 1906, pp. 28 sqq.; IDEM, *Die Ursachen der Selbstmord-häufigkeit*, Freiburg 1906.

⁷ Cfr. M. Baumgartner, *L. A. Seneca und das Christentum*, pp. 135 sqq.

⁸ M. Cronin, *The Science of Ethics*, Vol. II, p. 53 sq.; Vol. I, p. 90. The objection that it is incorrect to say that in committing suicide a person desires to compass his own destruction, because the soul does not disappear at death, while the body will rise again, and that, therefore, what is desired and accomplished in suicide is not annihilation, but a new life, more perfect than the present, and consequently suicide is not a violation

of our natural appetite for continued existence and well-being, is refuted by Dr. Cronin as follows: "Natural tendencies are all tendencies to the well-being of the *natural* agent, the agent regarded as a product of nature. Nature could not set up in any thing a tendency towards a condition which is either unnatural or which is even above nature. But the natural constitution of man, from which spring all our natural powers and appetites, is that of a composite of body and soul combined to form one person. And, therefore, our natural desire for happiness is a desire for the happiness and well-being of the *natural* person, consisting of body and soul. In suicide, therefore, we use our natural powers for an end which is the frustration of their own natural purpose." (*Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 55).

rangement. "Most suicides," says Dr. James J. Walsh, "are persons that have been recognized as paranoiacs and likely to do queer things for a long time beforehand. Indeed, some of the melancholic qualities on which the unfortunate impulse to self-murder depends are likely to have exhibited themselves in former generations. . . . As a matter of fact, suicides are not in possession of free will as a rule, but are the victims of circumstances and are unable to resist external influences."⁹ However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that every case of suicide can be traced to some condition of organic disturbance in which the use of reason, and consequently responsibility, are suspended. Not every perturbation of the moral life springs from physical or physiological causes, and melancholia, idiosyncrasy, fixed notions, hallucinations or illusions do not always hinder the use of reason and destroy freedom of action. It would be equally wrong to ascribe every case of suicide to personal guilt, and positively foolish to adopt the Stoic view that suicide is not an act of cowardice, but rather a proof of courage, on the plea that by killing himself a man not only escapes evil and thereby follows an instinct implanted in his soul by God, but likewise relieves society of an intolerable

⁹ O'Malley-Walsh, *Essays in Pastoral Medicine*, New York, 1906, p. 306.

burden, and, moreover, by an act of supreme self-sacrifice, atones for his crime and thus conciliates the eternal Judge.¹⁰ This view is radically false. For, in the first place, he who despairs in a difficult or hopeless situation and tries to escape the tribulations of life by committing suicide, does not display courage and strength of character, but the very opposite, and, secondly, all misfortunes, even those which a man incurs through his own guilt, must, from the Christian point of view, be regarded as trials in which he should exercise patience, faith, and confidence in God.¹¹ The decisive factor is not public opinion but the duty which the individual owes to society and which he is still able to fulfill, even though it be only by giving an example of Christian fortitude. Finally, for man to try to escape his judge instead of atoning for his sins in the way prescribed, namely, by contrition and penance, is a pagan, not a Christian motive.¹²

10 K. Joest, *Das Recht auf den Tod*, Göttingen, 1895.

11 St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, I. I, c. 26: "*Hoc dicimus, hoc asserimus, hoc modis omnibus approbamus, neminem spontaneam mortem sibi inferre debere velut fugiendo molestias temporales, ne incidat in perpetuas, neminem propter aliena peccata, ne hoc ipse incipiat gravissimum proprium, quem non polluebat alienum, neminem propter peccata praeterita, propter quae magis*

hac vita opus est, ut possint poenitendo sanari, neminem velut desiderio vitae melioris quae post mortem speratur, quia reos suae mortis melior post mortem vita non suscipit." (Migne, P. L., XLI, 39).

12 Ps. XXXIII, 19; L. 19.—A. von Oettiger, *Die Moralstatistik*, 3rd ed., p. 761, says: "The Protestant misses the energetic spiritual leadership of the Church; when unhappy, he does not so readily find consolation because he must do

According to the principles of Christian morality a person who commits suicide while in the full possession of his mental faculties is not only a murderer and a criminal, but renounces God and the hope of salvation and forfeits every right to the blessings of the Church, including that to a Christian burial.¹³ In denying any one the last mentioned privilege the Church, of course, does not mean to pass judgment on his probable fate in the other world.

Does suicide always result from (temporary or permanent) insanity, or is it sometimes committed by persons who are quite sane? While some eminent scientists¹⁴ hold that perfectly normal persons can and do commit suicide, others¹⁵ adopt the theory of Esquirol, who nearly a century ago¹⁶ asserted that "suicide is a disease." No doubt suicide is very often due to dementia, but it is equally undeniable that many who compass their own death are impelled by pique, despair or anger, which usually involve malice or culpable cowardice.¹⁷

Suicide is a moral, a social, a biological, and a psychological problem. Its frequency is governed by laws

without the human mediation of the priesthood (confession)."

¹³ *Codex Iuris Canonici*, can. 1240, § 1, n. 3: "*Ecclesiastica sepultura privantur, nisi ante mortem aliqua dederint poenitentiae signa. . . qui se ipsi occiderint deliberato consilio.*"—Cfr. *Rit. Rom.*, tit. 6, c. 2, n. 3; *S. Offic.*, d. 16. Maii 1866.

¹⁴ E.g., J. Maschka, *Handbuch der gerichtlichen Medizin*, Vol. I, Tübingen, 1881, p. 477.

¹⁵ For instance, R. Gaupp, *Ueber*

den Selbstmord, 2nd ed., Munich, 1910, p. 32.

¹⁶ He died 1840.

¹⁷ "Despair and anger," rightly observes Van der Heeren (*Cath. Encyclopedia*, Vol. XIV, p. 328), "are not as a general thing movements of the soul which it is impossible to resist, especially if one does not neglect the helps offered by religion, confidence in God, belief in the immortality of the soul and in a future life of rewards and punishments."

whose existence seems to be established by statistics, but whose nature we are but just beginning to surmise.¹⁸

b) As the theological notion of suicide implies the full use of reason and the deliberate intention, direct or indirect, of ending one's life, a man does not commit suicide if he kills himself accidentally, or through carelessness, or in order to escape certain danger of death, or when in a state of mental derangement, be it complete or partial, permanent or temporary; or indirectly by doing or omitting something the fatal consequences of which he might and should have foreseen, but does not advert to on account of their remoteness; *e. g.*, leading a dissolute life, indulging in anger or intemperance, or mortifying his body beyond the bounds of reason. An act which is not in itself sinful and of which it cannot be foreseen that it will lead to the destruction of life (as, *e. g.*, firing a gun, eating a food not known to be poisonous) is no sin. If death can be foreseen as the result of such a non-sinful act, the latter is forbidden, unless commanded by duty, as when a priest or a physician visits a patient who is suffering from a contagious disease or when a soldier goes into battle. If the act that results in self-destruction is in itself sinful, it is a *voluntarium in causa* with regard to

¹⁸ Cfr. Familler, *Pastoralpsychiatrie*, pp. 142 sqq.

such destruction, and may be imputed as a sin tending to self-destruction, which, however, is not suicide in the specific sense.

The ecclesiastical penalty inflicted upon those who are guilty of direct suicide does not affect those who commit suicide indirectly. If direct suicide has been committed in a state of mental derangement, the victim should not be buried in the customary solemn manner, but quietly, *i.e.*, without song, bell, or sermon; not as if the Church wished to judge the soul of the departed, but merely to indicate her sorrow at his misfortune and dreadful end. Where there is doubt as to the condition in which the act was committed, charity demands that the deceased be given the benefit of the doubt, and be buried with ecclesiastical honors. Mental alienation may be presumed, not only on the strength of expert opinion, but also on the testimony of trustworthy relatives or friends who were in personal touch with the deceased.¹⁹

A point to which attention should be called is that the power of suggestion and example have much to do with the increase of suicide. Dymond, an authority in the matter, says: "The power of the example of the suicide is much greater than has been thought. Every act of suicide tacitly conveys the sanction of one more judgment in its favor. Frequency of repetition diminishes the sensation of abhorrence and makes succeeding sufferers, even of less degree, resort to it with less reluctance."

Dr. Walsh, who quotes this passage, adds: "Our modern newspapers, by supplying all the details of every

¹⁹ *Regulae Iuris in VI^{to} Decret.*
Bonifat. VIII, n. 30: "*In obscuris*
minimum est sequendum." Ibid.,

n. 49: "*In poenis benignior est in-*
terpretatio facienda."

suicide that occurs, especially if it presents any criminally interesting features or morbidly sentimental accessories, familiarize the mind, particularly of the impressionable young, with the idea of suicide. When troubles come, lack of experience in life makes the youthful mind forecast a future of hopeless suffering. Love episodes are responsible for most of the suicides in the young, while sickness and physical ills are the causes in the old. In a certain number of cases, however, domestic quarrels, and especially the infliction of punishment on the young at an age when they are beginning to feel their independence and their right to be delivered from what they are prone to consider restriction, are apt to be followed in the morbidly unstable by thoughts of suicide.”²⁰

In order to forestall the putting into action of the suicidal impulse, Doctor Walsh suggests that those who are close to the patient should have some realization of the possibility of its occurrence. There are usually some previous indications of the suicidal trend. Many especially early suicides have distinct tendencies to and stigmata of hebephrenic melancholia. The best known symptoms of this condition are those described by Dr. Peterson in his book on mental diseases. The symptoms noted are extraordinarily rapid and paradoxical changes of disposition. Depressed ideas intrude themselves in the midst of boisterous gaiety, and untimely jocularities in the deepest depression, or at solemn moments. Then there is the paradoxical facial expression, the so-called paramimia, that is, a look of joy and pleasure when really mental depression is present, or a look of depression when joyful sentiments are being expressed.²¹

The tendency of suicide to repeat itself in families is

²⁰ *Essays in Pastoral Medicine*, p. 309. ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 309 sq.

now well known and recognized. It is "not directly inherited, but there is a mental weakness that makes the individual incapable of withstanding the sufferings life may entail."²²

2. SELF-MUTILATION.—As we are not masters of life, so neither are we owners of our limbs, and hence cannot dispose of them at will. A man is not justified in *mutilating* himself, but as the limbs of the body are subordinate to life, they may be sacrificed as parts for the whole if life can thereby be preserved. Hence the amputation of one or several limbs is permissible when it is the only means of preserving life. A sick man may allow an infected limb to be amputated in order to prevent infection of the whole body, and one who is handcuffed, *e. g.*, in prison, may tear or cut off a hand or an arm, or both, in order to escape certain death, *e. g.*, from fire.²³

To mutilate oneself or to allow oneself to be mutilated for any other purpose than that of saving one's life, for

²² *Ibid.*, p. 310.

²³ Cfr. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, 2a 2ae, qu. 65, art. 1: "*Quum membrum aliquod sit pars totius humani corporis, est propter totum, sicut imperfectum propter perfectum. Unde disponendum est de membro humani corporis secundum quod expedit toti. Membrum autem humani corporis per se quidem utile est ad bonum totius corporis, per accidens tamen potest contingere, quod sit nocivum, puta quum mem-*

brum putridum est totius corporis corruptivum."—IDEM, *Summa contra Gent.*, l. III, c. 112, n. 5: "*Manifestum est, partes omnes ordinari ad perfectionem totius; non enim est totum propter partes, sed partes propter totum sunt.*"—Cfr. J. P. Gury, *Comp. Theol. Mor.*, Lyons and Paris, 1850, Vol. I, n. 403, 9; H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, 11th ed., Innsbruck, 1914, pp. 351 sq.

instance, to escape military conscription, is not permissible.

Except as a remedy for diseased conditions of the body, *castration* or *emasculatio* (*eviratio*) is never allowed, not even from religious motives, as, for instance, to preserve chastity or avoid temptations, because the operation is neither necessary nor useful for that purpose;²⁴ still less, of course, for minor ends, *e. g.*, to keep the voice unbroken, because the preservation of a youthful voice is not a sufficient good to justify the commission of an act against nature. Following many censures of his predecessors, Leo XIII expressly forbade this practice for the singers of the Sistine Chapel.²⁵

Vasectomy and the *excision of the uterus or ovaries* are operations which, though permissible when necessary for the direct preservation of life or health, would be sinful if performed for the sole purpose of superinducing sterility.²⁶

24 St. Jerome, *Ep.*, 84 (*al.* 65), n. 8: "*Origenes voluptates in tantum fugit, ut zelo Dei, sed tamen non secundum scientiam ferro truncaret genitalia.*" (Migne, *P. L.*, XXII, 750).—St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 65, art. 1, ad 3: "*Membrum non est praescindendum propter corporalem salutem totius, nisi quando aliter toti subveniri non potest. Saluti autem spirituali semper potest aliter subveniri quam per membri praecisionem, quia peccatum subiacet voluntati. Et ideo in nullo casu licet membrum praescindere propter quodcunque peccatum vitandum.*"—J. P. Gury, *Comp. Theol. Mor.*, Vol. I, n. 403, 10: "*Non licet se castrare ad castitatem servandam vel ad tentationes sedandas, quia ad hunc finem non est necessarium; immo eviratio est prorsus inutilis ad peccatum vitandum, quia non*

tollit carnis tentationes, sed tantum generationem impedit."—Cfr. O'Malley and Walsh, *Essays in Pastoral Medicine*, p. 339.

25 Decree of Feb. 3, 1902.—H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, 11th ed., p. 352: "*Summi pontifices castrationem puerorum nunquam probarunt, nec unquam licitam dixerunt, immo eos, qui culpabiliter se aliosve eunuchos fecissent, irregulares declararunt. . . .*" Cfr. Benedict XIV, *De Syn. Dioec.*, l. XI, c. 7, n. 3; C. Richert, *Die Anfänge der Irregularitäten*, Freiburg, 1901, pp. 104 sqq.

26 S. C. S. Off., 22 May, 1895: "*Si sia lecita la pratica sia attiva sia passiva di un procedimento il quale si propone intenzionalmente come fine espresso la sterilizzazione della donna. R. Negative.*" Sabetti-Barrett, *Comp. Theol. Mor.*, n.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 64, art. 5.—James J. Walsh, *Essays in Pastoral Medicine*, Ch. xxvii, New York 1906.—F. A. Göpfert, *Moraltheologie*, Vol. II, 6th ed., pp. 6 sqq., Paderborn 1909.—Thos. Slater, S.J., *A Manual of Moral Theology*, Vol. I, pp. 301 sqq., New York 1908.—Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., *Theologia Moralis*, Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 403 sqq.—Ad. Tanquerey, S.S., *Synopsis Theologiae Moralis et Pastoralis*, Vol. III, pp. 124 sqq., Tournai 1904.—Westcott, *Suicide, its History, Literature, etc.*, London 1885.—Bonomelli, *Il Suicidio*, Milan 1892.—E. Durckheim, *Le Suicide*, Paris 1897.—Masaryk, *Der Selbstmord als soziale Massenerscheinung*, Vienna, 1881.—J. E. Ross, C. S. P., *Christian Ethics*, New York 1919, pp. 178 sqq.—Austin O'Malley, *The Ethics of Medical Homicide and Mutilation*, New York 1919, pp. 7 sqq., 244, 260 sqq.

267.—Cfr. H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, p. 352: "*Vasectomia . . . in eo consistit ut canales viri semen conferentes secentur, adeo ut omnis communicatio testiculorum cum membro virili impediatur. Vasectomicus, qui hanc operationem passus est actiones sexuales per copulam carnalem peragere quidem potest, at fecundationis*

est prorsus incapax, quippe qui verum semen in testiculis elaboratum emittere non possit. Haec operatio, quae brevissimo tempore peragitur, insuper nec periculosa nec admodum dolorosa est, moraliter dicenda est illicita, nisi ad servandam vitam vel sanitatem necessaria sit."—On vasectomy, see A. O'Malley, *The Ethics of Medical Homicide and Mutilation*, pp. 244 sqq.

CHAPTER V

POSITIVE DUTIES IN REGARD TO LIFE AND HEALTH

Though man may not end his life at will, he is in duty bound to sacrifice it under certain conditions. The reason for this obligation is twofold: First, there are higher duties than that of preserving life, and, secondly, every man possesses certain rights over his own person. Hence the duty of preserving and safeguarding life and health, with which we dealt in the last Section, does not bind absolutely, but is subject to certain limitations.

1. Man is bound to give his life, or to allow others to take it, if he can preserve it in no other way than at the expense of truth and virtue, *i. e.*, at the cost of his soul's salvation,¹ or if the duties of his vocation or state require him to sacrifice health or life, as often happens with priests, physicians, nurses, firemen, and others; or whenever it becomes a duty to run a serious risk for the sake of the common welfare.²

¹ Cfr. Matt. X, 39; XVI, 25 sq.; Mark VIII, 35-37; Luke IX, 24-26; XVIII, 33; John XII, 25.

² Acts XX, 24; Eph. III, 13; Phil.

II, 17; 1 John III, 16. Cfr. J. de Lugo, *De Iust. et Iure*, disp. 10, qu. 1: "*Ob magnum bonum commune vel ob specialem obligationem ex*

2. It is permissible for a man to sacrifice his life or to expose himself to certain danger of death:

a) If he knows no other way of escape from a physically proximate occasion of mortal sin. Thus a virgin may risk death in order to preserve her chastity, *e. g.*, by leaping into a river with the purpose of reaching the other side, even though there be no reasonable hope of attaining safety, or by offering resistance to her assailant, even though she run immediate danger of being killed and cannot escape except by a miracle. We say such conduct would be permissible; but it would not be obligatory, for it is not absolutely impossible to refuse internal consent. A person does not share the guilt of another's sin, says St. Augustine, as long as he does not give his consent.³ The Roman Breviary quotes St. Lucy as

pacto vel officio quam habet miles, gubernator, episcopus, parochus, licite possunt et tenentur mortem praeferre."—H. Busembaum, S.J., *Medulla Theol. Mor.*, III, tr. 4, c. 1, dub. 1: "*Miles potest, immo tenetur persistere in statione, etsi moraliter certus sit se occidendum.*" (Tournay, 1876, I, 172). Cfr. St. Alphonsus, *Theol. Mor.*, l. IV, n. 366.

³ *Epist.*, 98 (al. 23), n. 1: "*Non potest vinculo alienae iniquitatis obstringi, qui nulla sua voluntate consentit.*" (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 359).—*IDEM*, *De Mendacio*, c. 19, n. 40 (P. L., XL, 514).—St. Jerome, *Hebraicae Quaest. in Gen.*, c. 12: "*Corpus sanctarum mulierum non vis maculat, sed voluntas.*" (P. L.,

XXIII, 957).—St. Alphonsus says (*Theol. Mor.*, III, n. 368): "*Hic magis urget quaestio, an virgo teneatur potius permittere se occidi quam violari, puta si invasor minetur ei mortem, si copulae non acquiescat. Adest duplex sententia. Prima dicit, quod, licet possit, non tenetur tamen femina mortem pati, sed potest tunc permissive se habere, dum accidit copula, modo voluntate positive resistat et consensus periculum absit; quia, ut dicunt, illa permissio non est tunc cooperatio moralis, sed tantum materialis, et ideo ob periculum mortis satis excusatur. Secunda sententia docet, hoc omnino illicitum esse, quia, quum femina possit copulam impedire, si timore inducta quiescit, eius tunc*

saying: "The body is not stained except by the consent of the mind, and if you command me to be violated against my will, my chastity will be to me a double crown."⁴

Similarly, a woman has the right, though she is not in duty bound, to refuse to allow herself to be physically examined or operated upon in order to preserve her modesty or bodily integrity.⁵ She may furthermore refuse to submit to medical examination ordered by a court for the purpose of ascertaining whether she has committed infanticide, even though her refusal would be interpreted as a confession of guilt and result in her conviction. For although in the case of crimes of this kind a physical examination is often important for ascertaining the guilt of the accused,

cooperatio vere moralis et voluntaria fit; in femina enim illa quies in copula reputatur ut actio. Haec ratio tamen non convincit, quia illa quies feminae revera non potest dici actio, dum nullo modo est positiva. Ideo prima sententia (speculative loquendo) sua probabilitate carere non videtur. Non tamen negandum, secundum sententiam in praxi omnino suadendam esse, saltem ob periculum consensus, quod in illa permissione facile adesse potest."—Cfr. A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., *Theol. Mor.*, Vol. I, 10th ed., n. 580.

⁴ *Breviarium Rom.*, *Festum S. Luciae* (13 Dec.), lect. 6: "Non coinquinatur corpus nisi de consensu mentis, et si invitam iusseris violari, castitas mihi duplicabitur ad

coronam."—Cfr. Busembaum, *Medulla*, l. c.: "Etsi virgini non liceat ad castitatem servandam directe se occidere, licet tamen ei certo periculo mortis se exponere etiam pro sola integritate corporali, licet rationabiliter praesumeret se non consensuram, quia integritas ista magni aestimatur."

⁵ Cfr. Gury, *Comp. Theol. Mor.*, Vol. I, n. 403: "Non tenetur virgo operationem probrosam pati per manus medici, licet eius vita periclitetur, quia amor verecundiae aequare potest aut etiam superare malum quod morte pertimescitur."—St. Alphonsus, *Theol. Mor.*, III, n. 372: "Posset tamen virgo permittere, ut tangatur, immo teneretur sinere, ut ab alia femina curetur, ut recte ait Diana."

and it may happen that a guilty woman escapes punishment by her refusal to be examined, modesty must be protected at all costs, and Catholics should use their influence to prevent the adoption of laws that run counter to this principle.⁶

As regards the so-called *suicidia martyrum*,⁷ it is safe to say that the holy persons who thus voluntarily incurred death were divinely inspired⁸ or at least acted in good faith.⁹ Samson's deed, as recorded in the Book of Judges,¹⁰ was justifiable from another point of view, besides that mentioned by St. Augustine.* He may be

⁶ Cfr. F. v. Holtzendorff, *Das Verbrechen des Mordes und die Todesstrafe*, Berlin 1875, pp. 337 sq.

⁷ See Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.*, I. VI, c. 42; I. VIII, c. 12 (Migne, P. G., XX, 608, 772).

⁸ St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, I. I, c. 16-19 (Migne, P. L., XLI, 30-34): "*Sed quaedam, iniquiunt, sanctae feminae tempore persecutionis, ut insectatores suae pudicitiae devitarent, in rapturum atque necaturum se fluvium proiecerunt eoque modo defunctae sunt earumque martyria in catholica ecclesia veneratione celeberrima frequentantur. De his nihil temere audeo iudicare. Utrum enim ecclesiae aliquibus fide dignis testificationibus, ut earum memoriam sic honoret, divina persuaserit auctoritas, nescio, et fieri potest, ut ita sit. Quid, si enim hoc fecerunt non humanitus deceptae, sed divinitus iussae, nec errantes, sed oboedientes? Sicut de Samsone aliud nobis fas non est credere.*" (P. L., XLI, 39).—IDEM, *Tract. in Ioa.*, 51, n. 10 (P. L., XXXV, 1767).—St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 64, art. 5, ad 3: "*Non licet mulieri seipsam occidere, ne ab alio corrumpatur, quia non*

debet committere in se crimen maximum, quod est sui ipsius occisio, ut vitet minus crimen alienum. Non enim est crimen mulieris per violentiam, si consensus non adsit, quia non inquinatur corpus nisi de consensu mentis, ut Lucia dixit. . . . Similiter etiam nulli licet seipsum occidere ob timorem, ne consentiat in peccatum, quia non sunt facienda mala, ut veniant bona (Rom. III, 8) vel ut vitentur mala, praesertim minora vel minus certa; incertum enim est, an aliquis in futurum consentiat in peccatum; potens est enim Deus hominem quacunque tentatione superveniente liberare a peccato."—Ibidem, ad 4: "*Dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit [De Civ. Dei, I, c. 21; Migne, P. L., XLI, 35], nec Samson aliter excusatur, quod seipsum cum hostibus ruina domus oppressit, nisi quod latenter Spiritus Sanctus hoc iusserat, qui per illum miracula faciebat. Et eandem rationem assignat de quibusdam sanctis feminis, quae tempore persecutionis seipsas occiderunt, quarum memoria in ecclesia celebratur.*"

⁹ Lessius, *De Iust.*, II, c. 9, n. 23.

¹⁰ Judges XVI, 23 sqq.

* See note 8, *supra*.

said to have willed his death only indirectly as a means of destroying the Philistines, and hence acted for the common good (*ex caritate boni communis*).¹¹

b) It is also permissible to sacrifice one's life or to expose oneself to certain danger of death in order to escape a serious temptation. The older moralists held that a patient would be justified in refusing to submit to an extremely painful operation, even though it were likely to save his life, if he knew, or at least had reason to fear, that the pain would cause him to sin grievously by anger, impatience, despair, or blasphemy. In the present advanced stage of surgery this danger is slight,¹² although, because of the more or less well-founded fear of death under the knife, no general obligation can be established.

The duty of employing the resources of medicine and surgery to save one's life must not be interpreted as compelling a patient to employ such extraordinary means as would be harder to bear than death itself. No one is obliged, for instance, to consent to the amputation of a limb if he is not certain that the operation will not kill him. In the present stage of medical science there is nearly always at least a possibility of saving life, and hence it may be said, in a general way, that patients are bound to allow themselves to be operated upon if advised to do so by a reputable physician.

¹¹ Cfr. Sporer-Bierbaum, *Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1903, tr. 5, n. 390; F. X. Linsenmann, *Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie*, p. 259.

¹² Cfr. Chas. Coppens, S.J., *Moral Principles and Medical Practice*, New York 1897.

Of course, no man is obliged for the restoration of his health to employ means which would entail poverty upon his family or cause extraordinary hardship to himself, especially if the result is uncertain.

From what we have said the reader will have rightly concluded that the duty of submitting to medical or surgical treatment is never absolute, but always relative. When life can be saved in no other way, and it is very probable that the treatment suggested will prove successful, the patient should take it if he has the means to do so. But as long as there is hope of restoring health in some other way, there is no strict duty to take medicine or submit to the knife. If the disease is so far advanced that no reasonable hope can be entertained of saving the patient's life, he should not be molested, and the more doubtful the effect of a medicine or an operation, and the less inclined the patient is to take or undergo it, the less should he be harassed. No matter how far advanced the disease or how meagre the hope of recovery, it is never allowed to give a patient drugs which are apt to directly cause death, but it is permissible to employ medicines that may possibly hasten the end, provided there is hope, or at least a possibility, that they will have a beneficial influence upon the patient.

To hasten death artificially by the employment of anaesthetics (*εὐθανασία*) when all hope of recovery is gone, can be regarded as permissible only if the drugs employed for this purpose do not entirely deprive the sufferer of consciousness. No man should be robbed of the capacity of acquiring merits in the hour of death, when, as Dr. Delany rightly says "the compe-

tency of acting meritoriously is most necessary and its products invested with finality." ¹³

"The time just before death," says Father Slater, "is very precious; a sinner may then be reconciled with God and save his soul; one who is in the state of grace may very much increase his merit by a good use at that time. Euthanasia, then, in this sense, is unlawful; it is virtually shortening a man's life." ¹⁴

Dr. Delany further says that there can be no doubt that "the administration of drugs of the nature specified is, in the premises, if not formally, at all events equivalently, a shortening of the life of the patient. Hence as long as the stricken person has as yet made no adequate preparation for death, it is always grievously unlawful to induce a condition of insensibility. In no contingency . . . can any positive indorsement be given to means whose scope is to have one die in a state of unconsciousness. What has been said applies with equal force and for the same reasons to the case of those who have to suffer capital punishment by process of law." ¹⁵

c) Another motive which would justify a man in sacrificing his life or exposing himself to the danger of cer-

¹³ *Cath. Encyclopedia*, Vol. V, p. 630.

¹⁴ Thos. Slater, *Manual of Moral Theology*, Vol. I, p. 164.

¹⁵ *Cath. Encyclopedia*, Vol. V, p. 630.—Dr. Delany, in the excised portions of the paragraph above quoted, goes farther than most other Catholic writers by granting that "those charged with responsibility in the case" may "take up a passively

permissive demeanor whenever it is certain that the departing soul has abundantly made ready for the great summons," and adds: "This is especially true if there is ground for apprehending from the dying person's continued possession of his faculties, a relapse into sin." This sounds plausible, but is dangerous doctrine. (See O'Malley, *The Ethics of Medical Homicide*, pp. 13 sqq.)

tain death, would be the desire to escape death in some other, equally certain but more painful form. Thus one who is unable to flee from a burning building would be allowed to leap, at the risk of breaking his neck, even though the hope of saving his life were very small.¹⁶

3. To give up one's life when such a sacrifice is necessary or justifiable for the common welfare, is not only permissible, but positively virtuous.

a) A man is allowed to engage in occupations which may, though they need not necessarily be dangerous to life and limb, *e. g.*, working on "sky-scrapers," church steeples, etc. He may also choose a vocation which involves proximate danger of disease or death, even though in so doing he have no higher motive than to earn a living or win pecuniary gain.

Dangerous occupations are not only those in which sudden injury and death are caused by machinery or unguarded perils, but also, and in the technical sense of the term particularly those in which some form of poison or disease is incidental to the trade itself as at present carried on.¹⁷ Most of the trades and occupations of this class

¹⁶ Cfr. St. Alphonsus, *Theol. Mor.*, l. III, n. 367: "*Quaeritur, an liceat se occidere ad vitandam mortem duriozem. Resp.: Directe se occidere nunquam licet. . . . Licet vero se indirecte occidere, puta si quis se eiiciat per fenestram, ut effugiat incendium, praesertim si ad*

sit aliqua spes mortem evadendi."—Sporer-Bierbaum, *Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, 2nd ed., tr. 5, n. 389; A. Lehmkühl, S.J., *Theol. Mor.*, Vol. I, 10th ed., n. 580.

¹⁷ See Bliss, *Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, 2nd ed., p. 360.

are necessary for society as a whole and also for those individuals who make a living by following them.¹⁸

For the sake of gaining a livelihood, (which is a *dira necessitas*), it is also legitimate for a man to engage in a hazardous occupation for the amusement, recreation, or utility of others, such as tight-rope walking, acrobatics, show athletics, etc., provided, of course, no divine or human law is directly transgressed.

To endanger one's life merely for the purpose of displaying agility or courage, without strict necessity or a reasonable cause, is always sinful.¹⁹

b) It is permitted to volunteer one's services in war, nay even to risk one's life at or without the express command of a superior officer, if some essential object can be attained thereby, *e.g.*, if considerable damage can be done to the enemy or a great advantage gained for one's own side.²⁰

¹⁸ Cfr. Gury, *Comp. Theol. Mor.*, Vol. I, n. 403, 6°: "Non peccant artifices, qui super aedificiorum tecta ascendunt et variis sese periculis ad artem suam exercendam exponunt, nec fabri ferrarii qui quotidie ignem versando vitam sibi minuunt, quia ex causa rationabili agunt."

¹⁹ "Graviter peccant viri audaces, qui ex temeraria sponse et vana gloria in varia discrimina se iniiciunt, in altum ascendendo, deorsum se demittendo, onera graviora ferendo," etc. (*Ibid.*)

²⁰ Cfr. Judges XVI, 23-30; 1 Macc. VI, 73 sqq.—Cfr. St. Alphonsus, *Theol. Mor.*, III, n. 366:

"Miles potest, immo tenetur, persistere in statione, etsi moraliter certus sit, se occidendum. Item potest ad evertendam turrin hostilem aut perdendos hostes pulverem incendere, etsi sciat, se obruendum, uti et navim mergere vel incendere, ne hostis ea potiatur cum gravi reipublicae damno."—*Ibid.*, n. 367: "Quaeritur, an autem liceat navim incendere cum evidenti periculo vitae, ne illa veniat in manus hostium. . . . Affirmat Lugo cum Lessio, licere, si sit aliqua spes saltem modicissima vitandi mortem, vel, etsi mors sit certa, vitari tamen expediat damnum publicum."

But no one is allowed to seek death merely for glory or in order to escape the hardships of prison life.²¹ Committing *hara-kiri*, as the Japanese are said to do, to escape falling into the hands of the enemy or being tortured by an angry prince, is immoral and therefore forbidden.²²

c) A man may give up his life in the service of charity when there is question of the salvation of souls or the safeguarding of life, or some other equivalent good on the part of his fellow-men. Aside from the vocational duties of physicians and priests, it is a heroic act of virtue to ex-

21 2 Macc. XIV, 37-46.—Cfr. St. Augustine, *Epist.*, 204 (al. 61), n. 6: "*Quid mirum est, si [Raziae] tamquam homini elatio superba subrepsit, ut mallet manu propria perimere quam post illam in suorum aspectibus celsitudinem sustinere indignam in hostium manibus servitutem?*"—*Ibid.*, n. 7: "*In his Machabaeorum libris quamvis homo ipse fuerit laudatus, factum tamen eius narratum est, non laudatum, et iudicandum potius quam imitandum, quasi ante oculos constitutum, non sane nostro iudicio iudicandum, quod nos quoque ut homines habere possemus, sed iudicio doctrinae sanae, quae in ipsis quoque libris veteribus clara est. Longe quippe fuit iste Razias a verbis illis, ubi legitur: 'Omne, quod tibi applicitum fuerit, accipe, et in dolore sustine, et in humilitate tua patientiam habe.'* (Eccli. II, 4). Non ergo fuit iste vir eligendae mortis sapiens, sed ferendae humilitatis impatiens."—*Ibid.*, n. 8: "*Scriptum est, quod voluerit 'nobiliter et viriliter*

mori' (2 Mach. XIV., 37-46), *sed numquid ideo sapienter? . . . Magna haec sunt, nec tamen bona; non enim bonum est omne quod magnum est, quoniam sunt magna etiam mala.*" (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 941).—*IDEM*, *Contra Gaudent.*, I, c. 31, n. 39: "*Proinde quomodolibet accipiatur a vobis huius Raziae vita laudata, non habet mors eius laudatricem sapientiam, quia non habet dignam Dei famulis patientiam potiusque huic vox illa Sapientiae (Eccli. II, 16), quae non laudis, sed detestationis est, competit: 'Vae qui perdidierunt sustinentiam.'*" (P. L., XLIII, 730).

22 Cfr. Sporer-Bierbaum, *Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, 2nd ed., tr. 5, n. 389: "*Certum apud omnes est, non licere seipsum directe occidere ad atrociorum mortem iniustam evadendam. Damnabilis ergo mos est Iaponensium, qui, ut atrocem mortem, v. gr. lenti ignis evadere possint, discisso ventre necando se liberant.*"—Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., *Moralphilosophie*, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 599.

pose oneself to immediate danger of death, for instance, in nursing a patient afflicted with a contagious disease.²³ We have here a just cause (*iusta causa*), *i.e.*, the exercise of a duty or virtue of such great importance that the accompanying danger fades into insignificance and the sacrifice approaches martyrdom.²⁴ To incur such a risk out of obstinacy, pride, presumption, anger, or pique can, however, in no wise be regarded as permissible because no higher moral good is involved, and to risk life thoughtlessly or presumptuously would be opposed to the divine commandment of self-love.

Of those who charitably sacrifice or risk their lives for their fellowmen Jesus Christ says: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends."²⁵ The highest exemplar of such heroic devotion is our Divine

23 Sporer-Bierbaum, *op. cit.*, n. 386: "*Potest quis invisere, servire, sacramenta administrare, etc., peste infectis vel simili morbo contagioso laborantibus, quamvis timeatur et reipsa subsit periculum propriæ infectionis et mortis; multo magis uxor (vel econtra maritus) cum suo probabili vitæ periculo laudabiliter assistet marito peste infecto; idque non tantum ad necessarium obsequium, sed etiam solum ad solatium vel amorem demonstrandum licere, pie admittit Ioannes Sanchez.*"—*Ibid.*, n. 387: "*Potest quis se obicere telo ad conservandam vitam principis vel parentis, pietatis et boni communis causa, immo etiam in probabili magnorum doctorum sententia licet*

etiam propriam vitam pro vita corporali proximi amici exponere, alioquin iniuste occidendi, ut si Titius esset iniuste damnatus ad mortem, probabiliter poteris tu amicus eius te offerre ad occidendum, ut amicum serves. Dicunt tamen, iniuste; si enim iuste damnatus sit, non poteris, quia tunc iudicem volentem nonnisi iuste reum occidere induceres ad occidendum te iniuste."

24 Phil. II, 29 sq. (Epaphroditus). Cfr. S. Dionysius of Alex. *apud* Euseb., *Hist. Eccles.*, VII, c. 22; (Migne, P. G., XX, 689); St. Cyprian, *De Mortalit.*, c. 17 (*Corpus Script. Eccles. Lat.*, Vindob., III, I, 307).

25 John XV, 13.

Saviour Himself, dying on the cross for the salvation of mankind.²⁶

However, let it be well understood that, with the exception of those who are bound to do so by their vocation, no man is *obliged* to lay down his life for his fellowmen. The reason is that no man need love his neighbor more than himself. Therefore one who is caught in a shipwreck is not obliged to surrender his place in a lifeboat to another; ²⁷ a mother is not obliged to submit to an indisputably dangerous operation in order to insure the life of her unborn child. In both cases, moreover, the success of the sacrifice would be problematical. The mother, in the instance mentioned, would, of course, be allowed, nay should in certain circumstances be advised, to perform what would be an act of heroic charity on behalf of her child.

d) It is also permissible to sacrifice health and life in the interest of science for the common welfare. There is no moral objection, for instance, to participating in a polar expedition for scientific or research purposes, nay, such an act might be rendered positively virtuous by the circum-

²⁶ Cfr. Rom. V, 6-9; 1 John III, 16.—St. Thomas, *Comment. in Sent.*, III, dist. 29, art. 5, ad 3: "*Perfectissimus actus virtutis.*"—St. Alphonsus, *Theol. Mor.*, III, n. 366.

²⁷ Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., *Theol.*

Mor., Vol. I, 10th ed., n. 580, 5: "*Licet in naufragio amico tabulam iam acceptam cedere et ita eius vita potius quam propriae consulere, nisi propria vita prae vita amici forte necessaria sit.*"

stances of the case. The same is true of the act of undergoing inoculation with some virus to ascertain whether a certain disease is transmissible from beast to man, or for a similar purpose.²⁸

(e) It is permissible for a murderer to surrender himself to the public authorities in order to pay the death penalty for his crime, though no man is strictly bound to do so unless an innocent person would otherwise be executed for the deed through his fault.²⁹

A fugitive who has been innocently condemned to death may not of his own accord return to the country in which the sentence was pronounced, because to do so would be to incur death voluntarily. If, however, the circumstances of the case were such that he would be able to save his parents or friends from great distress, imprisonment or disgrace, it would be an act of heroic virtue to return.

It is not permissible for a criminal to commit

²⁸ Cfr. Juvenal, *Sat.*, IV, 91: "*Vitam impendere vero.*"—St. Alphonsus, *Theol. Mor.*, III, n. 369: "*Ad experiendum antidotum.*"

²⁹ Cfr. St. Th. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 2a 2ae, qu. 69, art. 4, ad 2: "*Nullus ita condemnatur, quod ipse sibi inferat mortem, sed quod ipse mortem patiatur, et ideo non tenetur facere id, unde mors sequatur, quod est manere in loco, unde ducatur ad mortem.*"—Sporer-Bierbaum, *Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, 2nd ed., tr. 5, n. 394: "*Damnatus vel damnandus ad mortem, etsi via*

fugae pateat, potest non fugere et amore iustitiae sententiae iudicis se conformare; quinimmo talis mortem meritis ultro se iudici et iustitiae exercendae occasionem offerre non prohibetur. At certe ad neutrum tenetur, sed licite fugere potest, non tantum ante iudicis latam sententiam, nisi promiserit vel iuraverit se permansurum, sed etiam post latam a iudice sententiam mortis propriae gravissimi periculi declinandi causa." Cfr. A. Lehmkühl, S. J., in the *Theol.-prakt. Quartalschrift*, Linz, 1907, pp. 116 sqq.

suicide, even though the death sentence be already passed and its execution certain.

Were a Catholic condemned, like Socrates, to be his own executioner, would he be allowed to obey? Moralists differ on this point. Assuming the judgment to be just, some answer the question affirmatively, saying that the culprit would end his life merely to obey the law and thus would coöperate in his own death only in a material and remote manner. Others take a negative view, for the reason that in a sentence of vindictive justice judge and culprit must be distinct and separate persons. As it is not certain that the act is intrinsically evil, Fr. Lehmkühl says such a culprit would be permitted to execute the judgment upon himself at the command of the supreme judge; but he would not be obliged to do so, because it can be defended as a probable opinion that this act is forbidden by the natural law, and it is, moreover, abhorrent to nature. The *sententia communis* of Catholic moralists is against the act, though it is regarded as licit by Haunold, Elbel, Illsung, Lacroix, and others. St. Alphonsus seems to defend it as "*probabilis*." Victoria, Aragon, Sa, and others draw a distinction: they hold that a guilty culprit legally condemned to execute judgment upon himself would be allowed to take poison, as Socrates did, but not to kill himself with the sword.³⁰

A criminal who has been justly condemned to die of starvation may refuse to take food offered to him.³¹

³⁰ Aug. Lehmkühl, S.J., *Theol. Mor.*, Vol. I, 11th ed., p. 404.—Cfr. St. Alphonsus, *Theol. Mor.*, III, n. 369.

³¹ St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 69, art. 4, ad 2: "*Si aliquis sit condemnatus, ut fame moriatur, non peccat, si cibum sibi*

occulte ministratum sumat, quia non sumere esset seipsum occidere." —Sporer-Bierbaum, *Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, 2nd ed., tr. 5, n. 393: "*Damnatus ad mortem fame subeundam potest a cibis clanculum oblati abstinere, quia talis ad mortem suam active non concurrit, sed*

READINGS.—H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 345 sqq., 90 sqq.—Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., *Theologia Moralis*, Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 401 sqq.—De Lugo, *De Iustitia et Iure*, disp. X.

passive tantum se habens iustitiae amore eam fortiter perfert. Ad id tamen non tenetur, sed cibos clam oblatos acceptare potest ipso iure naturae, quo quis vitam suam tueri, quantum valeat, licite potest; quin-

immo si talis esset iniuste damnatus, per se loquendo teneretur comedere, quia tunc iusta causa non esset vitam prodigendi excepta causa martyrii."

CHAPTER VI

THE DUTY OF DEVELOPING THE MIND

1. In addition to developing his physical powers, man is obliged to cultivate his mental and moral faculties. Intellectual and moral culture should go hand in hand, because mere knowledge and mental acuteness do not ennoble the mind, but may co-exist with brutality.¹

a) Though it is not true, as the ancient sophists claimed, that knowledge spells virtue and that, consequently, a learned man is invariably a good man, no sane person will deny that, broadly speaking, genuine moral culture is impossible without a definite sum of knowledge. In the matter of education we must beware of two extremes. It is as foolish to train any one faculty exclusively as it is to attempt to train all faculties of the intellect in an equal measure.² To demand that all men be raised to the highest attainable proficiency in literature and science is to require what is practically impossible. "*Non*

¹ Cfr. J. Guibert, *Le Caractère*, Paris 1905; P. Levy and M. Brahe, *Die natürliche Willensbildung*, Leipzig 1903.

Das Studium und die Privatlektüre, 5th ed., Freiburg 1904; Brother Azarias, *Books and Reading*, New York 1896.

² Cfr. J. B. Krier and J. Schofer,

omnia possumus omnes." The various faculties and talents were given to men for the purpose of being fully developed as a whole, for the benefit of society, but they need not all be developed in each individual, in fact this would be impossible on account of the difference in ability and character.

"Knowledge," says Lord Bacon,³ taking the term in its true and highest sense, "is power," and an ancient adage declares that the master of one book commands respect.⁴ St. Paul says: "If any man know not, he shall not be known."⁵ Yet knowledge alone does not insure goodness. Intellectual proficiency may lead or help a man to adopt a sublime conception of the universe, but it will never by itself render him good and happy. Truth and knowledge are precious gifts, by means of which man enriches himself, makes his fellowmen happy, and glorifies God. This is the highest attainable prize of earnest and continuous mental culture. But something more is necessary. Man must not only know the truth, he must also act in conformity with it; in other words, he must lead a morally good, that is, a virtuous life. To be good, he must assimilate moral goodness through the will. Education, therefore, is not complete unless the will is trained as carefully as the intellect. Only in this way does a man become contented and happy and helpful to his fellowmen.

"Every man naturally desireth to know; but what doth knowledge avail without the fear of God? Better indeed is an ignorant laborer who serveth God, than a proud

³ *Novum Organum*, aphorism III: "*Scientia et potentia in idem coincidunt.*"—Cfr. St. Ignatius Loyola's dictum: "If you wish to accom-

plish anything, you must know something."

⁴ "*Timeo lectorem unius libri.*"

⁵ 1 Cor. XIV, 38.

philosopher who, neglecting himself, contemplateth the course of the heavens. . . . If thou wouldst profitably know or learn something, love to be unknown and to be thought of no account. This is the most sublime and most useful subject of study: true self-knowledge and self-contempt.”⁶

b) Every man has the strict duty of acquiring so much intellectual and moral education as will enable him to follow a useful calling and to strive consistently for his mental and moral perfection. This duty implies instruction in matters of faith and morals and practice in the arts of reading, writing, and arithmetic, which, among civilized nations, constitute the elements of a general education and the indispensable means of communication. Every man who lives within the pale of civilized society, is bound under pain of sin to make use of the opportunities available to him for the acquisition of these elements, and, if the laws of State or Church demand it, he should also acquire a higher education.

When an opportunity of acquiring intellectual culture involves a proximate occasion of sin, there is no obligation to use it.

⁶ “*Omnis homo naturaliter desiderat scire, sed scientia sine timore Dei quid importat? Melior est profecto humilis rusticus, qui Deo servit, quam superbus philosophus, qui se neglecto cursum caeli considerat. . . . Si vis utiliter aliquid scire et discere: ama nesciri et pro*

nihilo reputari. Haec est altissima et utilissima lectio: sui ipsius vera cognitio et despectio.” (*De Imit. Christi*, I, 2, 1; ed. Pohl, II, 7 sq.) —Cfr. I, n. 3: “*Quid prodest tibi alta de Trinitate disputare, si careas humilitate, unde displiceas Trinitati?*” (*Ibid.*, p. 6).

Religion is the foundation of true culture, and any compulsory school law directed against religion would violate the natural rights of parents and children alike, for parents are commanded by God to take care that their children are trained in the principles of religion, and the children have a natural right to such training. Compulsory education may be a benefit to society, but it degenerates into tyranny when the children are compelled to attend un-Christian, or, what is worse, positively anti-Christian schools, or if the State does not provide for, or at least permit, the giving of sufficient religious instruction.

Education contains both a religious and a secular element. The control of the former belongs solely to the Church, whereas in regard to the latter, the State cannot be denied a reasonable share.⁷ "Though children are facts of the domestic order," says Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J., "and the care and formation of them belongs primarily to their parents, yet if the parents neglect their charge, the State can claim the right of intervention *ab abusu*. It certainly is within the province of the State to prevent any parent from launching upon the world a brood of young barbarians, ready to disturb the peace of

⁷ On the respective rights of Church and State in regard to education see M. Cronin, *The Science of Ethics*, Vol. II, Dublin 1917, pp. 486 sqq.; W. Turner in the *Cath. Encyclopedia*, Vol. XIII, p. 558; Quigley, *Compulsory Education*, N. Y. 1894; Zach. Montgomery, *Poison Drops in the U. S. Senate*; S. M. Brandi, S.J., "The Touchstone of Catholicity," in the *Am. Eccles. Re-*

view, Vol. VI (1892), pp. 89 sqq.; F. S. Chatard, "Dr. Bouquillon on the School Question," *ibid.*, Vol. VI, pp. 98 sqq.; R. I. Holaind, S.J., *The Parent First*, N. Y. 1895; S. G. Messmer, "The Right of Instruction," *Am. Eccl. Review*, Vol. VI, pp. 104 sqq.; Card. O'Connell, *The Reasonable Limits of State Activity*, Columbus, O., 1919.

civil society. The practical issue is, who are *barbarians* and what is understood by *peace*. The Emperor Decius probably considered every Christian child an enemy of the *Pax Romana*. But the misapplication of a maxim does not derogate from its truth. It also belongs to the State to see that no parent behaves *like a Cyclops* (κυκλωπικῶς, Aristotle, *Eth.*, X, ix, 13) in his family, ordering his children, not to their good, as a father is bound to do, but to his own tyrannical caprice. For *instruction*, as distinguished from *education*, it is the parent's duty to provide his child with so much of it as is necessary, in the state of society wherein his lot is cast, to enable the child to make his way in the world according to the condition of his father. In many walks of life one might as well be short of a finger as not know how to read and write. Where ignorance is such a disadvantage, the parent is not allowed to let his child grow up ignorant. There, if he neglects to have him taught, the State may step in with compulsory schooling. Compulsory schooling for all indiscriminately, and that up to a high standard, is quite another matter." ⁸

The spread of culture is beneficial not only from the intellectual but also from the moral point of view. Cultured nations as a rule stand on a higher moral level than those which are unlettered, and the same is true of social classes. A sound training of the mind and heart is a protection against evil passions and a means of conciliation between opposing classes of people. Lectures, study courses, public libraries, university extension, the dissemination of good literature, are means of satisfying the popular craving for knowledge, but they cannot attain their highest object if they merely convey information; they must above all else train the will, for man's

true worth depends, not on his intellect alone, but on his character. Intellectual proficiency does not level social inequalities. The only kind of culture that really promotes the progress of society, as of the individual, is that which leads up to Him who is "the way, the truth, and the life."⁹

2. Knowledge becomes transmuted into virtue if its motive, object, and standard are brought into harmony with the moral law.¹⁰ By earnestly

⁹ John XIV, 6.—Cfr. St. Augustine, *Confess.*, V, c. 4: "Numquid, Domine Deus veritatis, quisquis novit ista, iam placet tibi? Infelix enim homo, qui scit illa omnia, te autem nescit; beatus autem, qui te scit, etiamsi illa nescit. Qui vero et te ut illa novit, non propter illa beator, sed propter te solum beatus est." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 708).—Thomas à Kempis, *De Imitatione Christi*, I, 1: "Si scires totam bibliam exterius et omnium philosophorum dicta, quid totum prodesset sine caritate Dei et gratia?"

¹⁰ Cfr. St. Augustine, *De Trinit.*, I. XII, c. 14, n. 21: "Habet et scientia modum suum bonum, si quod in ea inflat vel inflare adsolet, aeternorum caritate vincatur, quae non inflat, sed, ut scimus, aedificat (1 Cor. VIII, 1). Sine scientia quippe nec virtutes ipsae, quibus recte vivitur, possunt haberi, per quas haec vita misera sic gubernetur, ut ad illam, quae vere beata est, perveniatur aeternam." (P. L., XLII, 1009).—St. Bernard, *Serm. in Cant.*, XXXVI, n. 3: "Sed melius mitto vos ad Magistrum. Non est enim nostra ista sententia, sed illius, immo et nostra, quoniam Veritatis. 'Qui se,' inquit, 'putat aliquid scire, nondum modum scit,

quomodo oporteat eum scire' (1 Cor. VIII, 2). Vides quoniam non probat multa scientem, si sciendi modum nescierit. Vides, inquam, quomodo fructum et utilitatem scientiae in modo sciendi constituit? Quid ergo dicit modum sciendi? Quid, nisi ut scias, quo ordine, quo studio, quo fine quaeque nosse oporteat? Quo ordine, ut id prius, quod maturius ad salutem; quo studio, ut id ardentius, quod vehementius ad amorem; quo fine, ut non ad inanem gloriam aut curiositatem aut aliquid simile, sed tantum ad aedificationem tuam vel proximi. Sunt namque qui scire volunt eo fine tantum, ut sciant, et turpis curiositas est. Et sunt qui scire volunt, ut sciantur ipsi, et turpis vanitas est. Qui profecto non evadent subsannantem satyricum et ei qui eiusmodi est decantantem: 'Scire tuum nihil est nisi te scire hoc sciat alter' (Persius, *Sat.*, I, 27). Et sunt item qui scire volunt ut scientiam suam vendant, verbi causa pro pecunia, pro honoribus, et turpis quaestus est. Sed sunt quoque qui scire volunt, ut aedificent, et caritas est. Et item qui scire volunt, ut aedificentur, et prudentia est."—*Ibid.*, n. 4. "Horum omnium solum ultimi duo non inveni-

striving to apply true knowledge to his conduct man acquires prudence or wisdom (*prudentia*), which, in the words of St. Thomas, is "the noblest of the moral virtues and directs all virtuous acts."¹¹

Prudence as the fundamental virtue manifests itself:

a) In love of truth or a tendency to develop the innate faculty by which the soul acquires the knowledge of truth. The desire to acquire knowledge *per se* serves only the truth, inasmuch as it is apt to lead man to the absolute Truth, *i. e.*, God. Hence to seek enlightenment and knowledge for the sake of enriching the mind and cultivating the spiritual sense is a proof of true wisdom. The Christian religion, indeed, demands faith; but its essential object is to propagate the truth, and hence, far from interfering with the desire for knowledge, far from opposing new discoveries and ideas, it, on the contrary, hails and welcomes every increase of knowledge because the truth renders man intellectually and morally free.¹²

untur in abusione scientiae, quippe qui ad hoc volunt intellegere, ut bene faciant." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXIII, 968).—Cfr. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 166 sq.

¹¹ *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 47, art. 6, ad 3: "*Prudentia est nobilior virtutibus moralibus et movet eas.*"—*Ibid.*, qu. 55, art. 3: "*Pru-*

dentia est recta ratio agibilium, sicut scientia est recta ratio scibilium."—*Ibid.*, qu. 56, n. 1: "*Ipsa est directiva omnium virtuosorum actuum.*"

¹² Cfr. John VIII, 32.—St. Jerome, *In Ierem.*, 1. I, c. 1: "*Semper amanda est veritas, nec timenda hominum multitudo.*" (Migne, P.

It follows from all this that intellectual dullness and credulity is not only a mental, but also a moral defect, and a serious one if it furnishes cause for doubt and superstition. It follows further that the pursuit of knowledge, if carried on purely for its own sake or to satisfy inquisitiveness or vanity, is immoral. Knowledge acquired from such motives, in the words of the Apostle, "puffeth up," whereas "charity edifieth."¹³

L., XXIV, 687).—*Ibid.*, l. VI, c. 23: "*Veritas claudi et ligari potest, vinci non potest, quae et suorum paucitate contenta est et multitudine hostium non terretur.*" (P. L., XXIV, 829).—*Idem*, In Is. Proph., l. XVI, c. 58: "*Sicut matutina lux solvit tenebras, ita lumen scientiae et veritatis omnes errores fugat.*" (P. L., XXIV, 568).

13 1 Cor. VIII, 1.—Cfr. J. Gerson, *Opera Omnia*, I, 117: "*Scientia inflat et daemonium facit. Quid enim daemon interpretatur, nisi sciens, sed absque caritate?*"—Thomas à Kempis, *De Imit. Christi*, l. I, c. 3: "*Non est culpanda scientia aut quaelibet simplex rei notitia, quae bona est in se considerata et a Deo ordinata, sed praeferenda est semper bona conscientia et virtuosa vita. . . . Quam multi pereunt per vanam scientiam in saeculo, qui parum curant de Dei servitio! Et quia magis eligunt magni esse quam humiles: ideo evanescent in cogitationibus suis.*" (Ed. Pohl, II, 10 sq.)—Cfr. St. Bernard, *Serm.* in Cant., XXXVI, n. 2: "*Videar forsitan nimius in suggillatione scientiae et quasi reprehendere doctos ac prohibere studia literarum. Absit! Non ignoro, quantum Ecclesiae profuerint et prosint literati sui sive*

ad refellendos eos, qui ex adverso sunt, sive ad simplices instruendos. Denique legi: 'Quia tu repulisti scientiam, repellam et ego te, ut non fungaris mihi sacerdotio' [Os. IV, 6]; *legi: 'Qui docti fuerint, fulgebunt quasi splendor firmamenti, et qui ad iustitiam erudiunt multos, quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates'* [Deut. XII, 3]. *Sed et scio, ubi legerim: 'Scientia inflat'* [1 Cor. VIII, 1], *et rursum: 'Qui apponit scientiam, apponit et dolorem'* [Eccles. I, 18]. *Vides quia differentia est scientiarum, quando alia inflans, alia contristans est. Tibi vero velim scire, quatenus harum videatur utilior seu magis necessaria ad salutem, illane, quae tumet an quae dolet. . . . Apostolus non prohibet sapere, sed plus sapere quam oporteat* [Rom. XII, 3]. *Quid est autem sapere ad sobrietatem? Vigilantissime observare, quid scire magis priusve oporteat. Tempus enim breve est. Est autem, quod in se est, omnis scientia bona, quae tamen veritate subnixa sit, sed tu qui cum timore et tremore tuam ipsius operari salutem festinas, ea scire potius ampliusve curato, quae senseris viciniora salutis.*" (Migne, P. L., CLXXXIII, 967).

"Happy are they who do not pay for the treasure of knowledge with their hearts," says Schiller. The desire for knowledge, when inspired by proper motives, leads not to pride, but to humility. Dom Odilo Rottmanner, O.S.B., one of the greatest savants of his age, says: "If, as sometimes happens, a really learned man is puffed up with pride, this is an aberration of the heart, for which science must not be held responsible. As a rule those who display pride and vanity are least proficient and have acquired at best only half an education; their knowledge is limited and one-sided. They resemble the empty ear of grain, which stands upright, whereas its neighbor, laden with kernels, bows humbly to the ground. How is it possible for one to be proud who at every step in the realm of knowledge perceives more clearly the vastness of science and the incapability of his tiny mind to compass it! How could he regard himself otherwise than as small who has envisaged, nay, glimpsed the immensity of the universe! How puerile is it to take pride in the fragments of knowledge which man can attain, in view of the infinite realm he can never hope to explore! Need we wonder that the highest degree of knowledge attainable to man is invariably united with sincere humility and modesty?"¹⁴

Prudence furthermore manifests itself

b) In the exercise of a reasonable caution. The virtue of cautiousness stands midway between fatalistic carelessness and indifference on the one hand, and, on the other, that un-Christian

¹⁴ O. Rottmanner, O.S.B., *Predigten und Ansprachen*, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Munich, 1904, p. 256.

solicitude and worry against which Jesus has warned us so earnestly.¹⁵

We are commanded to employ all our bodily and mental faculties for the purpose of pressing the laws and powers of nature into the service of humanity, and as far as possible, warding off harmful influences from ourselves and others. Hence it is not distrust of Providence, nor "un-Christian interference with the plans of God," as one writer has charged, but a morally licit precaution, which under certain conditions may become a duty and a virtue, to employ those means of protection which human foresight and prudence furnish, and take all proper or necessary measures to escape harm and loss,—for instance, by *insuring one's life and material possessions* against death, disease, fire, and other vicissitudes. The time-honored maxim, "Help yourself and God will help you," is in thorough harmony with the Catholic doctrine of Divine Providence, for, as Sacred Scripture says, "by slothfulness a building shall be brought down, and through the weakness of hands the house shall drop through."¹⁶

"To one who no longer takes an interest in the sun, the moon, and the stars," says a modern novelist, "they cease to convey a message; and if a man neglects his house, it will go to ruin. This rule is of general applica-

¹⁵ Matt. VI, 25-34; cfr. Luke XII, 22-32; Phil. IV, 6.

¹⁶ Eccles. X, 18.

tion. Neglect kills, whereas charity inspires all things with new life."

Therefore, in the words of the gentle and cultured Brother Azarias, whose writings are not as highly esteemed among us as they deserve to be, "it is worthy of our noblest efforts and our most undivided attention to foster in ourselves the Spiritual Life. Herein is the highest cultivation of the moral sense. No time should be thought too precious to devote to it, for it deals with the things of eternity; no thought too sustained or too painful, for its object is the Light of all intelligence."¹⁷

"Gather up with care," says the same writer in another place, "the treasures of knowledge and wisdom that lie strewn about you. Guard them with a jealous eye. See that they be not sullied either by the daubing of error or the turpitude of vice. Cherish them as a heaven-sent patrimony by the right use and investment of which you are to purchase your title to eternal glory. All else may pass away, but the wisdom of well-digested knowledge and methodical thought remains through sunshine and storm, making the sunshine more beautiful and the storm less severe."¹⁸

READINGS.—St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 47-55.—Brother Azarias, *Phases of Thought and Criticism*, Boston 1896.—IDEM, *Books and Reading*, 5th ed., New York 1896.—J. L. Spalding, *Education and the Higher Life*, Chicago 1894.—J. Guibert, *Le Caractère*, Paris 1905.—C. Krieg, *Die Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung*, Vol. I, pp. 506 sqq., Freiburg 1904.—Albert Muntch, S.J., *The Pilgrimage of Life*, St. Louis 1918, pp. 179 sqq.

¹⁷ Brother Azarias, *Phases of Thought and Criticism*, Boston, 1896, p. 79.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 10 sq.

PART II

VOCATIONAL DUTIES

CHAPTER I

CHOICE OF A VOCATION AND FAITHFUL PERSEVER- ANCE IN THE CHOSEN VOCATION

SECTION I

CHOICE OF A VOCATION

1. DEFINITION.—Man must live and move in the society of his fellowmen.¹ In return for the physical and intellectual advantages which he receives from them, he must endeavor to make himself as useful to them as he can, by choosing or accepting certain work which his inborn or acquired faculties or means enable him to perform. The sphere of activity to which he devotes his powers is called *vocation* in the broad sense of the term.

2. IMPORTANCE.—The significance of such a vocation arises from the fact that, when sanctified by religion; it becomes the natural basis

¹ Cfr. 1 Cor. XII, 12 sqq.; Gal. VI, 2; Phil. II, 4.

of a higher, spiritual life,—“the garden, as it were, in which the seeds of eternal life are planted, grow, and ripen unto Heaven.”

Every man is in duty bound to choose a definite vocation,—preferably the one which corresponds best to his natural endowments, inclination, and bodily constitution,—and to prepare himself conscientiously for it.²

3. CHOICE OF A VOCATION.—In choosing a vocation the individual is governed by subjective and objective influences, some of which may exercise a certain compulsion, whereas others are entirely under the control of the will.³

a) A degree of compulsion is exerted over each individual, first, by the social conditions and circumstances of the country or race to which he belongs, be they differences of class or caste, or of material means; secondly, by the social position of the family of which he is a member; thirdly, by his own natural talents and inclinations, which dispose him favorably for certain occupations, and fourthly, by the course and vicissitudes of his life. The latter, while they no doubt have a certain compelling force, are still subject to the guidance of Providence, that is, the

² St. Ambrose says (*De Offic.*, l. I, c. 44): “Unusquisque suum ingenium noverit, et ad id se applicet, quod sibi aptum elegerit; itaque qui sequatur, prius consideret. Noverit bona sua, sed etiam vitia cognoscat,

aequalemque se iudicem sui praebeat, ut bonis intendat, vitia declinet.” (Migne, P. L., XVI, 87).

³ Job XII, 10; Ps XXXVI, 23; Prov. XVI, 33; XX, 24; Wisd. VII, 16; Acts XVII, 28; Rom. XI, 36.

Will and Wisdom of God, who is both infinitely wise and infinitely good. "Man proposeth, but God disposeth, and the way of a man is not his."⁴ Free-will and moral responsibility are never entirely destroyed by what is commonly known as *milieu*. Every man, even he who has his vocation practically pointed out to him by circumstances of birth or parentage, is obliged to give his interior consent, and no one may be forced into a vocation against his better knowledge or will. Such external and objective factors as birth, parental commands or wishes, and that which thoughtless men call chance, sometimes contain valuable indications in regard to a man's vocation, but they should not be allowed exclusively to determine his final decision.

This is true especially of the vocation to the priesthood and the religious life. Foolish parents sometimes compel their children to embrace the one or other of these important states by undue suasion, nay even by direct threats. As the final choice is generally not made before the individual has attained a somewhat advanced age, the fear of offending parents (*timor reverentialis*) cannot exert so strong an influence as to neutralize free-will. The liberty of choice is indeed rendered difficult,—not, however, from without, but from within, and hence the excuse, "I was forced into this state of life" is irrelevant.

⁴ Thomas à Kempis, *De Imit. Christi*, I, c. 19: "Nam homo proponit, sed Deus disponit; nec est in homine via eius." (Ed. Pohl, II, 33).

b) Of the rules to be observed in the choice of a vocation, the first and most important is that the salvation of the soul must outweigh all other considerations. It would be as wrong, therefore, to try to work out one's salvation without regard to others, as to devote oneself entirely to their well-being, regardless of the fate of one's own soul.

Secondarily, and as a matter of considerably less importance, regard may be had for temporal advantages and the common welfare of society. Time contains the germs of eternity, and whatever we do for our fellowmen is apt, one way or another, to affect their eternal destiny. Hence it is forbidden to choose a vocation that is positively immoral or sinful in itself, as, *e. g.*, to be a slave-trader or a pirate, but it is not forbidden to choose an occupation which does not redound to the immediate and tangible benefit of society, as, *e. g.*, that of a hermit or member of a contemplative order. Man lives not by bread alone, but he has spiritual and moral needs, and prayer coupled with heroic renunciation is of great social and ethical value, as any one can see who will study the immense benefits conferred upon humanity by the Mendicant Orders.⁵

⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 2a 2ae, qu. 190 sqq. and the Apostolic Letter of Leo XIII to Cardinal Gibbons (Jan. 22,

1899) condemning "Americanism," in which the Pontiff says: "*Quam hi [ordines religiosi] etiam praeclare de hominum societate meruerint,*

Catholic moral science, as such, makes no distinction between higher and lower states of life, or between honorable and dishonorable occupations, but, accepting the differences existing in society, both ecclesiastical and civil, commands every man to preserve the constituted order and to refrain from breaking down, without sufficient cause, the barriers that separate the different classes. Let no one be ashamed of the class to which he belongs or the occupation in which he is engaged, but let all remember that the Divine Founder of Christianity chose to sojourn upon earth "in the form of a servant."⁶

c) Besides the fundamental principles stated above, a man when choosing a vocation should have some knowledge of his own character and the work for which he is fitted. To acquire this knowledge is a strict duty. Unless a man knows his own character and has an earnest desire to save his soul, he will not be able to select the vocation for which he is destined, and unless he has previously familiarized himself with the obligations and difficulties of that vocation, he is likely to experience grievous disappointment.

mereant, ii norunt profecto qui, quid ad placandum conciliandumque Numen posset deprecatio iusti assidua (Jas. V, 16) *minime ignorant, ea maxime quae cum afflictatione corporis coniuncta est.*"
—On the work of the religious Orders see Montalembert, *The Monks of the West*, English translation, with an introduction by Cardinal Gasquet, 6 vols., 1896. See also F. A. Möhler, *Gesammelte Schriften*

und Aufsätze, Vol. II, Ratisbon 1840; M. Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Kongregationen der kath. Kirche*, 3 vols., 2nd ed., Paderborn 1907-08.—On vocation to the religious life cfr. M. J. Scott, S.J., *Convent Life: The Meaning of a Religious Vocation*, New York 1919.

⁶ Phil. II, 6 sq.—Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, *Christology*, 3rd ed., St. Louis 1919, pp. 95 sqq.

Let it be further borne in mind that all vocations have two features in common, namely, work and self-denial, though not, of course, in the same degree. This is another reason why every man who is about to select his vocation, should endeavor to ascertain the will of God concerning himself, and then set to work to obey it. The means by which this may best be accomplished are mature deliberation at a time when the mind is calm and undisturbed, reading good books, consulting prudent and experienced advisers, and, above all, praying for light and grace from above.

READINGS.—J. B. Krier, *Der Beruf*, 4th ed., Freiburg 1909.—Berthier, *Des États de la Vie Chrétienne et de la Vocation d'après les Docteurs de l'Église et les Théologiens*, 4th ed., Paris 1897 (English tr., *Christian Life and Vocation*, New York 1897.)—A. Vermeersch, S.J., *De Vocatione Religiosa et Sacerdotali*, Bruges 1903.—IDEM in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. XV, pp. 498–501.—Hettinger-Stepka, *Timothy, or Letters to a Young Theologian*, St. Louis 1912, pp. 1 sqq., 20 sqq., 34 sqq., 40 sqq.—Jos. Lahitton, *La Vocation Sacerdotale*, Paris 1909.—J. Mausbach, *Altchristliche und moderne Gedanken über Frauenberuf*, München-Gladbach 1906, pp. 93 sqq.—Bernard Ward, *The Priestly Vocation*, London 1918.—H. Davis, S.J., “Religious Vocation,” in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, 54th year (1918), Nos. 608 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, Vol. II, 11th ed., Innsbruck 1914, pp. 77 sq.—Thos. Slater, S.J., *A Manual of Moral Theology*, Vol. I, New York 1919, pp. 635 sq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., *Theologia Moralis*, Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 362 sqq.—Damant, *Choice of a State of Life*, Dublin 1880.—M. J. Scott, S.J., *Convent Life: The Meaning of a Religious Vocation*, New York 1919.

SECTION 2

FAITHFUL PERSEVERANCE IN THE CHOSEN VOCATION

I. Once a man has chosen his vocation, he should persevere in it to the best of his ability and comply faithfully with the obligations which it imposes.¹

We do not mean to insinuate that a change of vocation is never permissible or advisable. We merely wish to lay down the general rule that frequent changes of vocation, or any change not dictated by reasonable and sufficient motives, is unjustifiable from the moral viewpoint.² Doubts may and often do arise with regard to the vocation chosen, and if feelings of disgust with its duties and obligations cannot be entirely suppressed, they should be regarded as temptations and vigorously combatted. Even when one has a well-founded fear (*dubium prudens*) that he may not be able to attain his eternal salvation or perform his allotted share for the welfare of society in the vocation he has selected, he should, if

¹ Cfr. Matt. XXV, 14 sqq. (parable of the talents); Eph. IV, 1 sqq.; Acts XX, 18 sqq.

² Cfr. 1 Cor. VII, 17 sqq.

the choice is irrevocable (as in the case of a priest), repel all thoughts of change and make a virtue of necessity,³ nay, try to recognize in that necessity the will of God. Constant brooding over a past or future change of vocation is apt to paralyze a man's moral power and to destroy the joy with which he ought to go about his duties, whereas a firm resolution to do one's best in all circumstances, coupled with unremitting prayer, invariably brings down the grace of God and often enables a man to perform even the seemingly impossible.

A mere change of occupation may, of course, be made for any good and sufficient reason, provided that no positive duty is violated thereby and the individual is satisfied that he is called to some other state of life.

He who, though in lowly station, fills his place with honor, is better off, socially and morally, than he who seeks a higher vocation for which he is not fitted. Talent and energy find a suitable field of activity in every state, and if properly applied, will yield personal satisfaction and social benefit.

In laying down this principle we do not, however, condemn those exceptional natures who break through the barriers of an humble station and aspire to higher tasks for which they feel themselves qualified. Nor do we believe in confining people too rigidly to classes or castes. The caste system, in particular, is more or

³ Cfr. St. Jerome, *Epist.*, 54 (*al.* 10), n. 6.

less immoral. No class as such should be excluded from social honors and privileges. Every man is entitled to the advantages of civilization and culture, and where equal opportunities are open to all, we usually find that ability or intellectual power joined to moral probity succeeds in winning a fruitful sphere of activity. We hear much about an aristocracy of birth in Europe and an aristocracy of wealth in America; but the only true aristocracy is the aristocracy of character and talent.⁴

The security of those in humble station finds graphic expression in the old Latin saying, "*Procul a Iove, procul a fulmine.*" Everywhere and always fidelity to duty ranks above mere success.⁵ "It is all the same," says Lessing, "how an honest man makes his living, whether he splits wood or pilots the ship of State; what really matters, in his inmost conscience, is not the thought how useful he is, but to what extent he is willing to make himself useful." A man's true worth consists in faithfully endeavoring to fulfil his appointed task, whatever it may be; and in this all may enjoy equality, regardless of the existing differences of vocation and occupation.

⁴ F. X. Linsenmann, *Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie*, pp. 683 sq.

⁵ Cfr. Acts XX, 18 sqq.; XXI, 13; Phil. II, 17.—Seneca, *Ep.*, 25, 2:

"*Malo successum mihi quam fidem deesse.*"—IDEM, *Ep.*, 14, 16: "*Consilium omnium rerum sapiens, non exitum spectat.*"

SECTION 3

SINS AGAINST VOCATION

There are various ways in which a man may sin against his vocation.

1. He injures himself and society if he neglects to seize the opportunity of securing a living, or to acquire the necessary facilities by developing his bodily and mental talents, or to prepare himself for what he perceives to be his vocation by the conscientious employment of his time and all available means of training.

The first and greatest sin one can commit against one's vocation, therefore, is to refuse to choose a vocation. This sounds paradoxical, but is literally true nevertheless. Failure to choose a vocation, when inexcusable, is a sign of sloth, and sloth, as we all know, is the source of innumerable sins. Tramping and vagabondage not only entail grave social dangers, but their victims as a rule deteriorate morally.

Any man who, without a reasonable excuse, fails to labor in some legitimate occupation, whether intellectual or physical, is useless to society, and forfeits the right to the benefits it confers upon its members. "If any man will not

work, neither let him eat," says the Apostle,¹ and "in the Lord Jesus Christ" he charges and exhorts those who "do no work but interfere with others," to "earn the food they eat," lest they be excluded from intercourse with their brethren.²

2. A man also sins against his vocation if he undertakes too many things or fails to make himself useful, physically or intellectually, to himself or to the community in which he lives, either because he is dissatisfied with what society offers him in return for his labor, or because a wrong disposition moves him to seek nothing but pleasure.

3. Another grievous sin against vocation is the pursuit of purely temporal rewards without regard to the supernatural. To lead a life devoted entirely to mundane ambitions and material gain degrades man to the level of the brute. "A voluptuous life," says the Angelic Doctor, "seeks its end in bodily pleasure, a tendency which is common to us and the beasts, and hence, in the words of the Philosopher [Aristotle], such a life is bestial."³ Unprofitable like the beast's is the life of him who has no supernatural faith, for faith is the foundation of vocation, and without it no one can pursue his course with joy and spiritual profit.

¹ 2 Thess. III, 10 sqq.; cfr. 1 Thess. IV, 11.—St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 5, ad 2: "*Non otiose vivit, qui qualitercunque utiliter vivit.*"

² 2 Thess. III, 3, 10–12.

³ *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 179, art. 2, ad 1: "*Vita voluptuosa . . . est vita bestialis.*"

Work performed in the spirit of faith and prayer is like the gold standard, says Bishop Keppler; it has a fixed, nay an eternal value. "Thus earthly deeds assume heavenly worth; they become treasures which moths and rust cannot consume, nor thieves dig up and steal; they produce everlasting merits which give title to a crown. Performed for the honor of God and with the help of the divine power of grace, they become copies and images of God's omnipotent activity." ⁴

READINGS.—F. H. Linsenmann, *Lehrbuch der Moralthologie*, Freiburg 1878, pp. 683 sq.—Fr. Probst, *Kath. Moralthologie*, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 389 sqq., Tübingen 1853.—H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, pp. 77 sqq.

⁴ P. W. von Keppler, *More Joy*, Louis 1914, pp. 229 sqq.—Cfr. Ps. tr. by Jos. McSorley, C.S.P., St. CXXVI, 1; 1 Cor. III, 7.

CHAPTER II

THE DUTY OF LABOR

Labor is a natural necessity, a moral obligation, and a religious duty. We shall treat it in as many sections, adding a fourth on recreation or rest, which is the necessary correlative of labor.

SECTION I

LABOR AS A NATURAL NECESSITY

1. Labor is, first of all, a natural necessity. Nature compels man to labor for the necessary means of subsistence. Since the fall of our first parents, the earth, which is the ultimate source of all things required for the support of the human race, of itself bears nothing but thorns and thistles, and man is compelled to till the soil in the sweat of his brow to make it yield the products he needs. "With labor and toil thou shalt eat thereof all the days of thy life."¹ "The soul of him that laboreth, laboreth for himself, because his mouth hath obliged him to it."²

"Manual labor," says St. Thomas, "has a four-fold purpose. The first and principal one is to procure food, wherefore the first man was told: 'In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.'³ . . . Therefore, since manual labor is ordained for the obtaining of sustenance, it falls under the necessity of precept, because it is necessary to attain that end. For that which is ordained towards an end, derives necessity from that end,

¹ Gen. III, 17 sqq.

³ Gen. III, 19.

² Prov. XVI, 26.

i. e., it is necessary in proportion as the end cannot be attained without it. Consequently, he who has no living from some other source, is obliged to perform manual labor, no matter what his position may be.”⁴

Having in view both the natural and the economic aspect of labor, we can truly say that the more industriously men work, the more abundant are the means of sustenance and enjoyment at their disposal, and the less danger there is of want.

2. As man consists of body and soul, his labor is either bodily or mental, or perhaps it would be more correct to say, it is *both* bodily and mental; for as a rule the two occur in combination, though one or the other may, and usually does, predominate. Moreover, nearly every kind of bodily labor is more or less planned and directed by the will and the intellect;—by the will, because all labor involves the overcoming of difficulties; by the intellect, because the proper utilization of the materials and powers furnished by nature requires a preliminary knowledge. ‘Productive labor is that which creates, conserves,

⁴ *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 3: “Labor manualis ad quatuor ordinatur. Primo quidem et principaliter ad victum quaerendum, unde et primo homini dictum est: ‘In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane tuo.’ . . . Secundum ergo quod labor manualis ordinatur ad victum quaerendum cadit sub necessitate

praecepti, prout est necessarius ad talem finem; quod enim ordinatur ad finem, a fine necessitatem habet, ut scilicet intantum sit necessarium, inquantum finis sine eo esse non potest. Et ideo, qui non habet aliunde unde vivere possit, tenetur manibus operari cuiuscunque sit conditionis.”

acquires or transfers material or economic goods, and likewise that which produces, preserves, communicates or spreads personal or social values, as religious and moral convictions or endeavors, useful knowledge or facilities, intellectual and spiritual culture, political order and security, or any other requisites of intellectual and physical well-being.⁵ While the work of some classes of men, *e. g.*, physicians, teachers, priests, authors, etc., does not produce material goods, it may be truly said to be productive in a mediate and indirect way, because the creation, acquisition, and preservation of economic values depends largely on personal and social goods. "He who writes a book," in the words of a modern author, "serves the intellect, and by serving the intellect, serves the world." Thus, in the natural or economic sense, labor may be defined as the conscious and purposeful application of man's faculties with a view to producing those things which are necessary or useful for sustaining life.

⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 3: "*Sciendum tamen, quod sub opere manuali intelleguntur omnia humana officia, ex quibus homines licite victum lucrantur, sive manibus sive pedibus sive lingua fiant. Vigiles enim et cursores et alii huiusmodi de suo labore viventes intelleguntur de operibus manuum vivere. Quia enim manus est organum orga-*

norum, per opus manuum omnis operatio intellegitur, de qua aliquis victum licite potest lucrari."—*Ibid.*, qu. 100, art. 3, ad 3: "*Ille qui habet scientiam et non suscepit cum hoc officium, ex quo obligetur aliis usum scientiae impendere, licite potest pretium suae doctrinae vel consilii accipere, non quasi veritatem aut scientiam vendens, sed quasi operas suas locans.*"

The line of demarcation between work and play is not always easy to draw; nevertheless it exists and must be duly attended to.

Charles S. Devas,⁶ because of the invidious and misleading character of the term "unproductive," prefers to divide labor into *industrial* and *non-industrial*, according as its end is, or is not, the preparation of material goods or the production of wealth. The terms industrial and non-industrial are also used by Dr. H. Sidgwick⁷ and correspond substantially with Prof. Nicholson's "material production" and "immaterial production." The moralist may disregard this controversy as irrelevant.

3. The welfare of the individual as well as that of society depends not only on the amount of labor performed, but likewise on its proper distribution among the different individuals and classes that constitute the community, on the way in which the laboring men are treated, and on the perfection of the mechanical means employed, such as tools, machinery, power, and on the progress made in industry, trade, and commerce. A higher standard of living with less expenditure of labor is to-day the goal of all classes of workers, including the farmer.

The necessity of working for a living entails the obligation of employing labor efficiently and economically, so as to make it as fruitful and re-

⁶ *Political Economy*, 3rd ed., London 1917, pp. 15 sqq.

⁷ *The Principles of Political Economy*, p. 265, London 1883.

munerative as possible and to satisfy not only the elementary natural needs of man, but likewise his legitimate craving for relaxation.⁸

Of the "right to work" we shall treat in the fifth volume of this Handbook.⁹

READINGS.—St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 3.—Leo XIII, Encyclical "*Rerum Novarum*," May 15, 1891 (*The Pope and the People*, London 1912, pp. 188 sqq.)—E. Génicot, *Theologiae Moralis Institutiones*, 4th ed., Louvain 1902, Vol. I, n. 365.—S. Weber, *Evangelium und Arbeit*, Freiburg 1898.—H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, Vol. II, 11th ed., Innsbruck 1914, pp. 79 sqq.

⁸ Cfr. F. Schäffle, *Kapitalismus und Sozialismus*, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1878; G. Ratzinger, *Die Volkswirtschaft in ihren sittlichen Grund-*

lagen, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1895.

⁹ See on this subject J. E. Ross, C. S. P., *The Right to Work*, New York, 1918.

SECTION 2

LABOR AS A MORAL OBLIGATION

1. Labor is not only a natural necessity, it is also a moral obligation.¹

Labor was enjoined upon our first parents in Paradise as the primary condition and chief means of moral progress and perfection. Man has to labor in order to ennoble his nature and to attain sanctification. Labor should be his very breath and life. It preserves his bodily and mental health; it steels and fortifies his will; it makes him contented and happy. Even when the tangible products do not seem to correspond to the energy expended, the right sort of work has an intrinsic ideal value which makes it worth while, whereas idleness and sloth entail spiritual death and at the same time are a gross violation of the duty which the individual owes to society; for, as St. Paul says, "If any man will not work, neither let him eat."²

2. To toil faithfully and assiduously in one's

¹ Job V, 7.—Cfr. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 3: "*Secundo [labor manualis] ordinatur ad tollendum otium, ex quo multa mala oriuntur. . . . Secundum autem quod opus manuale ordinatur ad otium tollendum vel ad corporis macerationem, non*

cadit sub necessitate praecepti secundum se consideratum, quia multis aliis modis potest vel caro macerari vel etiam otium tolli, quam per opus manuale."

² 2 Thess. III, 10; cfr. A. Winterstein, *Die christliche Lehre vom Erdengut*, pp. 157 sqq.

chosen vocation is to obey a divine command. Labor spells life; idleness, death. Distaste for labor has its source in repugnance to duty and involves contempt of the divine commandments which bind society together. There can be no doubt that labor brings its own reward. No matter how disagreeable any particular task or occupation may seem at first, after a while it becomes pleasant, as a bitter medicine grows sweet to the taste. Labor is a great blessing, and he who voluntarily renounces its benefits is a fool.

“Honor for every kind of work! In every man’s labor a human will, an immortal soul, externalizes itself, a man’s heart is throbbing and a man’s blood is circulating. All work is capable of being spiritualized and ennobled to the highest degree. We must come at last to recognize that it is a sin against both culture and art for the ‘upper’ classes to brand as vulgar and dishonorable whole groups of occupations which are necessary, and in fact indispensable, in the human household. Those persons should rather regard themselves as under personal obligations to all who perform menial offices and services. ‘If there were nobody to perform the menial tasks, the higher culture could not exist.’ ”³

READINGS.—See the authorities cited on page 129, and in addition: J. G. Uhlhorn, *Die Arbeit im Lichte des Evangeliums, betrachtet*, Bremen 1877.—K. Eger, *Die Anschauungen Luthers vom Beruf*, Giessen 1900.—A. Sabatier, *L’Église et le Travail Manuel*, Paris 1895.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., *Theologia Moralis*, Vol. I, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, pp. 410 sq.

3 P. W. von Kepler, *More Joy*, tr. by J. McSorley, C.S.P., St. Louis, 1914, p. 228.

SECTION 3

LABOR AS A RELIGIOUS DUTY

1. Labor would have been a duty even in the pure state of nature, but it has become absolutely necessary, and sacred as well, since the fall of our first parents. For now it is also a punishment and a means of penance, nay, more than that,—a means of atonement and redemption.¹ St. Thomas says: “Thirdly, [manual labor] is ordained for the repression of concupiscence, inas much as by it the body is mortified.² . . . The Apostle prescribes manual labor, first, to avoid theft; ³ secondly, as an antidote to covetousness; ⁴ third, against dishonest transactions by means of which some men make a living.”⁵

1 Gen. III, 17-19.—Cfr. St. Augustine, *De Gen. ad Lit.*, l. VIII, c. 8, n. 15: “*Quidquid deliciarum habet agricultura, tunc utique longe amplius erat, quando nihil accidebat adverse vel terra vel caelo. Non enim erat laboris afflictio, sed exhilaratio voluntatis, quum ea, quae Deus creaverat, humani operis adiutorio laetius feraciusque provenirent.*” (Migne, *P. L.*, XXXIV, 379).

2 2 Cor. VI, 5.

3 Eph. IV, 28.

4 1 Thess. IV, 11.

5 2 Thess. III, 10 sq. The quotation is from the *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 3: “*Tertio [labor manualis] ordinatur ad concupiscentiae refrenationem, in quantum per hoc maceratur corpus. . . . Nam primo quidem praecipit Apostolus opus manuale ad vitandum furtum, secundum ad vitandam cupiditatem alienarum rerum, tertio ad evitanda turpia negotia, ex quibus aliqui victum acquirunt.*”—Cfr. M. Hausherr, *Die geheiligte Handarbeit*, Mayence 1873.

Christ Himself was the son of a carpenter.⁶ He bore the burdens of an humble day laborer as part of His great work of sacrifice and atonement and by His example showed men how to sanctify and ennoble their daily task. The faithful Christian, therefore, labors not only to earn his bread, to provide for his family, to heap up riches, to gain the means of enjoyment, or because he prefers activity to idleness, but mainly for the reason that labor is a sacred duty which he owes to God, to himself, and to his fellowmen. He works for the honor and glory of God, for the sanctification of his own soul, and for the relief of his needy neighbors.⁷

The last-mentioned point is thus explained by St. Thomas: "In the fourth place [manual labor] is ordained for the giving of alms.⁸ . . . In this respect it does not, however, fall under the necessity of precept, except where one is under strict obligation to give alms and can obtain the means of succoring the poor from no other source. In that case all men, religious as well as seculars, are obliged to perform manual labor."⁹

Radulphus Ardens, a famous theologian and

⁶ Matth. XIII, 55; Mark VI, 3; cfr. John IV, 34; V, 38; VIII, 29.

⁷ Acts XX, 35; Eph. IV, 28.

⁸ Eph. IV, 28.

⁹ *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 3: "Quarto [labor manualis] ordinatur ad eleemosynas faciendas. . . . In quantum vero opus manuale ordinatur ad eleemosynas

faciendas, non cadit sub necessitate praecepti, nisi forte in aliquo casu, in quo ex necessitate aliquis eleemosynas facere teneretur et non posset alias habere, unde pauperibus subveniret, in quo casu obligarentur similiter religiosi et saeculares ad opera manualia exsequenda."

preacher of the twelfth century,¹⁰ tersely sums up the benefits of labor as follows: It destroys vice, nourishes virtue, provides the necessities of life, and affords the means of giving alms.¹¹

It was a grand and thoroughly Christian idea, which found expression throughout the Middle Ages, that man shall not regard his work and earnings, no matter how modest, selfishly, but always in relation to his neighbor. The Pauline passage embodying this thought: "Let him labor, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have something to give to him that suffereth need,"¹² was made the basis of a number of ancient monastic rules, which we know from the writings of St. Benedict of Aniane.¹³

Intimately related to this idea are two others, namely, (1) that labor is a duty which man owes to God, and (2) that it is a necessary means of developing the higher, spiritual side of his nature. Together these three concepts acted as a ferment in the conservative social and economic life of the Middle Ages. The idea that the living to which one is entitled should correspond to one's social position, was thus safeguarded against undue exaggeration. A man was permitted to earn more than he required for himself and his dependents, but only on condition that he took good care of his soul, made becoming sacrifices to God, gave alms to the poor, and faithfully performed all his duties to society.¹⁴

¹⁰ Cfr. M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, Vol. I, Freiburg 1909, pp. 246 sqq.

¹¹ *Hom.*, I, II, c. 32 (Migne, P. L., CLV, 1615): "*Vitia destruit, virtutes nutrit, necessaria parat, eleemosynam donat.*"

¹² Eph. IV, 28.

¹³ On Benedict of Aniane see J. P. Kirsch in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, p. 467.

¹⁴ Cfr. F. Schaub, *Der Kampf gegen den Zinswucher*, Freiburg 1905, pp. 16 sq.

"Nothing hinders us from raising our daily work to the higher Christian plane of dignity and value. Hence there should no longer be question of compulsory labor; the loud, cheerful 'aye' of a man perfectly willing to work prevails over the 'nay' of indolent, weary nature. Thus a man becomes free, even if born in labor's chains. He determines the kind and value of his work; and he appropriates its best fruit, the absolutely sure pay which no one can lessen. With his work he is serving not men, not force, nor necessity, nor a gloomy fate, nor a machine, nor the owner of a machine, but the Overlord of all work, his God and Lord and Saviour Christ Jesus." "So we learn to prize and honor and love work. We know that we never labor in vain, that despite all human weakness, misery, and imperfection, our work has a value. We know how much we owe to work, and what a benefit is a great serious life-task; how work steels the will, trains the faculties, strengthens the whole man; how external labor helps us in our inner work with ourselves, promoting moral purity, mental breadth and depth. Often we profit as much by failure as by success,—sometimes even more. In a great sorrow or a terrible crisis, we find that work has a wonderful power of healing. When work is completed, we enjoy inner peace, a pleasant fatigue. And not only do we rejoice after work, but we learn to be joyful during our work, and even to enjoy the work itself. That is the true joy of work; and sometimes it breaks out in song. 'Give me the man who sings while at work,' says Carlyle."¹⁵

¹⁵ Bishop Keppler, *op. cit.*, pp. 229 sq. A modern poet describes Jesus going through a great factory, not impressed by its marvellous machinery, its speed, its skill, but "looking for His singing-man,"—

the man whom His Father made to sing at work. He looks in vain. (See Catholic *Fortnightly Review*, St. Louis, Mo., Vol. XXV (1918), No. 23.

SECTION 4

MANUAL AND INTELLECTUAL LABOR, AND RECREATION

I. Rest or recreation follows labor as inevitably as day follows night or summer follows winter. To the duty of labor, accordingly, there corresponds the right to rest and recreation,—the right to enjoy an earthly Sabbath here below and the hope of a heavenly Sabbath in the world beyond.¹

According to the teaching of Revelation there exists the right and, under certain circumstances, the duty of performing mental or spiritual labor, consisting in prayer, study, or contemplation of the eternal truths.²

The Schoolmen divided life into the active and the contemplative.³ “All endeavors of human activity,” says, *e. g.*, St. Thomas, “if they are ordained towards the necessity of the pres-

¹ Gen. II, 2; Ex. XX, 11; Apoc. XIV, 13.

² Luke X, 38-42.—Cfr. St. Jerome, *Epist.*, XIV (*al.* I), n. 10: “*Labore terreris? At nemo athleta [Christi] sine sudore coronatur.*” (Migne, *P. L.*, XXII, 354).

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, *Summa Theo-*

logica, 2a 2ae, qu. 179, art. 1: “*Quia quidam homines praecipue intendunt contemplationi veritatis, quidam vero intendunt principaliter exterioribus actionibus, inde est quod vita hominis convenienter dividitur per activam et contemplativam.*”

ent life according to right reason, pertain to the active life, which provides for the necessities of the present by duly disposed actions, . . . whereas those human endeavors which are ordained towards the consideration of truth, belong to the contemplative life.”⁴

The essential difference between the active and the contemplative life has been frequently lost sight of, even by Catholics. Only a few years ago Pope Leo XIII found it necessary to recall the traditional Catholic teaching on this point in a letter to Cardinal Gibbons.⁵

Labor, both bodily and mental, if it is not followed by sufficient rest, will in course of time cause nervous exhaustion (neurasthenia), which with its attendant disorders is apt to prove hereditary. The restless pursuit of wealth is expressly condemned by our Lord in the famous passage: “What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his own soul?”⁶

The intellectual and the material aspects of human labor as a factor in the advancement of civilization and culture are aptly summarized in

⁴ *Ibid.*, art. 2, ad 3: “*Omnia studia humanarum actionum, si ordinentur ad necessitatem praesentis vitae secundum rationem rectam, pertinent ad vitam activam, quae per ordinatas actiones consulit necessitati vitae praesentis, . . . hu-*

mana vero studia, quae ordinantur ad considerationem veritatis, pertinent ad vitam contemplativam.”

⁵ “*Testem benevolentiae*,” Jan. 22, 1899.

⁶ Matth. XVI, 26.

the ancient Benedictine adage: "*Ora et labora*—Pray and work!"⁷

The duty of labor, however, must not be urged beyond reasonable limits. A man who retires from business after years of hard work to rest and prepare for death, is not to be accused of idleness. Man owes to his fellowmen, present and future, not his whole being, but only a portion of his power to work. No matter how important his position in life, the individual is never indispensable, but his labor is merged in the collective toil of the race. Work is measured by hours and days, and may cease for hours and days without perceptibly retarding the progress of society. Then again, there are cases in which it is better for a man, especially one advanced in years, to step aside than to cling to a position for which he is no longer fit.⁸

2. There are some species of human activity which afford employment to many thousands, yet do not deserve the noble name of labor. To this class of occupations, which do not produce, but merely consume and destroy, and batten on the financial and moral ruin of men, belong usury, prostitution, gambling in "futures,"⁹ etc.

⁷ See Anonymus, *Die Regel des hl. Benedikt*, pp. 345 sqq.

⁸ Cfr. F. X. Linsenmann, *Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie*, p. 287.

⁹ On gambling in "futures" see Th. Slater, S.J., *Questions of Moral Theology*, New York 1915, pp. 154 sqq.

With these Special Moral Theology deals in connection with economics.¹⁰

There is another kind of (predominantly intellectual) labor which is destructive and therefore worse than useless. It is the writing and publishing of books, magazines, and newspapers that attack or undermine faith and morals.

To adjust the relative claims of manual and intellectual labor is not an easy task. The man who makes his living by the work of his hands, finds it hard to understand that mental labor can be quite as exhausting as physical exertion,¹¹ whereas the man engaged in purely mental work is apt to underestimate the hardships of the physical toiler. This lack of mutual understanding and sympathy leads to envy on the one and undue pride on the other side and frequently gives rise to unjust judgments on both.

3. Though a few ancient writers, like Hesiod, extolled manual labor as the source of well-being, or, like Homer, spoke of it with respect,¹² pagan antiquity for the most part held it in contempt.¹³ Christianity restored it to honor and respectability. The Gospel emphasized the universal

¹⁰ See Vol. V of this Handbook.

¹¹ Shelley speaks of the "agony and sweat of intellectual travail." Newman says that "every book I have written . . . has been a sort of operation, the distress has been so great." (Ward's *Life of Newman*, I, 296). And: "The composition of a volume is like gestation and child-birth. I do not think that I ever thought out a question, or

wrote my thoughts, without great pain, pain reaching to the body as well as to the mind. It has made me feel practically that labor '*in sudore vultus sui*' is the lot of man." (*Ibid.*, p. 637.)

¹² Cfr. M. Heinze, *Der Eudämonismus in der griechischen Philosophie*, Leipsic 1883, pp. 671 sqq.

¹³ Cfr. Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, c. 42.

duty of labor and introduced a spirit of fraternal charity among all classes of people, high and low, learned and ignorant.¹⁴ The fact that St. Peter "abode many days in Joppe with one Simon, a tanner,"¹⁵ shows that even "unclean" and despised trades were regarded by the Apostles as honorable. Protestants assert that it is only since the so-called Reformation that ordinary labor has received its due in the Christian Church. This is not true. The two principal ideas which Protestantism claims for its own, *viz.*: that labor is a form of prayer, or a sacred office, and that it is a duty which the individual owes to society, were strongly enforced by the Catholic Church all through the Middle Ages.¹⁶ Again and again people of all classes were exhorted to labor and warned against idleness.

Bishop RATHERIUS of Verona (+ 974) says in a sermon addressed to farmers: "You wish to be a good Christian? Well, then, be not only a just but a constant laborer."¹⁷ To the artisan he says: "Listen to what is written in Ecclesiasticus XXXVIII, 39,¹⁸ in order that you may know that you are able with your labors to offer

¹⁴ Cfr. A. Sabatier, *L'Eglise et le Travail Manuel*, Paris 1895, pp. 24 sqq., 45 sqq., 85 sqq., 211 sqq.; A. Stöckl, *Das Christentum und die grossen Fragen der Gegenwart*, Vol. I, pp. 169 sqq., Mayence 1879.

¹⁵ Acts IX, 43; X, 6, 17, 32.

¹⁶ Cfr. F. Schaub, *Der Kampf gegen den Zinswucher*, p. 15; also J. G. Uhlhorn, *Die Arbeit im Lichte des Evangeliums betrachtet*,

Bremen 1877; K. Eger, *Die Anschauungen Luthers vom Beruf*, Giessen 1900.

¹⁷ "Laborator."

¹⁸ Eccles. XXXVIII, 39: "But they shall strengthen the state of the world, and their prayers shall be in the work of their craft, applying their soul, and searching in the law of the most High."

God an acceptable prayer of praise." And to the beggar: "Woe to thee if thou art able to work for a living!" With equal insistence the same prelate admonishes poor soldiers and rich burghers to work.¹⁹ The Emperor Charlemagne, in 806, forbade his subjects to feed the many idlers who roamed about the country begging but unwilling to work. Long before Luther, John Herolt, a famous Dominican preacher of the fifteenth century,²⁰ said in a sermon that whatever a man's profession may be, his daily labor is ordained by God and therefore morally good.²¹ When St. Francis Xavier, on his journey to India, was urged to employ a servant because it was beneath his dignity as Apostolic delegate to wash his clothes and cook his food, he replied: "As long as I have hands and feet, I will allow no one to serve me, for there is but one thing that is unworthy of man, and that is sin."²²

With *recreation* we have already dealt in the first part of this volume,²³ and here will only add that all forms of recreation are licit, provided they do not violate the laws of modesty and chastity, and are rightly ordered according to time, place, duration, and manner. *Athletic sports* are especially to be recommended, within proper limits, as they help to keep a sound mind in a healthy body, and, in the words of Father

¹⁹ *Praeloquia*, l. I, tit. 1-3, 17, 19 (Migne, P. L., CXXXVI, 149 sqq., 179, 188).

²⁰ He died in 1468.

²¹ See N. Paulus, "*Luther und der Beruf in neuester Beleuchtung*," in the *Katholik*, Mayence, 1902, Vol. I, pp. 327 sqq. Cfr. F.

Landmann, *Das Predigtwesen in Westfalen*, Münster 1906, pp. 179 sq.; K. Braun, *Die kath. Predigt während der Jahre 1450-1650*, Würzburg 1904, pp. 90 sqq., 100 sq.

²² F. X. Brou, *Saint François Xavier*, Paris, Vol. I, 1915.

²³ *Supra*, pp. 35 sqq.

Noldin, are apt to serve not only the principal object of recreation, as such, but to aid in preserving and augmenting the virtues of chastity and temperance. Hence there is no reason why pastors of souls should condemn clubs and associations formed for the practice of wholesome sports, but there is every reason why they should promote such and endeavor to have them conducted in accordance with the rules of probity and religion.²⁴

Having dealt with labor, we pass by a natural transition to its product, *i. e.*, property. This, too, may be twofold, material or ideal. Among ideal goods the most valuable is honor.

READINGS.—H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, Vol. II, 11th ed., Innsbruck 1914, p. 76.—F. A. Göpfert, *Moraltheologie*, Vol. II, 6th ed., pp. 12 sq., Paderborn 1909.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., *Christian Ethics*, New York 1919, pp. 177 sq., 329 sq.

²⁴ Noldin, *Summa Theol. Mor.*, Vol. II, p. 76.

CHAPTER III

RIGHT AND DUTY OF ACQUIRING AND POSSESSING PROPERTY

1. From the duty of labor flows the right of property or ownership, *i. e.*, the right to acquire, hold, and dispose freely of the material fruits of labor, that is to say, the goods which are the result of man's individual and personal endeavor.

The right to acquire and possess property is by no means, as the Communists and Socialists maintain, a fictitious claim based on robbery and injustice,¹ but corresponds to the natural duty of labor from which it arises, and therefore is a natural right.

Under certain conditions the acquisition of a limited amount of earthly goods even becomes a duty.² The supreme, though not the sole, title of ownership is labor.

1 Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., *Socialism: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Application*, tr. and adapted to conditions in the United States by V. Gettelmann, S.J., New York 1904.

2 Gen. III, 19; Eccles. V, 17; 2 Thess. III, 10.—Cfr. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 2: "Circa rem exteriorem duo

competunt homini, quorum unum est potestas procurandi et dispensandi, et quantum ad hoc licitum est quod homo propria possideat. Est etiam necessarium ad humanam vitam propter tria: primo quidem, quia magis sollicitus est unusquisque ad procurandum aliquid, quod sibi soli competit, quam id quod est commune omnium vel multorum, quia

Private ownership is a wonderful institution, to which humanity owes the development of trade, commerce, and industry, nay whatever determines the differences between civilized man and the savage. Without it labor would languish because the laborer would no longer be sure of the product of his industry. The surer he feels that he is toiling for himself and his own, rather than for strangers, the greater the persistency and diligence which he will bestow upon his work. Private ownership safeguards the future, as far as this is humanly possible, and without it diligence and thrift would never increase the movable capital that lends so powerful an impetus to production, nor would the constantly renewed and always laborious work of cultivating the soil insure to the earth that increase of fertility without which society would be condemned to endless misery.³

Barely touching the traditional arguments as

unusquisque laborem fugiens relinquit alteri id quod pertinet ad commune, sicut accidit in multitudine ministrorum; alio modo, quia ordinatius res humanæ tractantur, si singulis imminet propria cura alicuius rei procurandæ; esset autem confusio, si quilibet indistincte quaelibet procuraret; tertio quia per hoc magis pacificus status hominum conservatur, dum unusquisque re sua contentus est. Unde videmus, quod inter eos qui communiter et ex indiviso aliquid possident, frequentius iuriga oriuntur."—Father

J. Kelleher, in what is probably the best modern treatise on the subject (*Private Ownership*, Dublin 1911) points out (p. 149) that the classical theologians almost unanimously taught that the division of private property does not depend directly upon the natural law, but is derived from the *ius gentium*." (Cfr. Ross, *Christian Ethics*, pp. 278 sqq.)

³ Chas. Périn, *Les Lois de la Société Chrétienne*, 2 vols., Paris 1876, especially Vol. I; F. Walter, *Naturrecht und Politik*, Bonn 1863, pp. 145 sqq.

developed, *e. g.*, by St. Thomas, Pope Leo XIII, in his famous Encyclical "*Rerum Novarum*," bases private ownership on the rational nature of man.

"Every man," he says, "has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation, for the brute has no power of self-direction, but is governed by two main instincts, which keep its powers on the alert, impel it to develop them in a fitting manner, and stimulate and determine it to action without any power of choice. One of these instincts is self-preservation, the other, the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which lie within range; beyond their verge the brute creation cannot go, for beasts are moved to action by their senses only, and in the special direction which these suggest. But with man it is wholly different. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of the animal being, and hence enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal kind, the fruition of things material. But animal nature, however perfect, is far from representing the human being in its completeness, and is in truth but humanity's humble handmaid, made to serve and to obey. It is the mind or reason which is the predominant element in us who are human creatures; it is this which renders a man human, and distinguishes him essentially and generically from the brute. And on this very account—that man alone among the animal creation is endowed with reason—it must be within his right to possess things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings do, but to have and to hold them in stable and permanent

possession; he must have not only things that perish in the user, but those also which, though they have been reduced to use, continue for further use in after time. This becomes still more clearly evident if man's nature be considered a little more deeply. For man, fathoming by his faculty of reason matters without number, and linking the future with the present, becoming, furthermore, by enlightened forethought, master of his own acts, guides his ways under the eternal law and the power of God, whose providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice not only as to matters that regard his present welfare, but also about those which he deems may be for his advantage in time yet to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the very soil, inasmuch as from the produce of the earth he has to lay by provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; although satisfied to-day, they demand fresh supplies for to-morrow." ⁴

The Pontiff goes on to show that private ownership was established through individual efforts before the existence of the State, and that it is recognized by history, by civil law, and by divine law.⁵

It is frequently asserted that the first Christians, especially those at Jerusalem, practiced Communism.⁶ Learned scholars who have investigated the question with great care denies that

⁴ English tr. from *The Pope and the People*, London 1912, pp. 181 sq. A better tr. in *Bolshevism—The Remedy*, New Haven, Conn., 1919, pp. 5 sq.

⁵ Cfr. A. C. Breig, *Papal Program of Social Reform*, Milwaukee 1913, pp. 14 sqq.

⁶ Cfr. Acts II, 44 sq.; IV, 32-37; V, 1-4.

there was Communism in the primitive Church. The early Christians were allowed to keep their property, and if some of them sold it, they did so voluntarily, for the purpose of assisting the poor.⁷ The most that can be said is that in some sections of the great congregation of Jerusalem there existed a sort of religious community of goods.⁸

Those Church Fathers who are represented as having preached Communism, did not oppose private ownership, but merely its abuse. The passages quoted from their writings by Socialist authors are largely spurious, and those which are genuine prove nothing more than that God did not distribute temporal goods directly among individual men, but gave the earth with its resources to the race at large for the common use of all, so that no one may claim anything as his own as if he had the right to exclude all others absolutely and for ever from its use.⁹ The Fathers simply wished to express the same truth which St. Thomas in the thirteenth century set forth as follows: "Man may not have exterior things for his own, but as the common property of all, namely in such a way that one readily shares them with others in case of need."¹⁰

There are many Patristic texts which unmistakably assert the right of private ownership.¹¹ Lactantius defends

7 Cfr. E. Baumgartner, "*Der Kommunismus im Urchristentum*," in the *Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie*, 1909, pp. 625 sqq.

8 O. Schilling, *Reichtum und Eigentum in der altkirchlichen Literatur*, Freiburg 1908, pp. 16 sq.

9 Cfr. J. Biederlack, S. J., *Die soziale Frage*, 7th ed., p. 134, n. 1.

10 *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 66,

art. 2: "*Non debet homo habere res exteriores ut proprias, sed ut communes, ut scilicet de facili aliquis eas communicet in necessitate aliorum.*"

11 See G. Ratzinger, *Die Volkswirtschaft*, 2nd ed., pp. 82 sqq.; A. Vermeersch, S. J., *Quaestiones de Iustitia*, 2nd ed., pp. 266 sqq.; V. Cathrein, S. J., *Moralphiloso-*

it with great scientific acumen. St. Ambrose, who frequently censures the wealthy, teaches that the condemnation pronounced by Christ does not affect all who have wealth, but only those who abuse it, and adds that every man is allowed perfect freedom in giving alms.¹²

The phrase, "*Omnis dives aut iniquus aut iniqui heres*,"¹³ which occurs repeatedly in the writings of St. Jerome, has led to his being classed as a Socialist. But

phie, 4th ed., Vol. II, pp. 313 sqq.; J. Seipel, *Die wirtschafts-ethischen Lehren der Kirchenväter*, Vienna 1907, pp. 49 sqq., 120 sqq., 190 sqq.; J. A. Ryan *Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers*, St. Louis 1913.

¹² St. Ambrose, *Expos. Evangel. sec. Luc.*, l. V, n. 69: "*Licet in pecuniariis copiis multa sint lenocinia delictorum, pleraque tamen sunt etiam incentiva virtutum. Quamquam virtus subsidia non requirat et commendatior sit collatio pauperis quam divitis liberalitas, tamen non eos qui habeant divitias, sed eos qui uti his nesciant, sententiae coelestis auctoritate condemnat.*" (Migne. P. L., XV, 1654).—IDEM *De Nabuthe Iezrael*, c. 13, n. 55: "*Qui in divitiis potuerit comprobari, is vere perfectus et dignus est gloriâ.*" (P. L., XIV, 748).—IDEM, *De Officiis*, l. I, c. 30, n. 14: "*In tua potestate est largiri quod velis.*" (P. L., XVI, 66).—On the teaching of St. Ambrose consult O. Schilling, *Reichtum und Armut*, (see note 8, *supra*) pp. 134 sqq., and J. A. Ryan, *Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers*, St. Louis 1913, pp. 52-66. "What St. Ambrose teaches is not communism in any correct sense of the word," says Dr. Ryan (*op. cit.*, p. 57 sq.). "It is rather a first principle of the natural law,

namely that the earth belongs to all the children of men, and not to a few only. He tells the rich to restore their excessive wealth to the poor, while a communist would order them to turn it over to the community. It is true that he calls these donations of the rich by the name of *restitution*, but this is because the rich have accumulated so much that the poor have been deprived of their birth-right. Hence, he commands them to give back their unjust gains. Any one who will read the history of the oppression of the poor in Italy in the fourth century, will know that St. Ambrose was right when he told the rich that they had robbed the poor, and were consequently bound to make reparation. The most zealous defender of individual ownership could speak the same way in the same circumstances. What St. Ambrose demands, therefore, is not a return to common property, but a recognition of common rights."

¹³ This remarkable saying, which seems to have been of pagan origin, was evidently current in St. Jerome's day, for he quotes it in three distinct passages of his writings. For an analysis of these passages see J. A. Ryan, *Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers*, pp. 67 sqq.

the fact that St. Jerome makes this sentiment his own and quotes it with approval, does not prove that he looked upon every property holder as a thief. "*Iniquus*—from *in* + *aequus*—refers literally to a want of equality or want of proportion. Taken figuratively, it has about the same meaning as *iniustus*, for which it was often used as a synonym by the best authors. Now St. Jerome's style, as well as his own confession, assures us that he was well acquainted with classical Latin. We may safely infer then that he uses this word in the specific sense of *iniustus*, and not in the more general sense of *peccator*. This inference is confirmed by his manner of speaking in a sentence where he distinguishes between an *impius* on the one hand, and an *iniquus* and a *peccator* on the other. Even if he meant merely 'wrong doer' when he wrote *iniquus*, the specific wrong doing referred to must have been an act of injustice, since it was committed in acquiring riches. When a man gets possession by wrong-doing, the greater part of the wrong will fall under the head of injustice, violation of personal rights. St. Jerome, therefore, subscribed to the opinion that every *dives* was an unjust man, and by *dives* he meant, not a man of some property, but a man of *much* property. All the synonyms of *dives* and its use by the best authors show that it refers to an abundance of goods, and not to mere ownership, as some would have us believe." ¹⁴

¹⁴ Ryan, *op. cit.*, pp. 70 sq. Further on in his booklet (p. 74) Dr. Ryan shows that Herbert Spencer spoke in much the same way of the present titles to landed property as St. Jerome did of those of his time. "It can never be pretended that the existing titles to such property are legitimate. . . . Violence, fraud, the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning,

these are the sources to which these titles may be traced." The passage occurs in Spencer's *Social Statics* and was omitted in later editions, but, as Dr. Ryan correctly says, "the question is one of fact, not of opinion." W. S. Lilly declares: "I say, without shadow of doubt, that to much property the saying of Proudhon [namely, that property is theft] is strictly ap-

The proposition, "No Christian should be engaged in commercial pursuits, and those who persist in them, should be expelled from the Church,"¹⁵ which it frequently ascribed to St. Chrysostom, does not occur in his genuine writings, but in the *Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum* of an Arian writer falsely attributed to the Saint.¹⁶ Certain communistic ideas that occur in the genuine works of St. Chrysostom must be interpreted as the product of a sort of ideal Communism, resembling that of Plato, which marked a reaction against the dominating power of wealth, the materialism and egotism of certain rich people, and the exaggerated esteem in which worldly possessions were generally held at that time and which manifested itself in an insane pursuit of wealth similar to that which we behold all around us to-day. In attacking these flagrant and serious abuses St. Chrysostom occasionally employed expressions which, when read through modern glasses, seem to stamp him as an opponent of the principle of private ownership.¹⁷

plicable." Charles S. Devas says: "As a matter of fact, much of the wealth of the rich classes in modern Europe has been gathered together, and is still kept up, by dreadful deeds of cruelty, injustice, and fraud."—"Mr. Lilly," comments Dr. Ryan, "is neither a Socialist nor a radical, but above all a pleader for law, while Mr. Devas was an unimaginative student of economics. If men of this character can write thus of titles to property in modern times, is it any wonder that St. Jerome used similar language in his day?" (*Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers*, pp. 74 sq.)

¹⁵"Nullus christianus debet esse

mercator, aut si voluerit esse, proiciatur de ecclesia Dei."

¹⁶Cfr. F. X. Funk's paper, "Ueber Reichtum und Handel im christlichen Altertum," in his *Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen*, Paderborn 1917, Vol. III, pp. 150 sqq.

¹⁷On the teaching of St. Chrysostom, see O. Schilling, *Reichtum und Armut*, (note 8, *supra*), p. 122 and J. A. Ryan, *Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers*, pp. 1-7; on the teaching of St. Basil, *ibid.*, pp. 7 sqq., 17 sqq.; of St. Gregory of Nyssa, pp. 10 sq.; of Clement of Alexandria, p. 11; of St. Augustine, pp. 12 sq.; of St. Gregory the Great, pp. 15 sq.

2. In all that regards wealth and earthly possessions (*bona fortunae*) Catholics must be guided by the following principles.

a) Broadly speaking, every man is in duty bound to acquire the means which are necessary to support himself and his dependents and to fulfil the obligations that rest upon him as a member of society. He may, moreover, acquire a superfluity of earthly possessions, but if he does so, he incurs the additional obligation of making good use of his surplus; in other words, he must not acquire or cherish wealth for its own sake, but in order to share it with the needy.¹⁸

b) The possession of wealth is no sin in itself, but involves great danger because a rich man is constantly tempted to seek his happiness in this world and to neglect his soul.¹⁹ It is in this sense that Christ speaks of "the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches,"²⁰ and warns His disciples that "a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven."²¹

Neither is poverty in itself a virtue, or a source of virtue, though apt to become such. That it is

¹⁸ Eph. IV, 28; I Tim. VI, 18.
—Cfr. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 3.

¹⁹ Cfr. I Tim. VI, 9 sq., 17.—
Seneca says (*Epist.*, XVII, 3): "*Multis ad philosophandum obstiteret divitiae, paupertas expedita est, secuta est.*" And in another place (*Ep.*, XVII, 5): "*Si vis vacare*

animae, aut pauper sis oportet, aut pauperi similis."—Cfr. G. Ratzinger, *Die Volkswirtschaft*, 2nd ed., pp. 43 sqq.

²⁰ Matth. XIII, 22.

²¹ Matth. XIX, 23 sq.; cfr. Mark X, 23 sqq.; Luke XII, 16 sqq.; Jas. V, 1 sqq.

no disgrace to be poor, appears from the example of Christ and His disciples, who were all poor laboring-men. "Jesus saith to him: The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air nests: but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head." ²² "Being rich," says St. Paul, "He [Jesus] became poor for your sakes, that through his poverty you might be rich." ²³

When poverty is the result of sloth and shiftlessness, it easily leads to immorality and is in itself a sin if it makes a man discontented and covetous of the possessions of others. We read in Sacred Scripture: "Give me neither beggary nor riches: give me only the necessities of life, lest perhaps being filled, I should be tempted to deny and say: Who is the Lord? or being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name of God." ²⁴ Poverty becomes a virtue if borne humbly and with resignation to the will of God. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." ²⁵ St. Ambrose explains this text as follows: "Not all the poor are blessed, for poverty is merely a means: both good men and bad may be poor, unless perhaps that poor man is to be considered blessed of whom the prophet says, 'Better is the poor man that walketh in his simplicity than a rich man that is perverse.' . . ." ²⁶ Blessed the poor man who cried to the Lord and was heard: poor in crime, poor in vice, a poor man in whom

²² Matth. VIII, 20; X, 9 sq.

²³ 2 Cor. VIII, 9; IX, 1 sqq.

²⁴ Prov. XXX, 8-9.—St. Leo the Great says (*Serm.*, 49 [*al.* 48], c. 1): "*Insidiae sunt in divitiarum amplitudine, insidiae in paupertatis*

angustiis. Illae elevant ad superbiam, hae incitant ad querelam." (Migne, P. L., LIV, 302).

²⁵ Matth. V, 3; cfr. Jas. II, 5.

²⁶ Prov. XIX, 1.

the prince of this world finds nothing, who imitates Him who, being rich, was made poor for our sake.²⁷ St. Matthew unfolded the full truth when he said: 'Blessed are the poor in spirit,'²⁸ for he who is poor in spirit does not become puffed up and proud in his conceit."²⁹

"Cheerful poverty is an honorable thing," says Epicurus,³⁰ and Seneca, who quotes this sentiment with approval, adds: "Not he is poor who has little, but he who attempts to gain more by dishonest means."³¹ In another place the great Roman philosopher says: "Great is the man who remains poor [*i. e.*, in spirit] amid riches, but safer is he who does without them."³²

c) Those who devote themselves entirely to intellectual or mental labor, have a just claim to such material goods as they require, not merely to satisfy their necessities, but to enable them to live according to their rank or station. St. Paul's dictum that "they who serve at the altar share with the altar,"³³ applies in a wider sense to all who devote themselves to spiritual and intellec-

²⁷ 2 Cor. VIII, 9.

²⁸ Matth. V, 3.

²⁹ St. Ambrose, *Expos. Evangel.* in Lucam, I. V, n. 53: "Non omnes beati pauperes, paupertas enim media est: possunt et boni et mali esse pauperes. Nisi forte ille intellegendus pauper beatus, quem propheta descripsit dicens: Quia melior pauper iustus quam dives mendax. Beatus pauper qui clamavit et Dominus exaudivit eum: pauper a crimine, pauper a vitiis, pauper in quo mundi princeps nihil invenit, pauper illius aemulus pauperis, qui quum dives esset, propter nos pauper factus est. Unde plene Mat-

thaeus aperuit dicens: Beati pauperes spiritu; pauper enim spiritu non inflatur, non extollitur mente carnis suae." (Migne, P. L., XV, 1650).—Cfr. A. Winterstein, *Die christl. Lehre vom Erdengut*, pp. 73 sqq.

³⁰ "Honestas res est laeta paupertas," quoted by Seneca, *Ep.*, II, 5.

³¹ *Ep.*, II, 6: "Non qui parum habet, sed qui plus capit, pauper est."

³² *Ep.*, XX, 10: "Magnus est ille, qui in divitiis pauper est, sed securior, qui caret divitiis."

³³ 1 Cor. IX, 13.

tual labor for the benefit of their fellowmen, and includes pre-eminently the members of contemplative orders.

d) As the individual, so also each social group (the family, the Church, the State, etc.) has the right and the duty to acquire property. But the group no less than the individual is exposed to the dangers that arise from wealth. History furnishes abundant examples of the truth of the Apostle's saying: "They that will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the devil, and into many unprofitable and hurtful desires, which drown men into destruction and perdition." ³⁴

Man is not the absolute owner, but rather the steward of his possessions, and as such must give a strict account to God. Material wealth should never be the ultimate aim either of the individual or of society, but should be regarded and employed merely as the basis and foundation of a higher life. "Charge the rich of this world," says St. Paul, "not to be proud, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God, who giveth us abundantly all things to enjoy, to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate to others, to lay up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on the true life." ³⁵

The concentration of great fortunes in the hands of a few is becoming a serious danger,

³⁴ 1 Tim. VI, 9; cfr. Ps. XXXIII, 11; Luke XII, 15-21.

³⁵ 1 Tim. XVI, 17-19; cfr. Matth. VI, 19-21.

not only to the individual, since, as St. James says, the rich oppress the poor by might,³⁶ but also to society, because so many rich men now-a-days employ their wealth to establish monopolies, obtain excessive profits, defraud their fellowmen, purchase political power, etc. The fact that it is possible under present conditions, for the exceptionally able, the exceptionally cunning, and the exceptionally lucky, to accumulate enormous riches through the clever and unscrupulous utilization of special advantages, natural and otherwise, has given rise to a just demand for the legal limitation of fortunes. Various methods are suggested. The law might directly limit the amount of property to be held by any individual. One of our leading Catholic authorities on social and political science, Dr. John A. Ryan, thinks that if the limit were placed fairly high, say at one hundred thousand dollars, such a law "could scarcely be regarded as an infringement on the right of property. In the case of a family numbering ten members, this would mean one million dollars. All the essential objects of private ownership could be abundantly met out of a sum of one hundred thousand dollars for each person. Moreover, a restriction of this sort need not prevent a man from bestowing unlimited amounts upon

³⁶ Jas. II, 6; cfr. R. Ehrenberg, *Grosse Vermögen, ihre Entstehung und ihre Bedeutung*, Jena 1902;

Andrew Carnegie, *The Gospel of Wealth*, New York 1900.

charitable, religious, educational, or other benevolent causes.”³⁷

On the other hand, “the dangers and obstacles confronting any legal restriction of fortunes are so real as to render the proposal socially inexpedient. It would easily lend itself to grave abuse. Once the community had habituated itself to a direct limitation of any sort, the temptation to lower it in the interest of better distribution and simpler living would become exceedingly powerful. Eventually the right of property might take such an attenuated and uncertain form in the public mind as to discourage labor and initiative, and thus seriously to endanger human welfare. In the second place, the manifold evasions to which the measure would lend itself would make it of very doubtful efficacy.”³⁸

Another suggestion is that the amount of property capable of being received by heirs of any person be limited, say, to one million dollars.³⁹ This would be a restriction of the rights of bequest and succession, which are integral elements of the right of ownership. Is such restriction admissible? The answer to this question, according to the same authority, “depends upon the effects of the measure on human welfare. . . . A

³⁷ J. A. Ryan, *Distributive Justice. The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth*, New York 1916, pp. 292 sq.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

³⁹ Final Report of the Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, p. 32; H. E. Read, *The Abolition of Inheritance*, N. Y., 1919.

person needs private property not only to provide for his personal wants and those of his family during his life-time, but also to safeguard the welfare of his dependents and to assist other worthy purposes, after he has passed away. . . . All the necessary and rational ends of bequest and succession could be attained in a society in which no man's heirs could inherit more than one million dollars. Under such an arrangement very few of the children of millionaires would be prevented from getting at least one hundred thousand dollars. That much would be amply sufficient for the essential and reasonable needs of any human being. Indeed, we may go further, and lay down the proposition that the overwhelming majority of persons can lead a more virtuous and reasonable life on the basis of a fortune of one hundred thousand dollars than when burdened with any larger amount. The persons who have the desire and the ability to use a greater sum than this in a rational way are so few that a limitation law need not take them into account. Corporate persons, such as hospitals, churches, schools, and other helpful institutions, should not, as a rule, be restricted as to the amount that they might inherit; for many of them could make a good use of more than the amount that suffices for a natural person.”⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Ryan, *Distributive Justice*, p. 294.

The limitation of inheritance would, of course, also be liable to abuse, and while its bad effects would probably not be as great as those following a similar abuse with regard to possessions, they are, in Dr. Ryan's opinion, "sufficiently grave and sufficiently probable to suggest that the legal restriction of bequest and succession should not be considered except as a last resort, and when the transmission of great fortunes had become a great and certain public peril." ⁴¹

An indirect way of limiting large fortunes would be through a progressive tax on incomes and inheritances. This is a more feasible method, though the maximum limit that justice would set to the rate of taxation is not easy to determine. Some years ago Andrew Carnegie ⁴² recommended an inheritance tax of fifty per cent on estates amounting to more than one million dollars. While no country has yet reached this high level, the proposal cannot be stigmatized as unjust either to the testator or his heirs, nor can it be proved that it is in any other manner injurious to human welfare. In a general way, all that can be said with confidence concerning the just rates of inheritance taxation is that "the increments of the tax should correspond as closely as possible to the diminishing intensity of the wants which the tax deprives of satisfaction; in the case of each heir a certain fairly high minimum of property should be entirely exempt; on all the highest estates the rate should be uniform, and it should fall a long way short of confis-

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

⁴² *The Gospel of Wealth*, pp. 11 sqq.

cation; and the tax should at no point be such as to discourage socially useful activity and enterprise.”⁴³

It would be still better, perhaps, instead of clipping off wealth *from the top*, by limiting possession and transmission, to prevent these things *by going to the root, i. e.*, by abolishing the wage system and admitting workingmen to a *share in the possession of the means of production*. This, too, could best be brought about, not by legal enactment, but by molding public opinion.⁴⁴

e) We will close this chapter with a few remarks on the duty of distributing superfluous wealth. Here, also, we shall follow Professor Ryan.

It is the fundamental teaching of Christianity that ownership is stewardship and that he who possesses superfluous goods must regard himself as a trustee for the needy. St. Thomas clearly and concisely formulates this principle as follows: “As regards the power of acquiring and dispensing material goods, man may lawfully possess them as his own; as regards their use, however, a man ought not to look upon them as his own, but as common, so that he may readily minister to the needs of others.”⁴⁵ This teach-

⁴³ Ryan, *Distributive Justice*, p. 300.

⁴⁴ See *Social Reconstruction*, a brochure issued by the four bishops constituting the Administrative Committee of the American Catholic War Council, Washington, D. C.,

1919; Cardinal Bourne's Lenten Pastoral for 1918, “The Nation's Crisis,” London, Catholic Social Guild, 1918.

⁴⁵ *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 3.

ing is in perfect conformity with reason. Since the goods of the earth were intended by the Creator for the common benefit of all mankind, the possessor of a surplus is reasonably required to use it in such a way that this original purpose of all created goods will be fulfilled. To refuse to do so is to treat one's less fortunate neighbor as something different from and less than oneself, as a creature whose claim upon the common bounty of nature is something less than one's own.

Is this obligation one of charity or of justice? In the case of wealth unjustly acquired it is clearly one of justice. But how about *wealth honestly acquired*? St. Thomas says: "The goods which a man has in superfluity are due by the natural law to the sustenance of the poor."⁴⁶ This is the official teaching of the Church, for Pope Leo XIII says: "When one has provided sufficiently for one's necessities and the demands of one's state of life, there is a duty to give to the indigent out of what remains. It is a duty not of strict justice, save in case of extreme necessity, but of Christian charity."⁴⁷

There seems to be a contradiction between this teaching and that of certain Fathers, but the contradiction is apparent rather than real. "The truly important fact of the whole situation," says Dr. Ryan, "is that both the Fathers and the later authorities of the Church regard the

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, art. 7.

⁴⁷ Encyclical "On the Condition

of Labor," 15 May, 1891; *The Pope and the People*, p. 192.

task of distributing superfluous goods as one of strict moral obligation, which in serious cases is binding under pain of grievous sin. Whether it falls under the head of justice or under that of charity, is of no great practical importance.”⁴⁸

What portion of his superfluous wealth is a man obliged to distribute among the needy? Dr. Ryan, proceeding from the unanimous teaching of moral theologians that the entire mass of superfluous wealth is morally subject to the call of grave need, and from the principle of the moral law that the goods of the earth should be enjoyed by the inhabitants of the earth in proportion to their essential needs, attempts to answer this question from the standpoint of common welfare. He thinks that, in view of available statistics, the conclusion is inevitable “that the greater part of the superfluous income of the well-to-do and rich would be required to abolish all grave and ordinary need.” He adds: “The proposition that men are under moral obligation to give away the greater portion of their superfluous goods or income is, indeed, a ‘hard saying.’ . . . No Catholic, however, who knows the traditional teaching of the Church on the right use of wealth, and who considers patiently and seriously the magnitude and the meaning of human distress, will be able to refute the proposition by reasoned arguments.

⁴⁸ *Distributive Justice*, pp. 303 sq., 307 sq.

Indeed, no man can logically deny it who admits that men are intrinsically sacred, and essentially equal by nature and in their claims to a reasonable livelihood from the common heritage of the earth. The wants that a man supplies out of his superfluous goods are not necessary for rational existence. For the most part they bring him merely irrational enjoyment, greater social prestige, or increased domination over his fellows. Judged by any reasonable standard, these are surely less important than those needs of the neighbor which are connected with humane living. If any considerable part of the community rejects these propositions, the explanation will be found not in a reasoned theory, but in the conventional assumption that a man may do what he likes with his own. This assumption is adopted without examination, without criticism, without any serious advertence to the great moral facts that ownership is stewardship, and that the Creator intended the earth for the reasonable support of all the children of men.”⁴⁹

READINGS.—St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 1 sq.—Theodore Meyer, S.J., *Institutiones Iuris Naturalis*, Vol. II, pp. 126 sqq., Freiburg 1900.—V. Cathrein, S.J., *Moralphilosophie*, 4th ed., Freiburg 1904, Vol. II, pp. 285 sqq.—IDEM, *Das Privateigentum und seine Gegner*, 4th ed., Freiburg 1909.—A. Vermeersch, S.J., *Quaestiones de Iustitia*, 2nd ed., pp. 240 sqq.—Ch. Périn, *De la Richesse dans les Sociétés Chrétiennes*, 3rd

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

ed., 2 vols., Paris 1881.—F. Walter, *Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin und des Socialismus*, pp. 266 sqq., Freiburg 1895.—H. Pesch, S.J., *Lehrbuch der National-ökonomie*, Vol. I, Freiburg 1905, pp. 179 sqq.—Michael Cronin, *The Science of Ethics*, Vol. II, Dublin 1917, pp. 113 sqq.—R. I. Holaind, S.J., *Natural Law and Legal Practice*, New York 1899, pp. 203 sqq.—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., *Moral Philosophy: Ethics, Deontology and Natural Law*, 4th ed., London 1918, pp. 278 sqq.—J. A. Ryan, *Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth*, New York 1916, pp. 3 sqq., 291 sqq., 303 sqq.—J. Husslein, S.J., *The World Problem: Capital, Labor, and the Church*, New York 1918, pp. 232 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, Vol. II, 11th ed., Innsbruck 1914, pp. 387 sqq.—Thos. Slater, S.J., *A Manual of Moral Theology*, Vol. I, pp. 344 sqq., 350 sqq., New York 1919.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., *Theologia Moralis*, Vol. I, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, pp. 499 sqq.—J. Kelleher, *Private Ownership*, Dublin 1911.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., *Christian Ethics*, pp. 271 sqq., New York 1919.

CHAPTER IV

DUTIES IN REGARD TO HONOR

SECTION I

NOTION AND VALUE OF HONOR

I. NOTION.—The term *honor* may be taken either subjectively or objectively.

Subjectively, honor is the dignity of a person (*honor, dignitas*) based on his worth, character, or distinguished service. Objectively, it is any consideration due or paid to a person by others, on account of worth, character or distinguished service; or, to express the same idea somewhat differently, recognition of a man's personal excellence, virtue, and ability by his fellowmen (*aestimatio, existimatio*).¹

There are several degrees of honor.

¹ St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 1a 2ae, q. 2, art. 2: "*Honor exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam, et ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae, quae est in honorato.*"—IDEM, *ibid.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 103, art. 2: "*Honor nihil aliud est quam quaedam protestatio de excellentia bonitatis alicuius.*"—Cfr. J. P. Gury,

Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 459: "*Fama est bona aestimatio, quam alii habent de vita et moribus alicuius.*"—Aug. Lehmkuhl, *Theologia Moralis*, Vol. I, 11th ed., p. 819: "*Fama est bona aestimatio, qua homo apud alios fruitur: honor huius aestimationis secundum virtutem, dignitatem, meritum significatio seu manifestatio.*"

a) The first or lower degree is a good name or reputation (*fama seu gloria humana*).² This may justly be claimed by every man who conscientiously follows his chosen vocation and has not forfeited his claim to the recognition and esteem of his fellowmen by public crimes or blunders.

b) The second or higher degree of honor is that which is due to a man on account of his state of life or social position, regardless of whether these are acquired by his own labor or inherited from his ancestors.

2. VALUE.—Although intrinsic honor, *i. e.*, the consciousness of one's personal worth, is superior to exterior honor, which is merely the consideration or recognition received from others, the latter, too, is a valuable possession, whose loss may entail serious consequences.

The high value of exterior honor becomes evident from the following considerations:

a) Honor is the medium through which the individual exercises his authority or influence upon society;

b) Without honor no man can exercise a fruitful activity among and upon his fellows, and the

² Lehmkuhl, *ibid.*: "*Fama bona est fundamentum honoris, ita ut, si praecise spectetur, fama maius bonum sit quam honor, honor autem, si cum suo fundamento sumitur, aliquid plus dicat quam fama. Hinc est, cur honor apud homines pluris valeat quam fama, honoris*

laesio gravius etiam feratur quam laesio famae; nam quum aestimatio intus lateat, honor autem et exterius prodatur et internae aestimationis naturalis index sit: qui honorem exhibet, plus censetur dare, quam qui intus aliquem aestimat."

loss of honor often entails moral death or absolute exclusion from the society of respectable men.³ "Take my honor, take my life," says an Irish proverb.

c) A man's moral character not infrequently depends upon his good name, and many are deterred from doing evil by the fear of disgrace.

"Honor," says St. Thomas, summarizing the doctrine of the Fathers, "is the greatest among the exterior things that affect man, both because it ranks next to virtue, being as it were a testimony to man's virtue, and also for the reason that it is shown to God and those in authority, and men prefer the attainment of honor and the avoidance of disgrace to all other things."⁴

³ Cfr. Prov. XXII, 1; Ecclus. XLI, 15; John V, 44; Rom. XIII, 7; 1 Cor. IX, 15; 2 Cor. VIII, 21; Phil. IV, 9.—St. Augustine says, *Serm.*, 355 (al. 49 de *Diversis*), c. 1, n. 1: "*Duae res sunt conscientia et fama. Conscientia tibi, fama proximo tuo. Qui fidens conscientiae suae negligit famam suam, crudelis est, maxime in loco isto positus, de quo dicit Apostolus (Tit. II, 7) scribens ad discipulum suum: Circa omnes teipsum bonorum operum praebens exemplum.*" (Migne, P. L. XXXIX, 1569).—IDEM, *De Bono Viduit.*, c. 22, n. 27: "*Quisquis a criminibus flagitiorum atque facinorum vitam suam custodit, sibi bene facit, quisquis autem etiam famam, et in alios misericors est. Nobis enim necessaria est vita nostra, aliis fama nostra, et utique etiam quod aliis ministramus misericordi-*

ter ad salutem, ad nostram quoque redundat utilitatem." (P. L., XL., 448).—IDEM, *Contra Faustum Manich.*, l. 22, c. 56: "*Fama popularis, qua etiam maior et clarior notitia comparatur, non ipsa per sese expetenda, sed intentioni bonorum, quo generi humano consulunt, pernecessaria.*" (P. L., XLII, 436).

⁴ *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 129, art. 1: "*Res quae in usum hominis veniunt, sunt res exteriores, inter quas simpliciter maximum est honor, tum quia propinquissimum est virtuti, utpote testificatio quaedam existens de virtute alicuius, tum etiam quia Deo et optimis exhibetur, tum etiam quia homines propter honorem consequendum ut et vituperium vitandum alia omnia postponunt.*"—Cfr. qu. 131, art. 1, ad 3.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 1a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 2 sq.; 2a 2ae, qu. 103, art. 1 sq.—F. Kattenbusch, *Ehren und Ehre*, Giessen 1909.—H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 76 sq., 655 sqq., 678 sq.—J. E. Ross, C. S. P., *Christian Ethics*, pp. 258 sqq.

SECTION 2

THE DUTY OF PRESERVING HONOR

1. Every man is in duty bound to safeguard and preserve his honor or good name to the best of his ability.

a) This means, first and above all, that he must endeavor to acquire the basis of a good reputation by irreproachable conduct and to become ever more worthy of honor by faithfully performing his vocational duties and especially by conforming himself to Christ.¹

b) We are exhorted to let our "light shine before men," that they may see our good works and glorify the Father who is in Heaven,² and to declare the virtues of Him who hath called us out of darkness into His marvellous light.³ We comply with this duty if we, each in his own particular sphere, faithfully and punctually do the things that are given us to do, or, as the Apostle puts it, "provide good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of men,"⁴ and

¹ Rom. VIII, 29.—Cfr. Virgil, *Aeneis*: "*Famam ostendere factis, hoc virtutis opus.*"

² Matth. V, 16.

³ 1 Pet. II, 9; cfr. Acts XXIV, 16.

⁴ Rom. XII, 17; 2 Cor. VII, 21.

avoid even the semblance of evil. "Do ye all things without murmurings and hesitations, that you may be blameless and sincere children of God, without reproof, in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, among whom you shine as lights in the world." ⁵

He who does his share towards the well-being of society according to his insight and gifts,⁶ has no responsibility with regard to the recognition of his work by others. For, in the first place, the duty of providing for the proper recognition of his personal dignity and activity does not go beyond that of furnishing the object of recognition, which is dignity and activity itself; and, secondly, the judgments of society upon the moral worth of an individual and his work are uncertain and fallacious, because men do not always esteem one another according to their true value, but are often deceived by appearances and swayed hither and thither by error and prejudice. "Not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth," says the Apostle,⁷ and our Divine Saviour admonishes

⁵ Phil. II, 14-16.—Cfr. St. Jerome, *Ep.*, 123 (*al.* 11), n. 15: "*Fuge personas, in quibus potest malae conversationis esse suspicio, nec paratum habeas illud e trivio: Sufficit mihi conscientia mea, non curo, quid de me loquantur homines. Et certe Apostolus providebat bona, non tantum coram Deo, sed etiam hominibus, ne per illum*

nomen Dei blasphemaretur in gentibus. (Rom. II, 24). *Habebat utique potestatem sororem mulierem circumducendi, sed nolebat* (1 Cor. X, 29) *se iudicari ab infideli conscientia.*" (Migne, P. L., XXII, 1056). Cfr. *Ep.*, 148 (*al.* 14), n. 23 (P. L., XXII, 1215).

⁶ Rom. XII, 5.

⁷ 2 Cor. X, 18.—Cfr. Is. XI, 3.

us to "judge not according to the appearance, but judge just judgment."⁸

It is entirely legitimate for a man to try to make himself worthy of honor before God and his fellowmen by leading a virtuous life. The love of honor, in its true sense, is not opposed to humility, for humility does not enjoin self-contempt, but merely forbids conceit. Both Church and State acknowledge man's right to strive after positions or offices of honor, and reward with titles and privileges those who distinguish themselves by extraordinary courage, zeal, or fidelity. Monuments are sometimes erected in their honor, whereas those guilty of certain public crimes, *e. g.*, perjury, are formally deprived of honor (*capitis deminutio*).

To seek honor for its own sake, or as an end rather than as a means to a higher end, to delight in it unduly (vanity), to covet it without regard to God,⁹ to demand recognition for qualities which one does not possess (hypocrisy) or to seek it through actions which are forbidden, *e. g.*, by neglecting one's duty, or doing evil, or omitting good which one is bound to do, are sinful acts.¹⁰ It is also sinful to be careless of honor or reputation, to

⁸ John VII, 24; VIII, 15.—Cfr. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 1a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 3: "*Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana notitia saepe fallitur et praecipue in singularibus contingentibus, cuiusmodi sunt actus humani, et ideo frequenter humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non pot-*

est, eius gloria semper vera est, propter quod dicitur: Ille probatus est, quem Deus commendat."

⁹ Ps. CXIII, 9; 2 Cor. XI, 30.—Cfr. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 131, art. 1.

¹⁰ Cfr. Luke IX, 26.—St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 132, art. 1-4.

hold them lightly or to despise them cynically. The last-mentioned attitude is generally a result of disguised pride.

"There are honors which dishonor him who seeks them," truly says a modern novelist.¹¹ Every honor or dignity, according to an ancient proverb, entails its own peculiar responsibilities and burdens.¹²

An ancient saw declares that honors and dignities often change a man's character.¹³ Unfortunately, the change is not always for the better, and consequently those who receive honors or dignities should strive to employ them as a means of moral improvement. "It is sure proof of nobility of character," says Jean Paul, "if a man uses honors and dignities as means of acquiring virtue."

The foundation of true happiness is neither honor nor wealth, but honesty, sincerity, and trust in God. Human glory frequently evaporates like smoke, but nobility of character is a stable possession. "The Lord rewards his servants, not according to the dignity of their office," says St. Francis de Sales, "but in proportion to the humility and love with which they discharge the same."¹⁴

c) Every man is bound to preserve his honor and good name by faithfully complying with the duties of his vocation, leading a pure and upright life, and avoiding whatever might justly cause offense to others. If, despite all reasonable care, he has the misfortune to give scandal, either by making mistakes or letting his zeal run to ex-

¹¹ "Il y a des honores qui dés-honorent" (G. Flaubert).

¹² "Honor habet onus."

¹³ "Honores mutant mores."

¹⁴ *De la Vie Dévote*, III, 2.

cess, let him candidly admit his fault and humbly seek forgiveness. One whose honor is unjustly attacked has the right to defend it, nay, he is in duty bound to do so if his office, or the interest of his family, or the good name of those associated with him, or the danger of scandal render it necessary. Sometimes, however, it is an act of heroic virtue to suffer persecution silently, like Christ and His Apostles, or to sacrifice one's good name for the honor and glory of God. Our Lord says: "Blessed are ye when they shall revile you, and persecute you, and speak all that is evil against you, untruly, for my sake."¹⁵ And St. Paul: "We labor, working with our own hands, we are reviled, and we bless; we are persecuted, and we suffer it."¹⁶ A good conscience and the conviction that an omniscient God governs the universe and draws good out of evil, will give us the consoling assurance that we have nothing to fear, especially since we know from Revelation that the names of Christ's faithful servants, even though they be traduced by men, are held in high honor by God and indelibly graven in the Book of Life.¹⁷

¹⁵ Matth. V, 11; Luke XVII, 3.

¹⁶ 1 Cor. IV, 12; Col. III, 12;

1 Thess. V, 15; 1 Pet. II, 23.

¹⁷ Luke X, 20; XII, 7; Phil. IV, 3.—Cfr. St. Augustine, *De Bono Viduitatis*, c. 22: "Quoniam quantalibet humana cautela suspiciones malevolentissimas non potest omni

ex parte vitare, ubi pro existimatione nostra quidquid recte possumus fecerimus, si aliqui de nobis vel mala fingendo vel male credendo famam nostram decolorare conantur, adsit conscientiae solatium planeque etiam gaudium, quod merces nostra magna est in coelis, etiam

When a man has lost his good name through his own fault, silence and patience may be recommended as suitable means of atonement. A person who has been innocently robbed of his good name and sees his career endangered or ruined, may find that the simple continuance of his accustomed mode of life is the most effective weapon of self-defence. Where deeds fail to convince, words generally prove of little or no avail.

It is never allowed to employ immoral means, such as lies or duelling, for the restoration of one's honor.

To hide secret sins and defects from others, in order to preserve one's honor and good name, is not forbidden. No human authority can pass judgment upon the secret deeds and motives of men. (*"De internis non iudicat praetor."*)

d) If a man has lost his good name through his own fault, he must try to regain it as soon and as fully as possible. The means by which it may be regained depend as a rule on the manner in which it was lost. A reputation that is completely shattered may be difficult to rebuild; but the obligation of trying to do so remains and

quum dicunt homines mala multa de nobis pie tamen iusteque viventibus (Mt. V, 11-12). *Illa enim merces tamquam stipendium est militantium per arma iustitiae* (2

Cor.⁵ VI, 7-8) *non solum dextera, verum et sinistra, per gloriam scilicet et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam.*" (Migne, P. L., XL, 449).

binds especially in those cases where the welfare of a family or the good name of a community depend upon the honor of the individual member.

If honor has been lost through neglect or the commission of some minor fault, it may be restored by increased zeal, fidelity, diligence, and prudence. If the fault was grievous, sincere penance and a genuine purpose of amendment are not only a strict duty, but the only suitable means of making amends for the sin committed and repairing the scandal given. However, as Christ has expressly declared that there will be more joy in Heaven over one sinner who does penance than over ninety-nine just who need it not, every penitent sinner who atones his fault, regains the right to his good name, and it must not be denied him. Nor should it be forgotten that even in the impenitent sinner, no matter how deeply he may have fallen, there is always the human dignity to be respected.¹⁸

a) The teaching of Catholic Moral Theology on the subject of honor has been denounced as a hindrance to progress and as subversive of that self-respect which no man can afford to surrender. This is a grievous mistake. Seeking honor and fleeing from it seem indeed contradictory acts, but the apparent contradiction is solved by a higher unity. In preaching contempt of the world and of oneself¹⁹ the Church does not mean to imply that, to be

¹⁸ Cfr. Luke XV, 7, 10; Gal. VI, 1; Eph. VI, 8 sq.; Jas. II, 1-9.

¹⁹ "*Spernere mundum, spernere sese, spernere nullum, spernere se sperni.*"

truly humble, a man must be indifferent to mundane things, but merely that he who is truly humble will patiently suffer contempt for Christ's sake, though he will never stoop to anything that would degrade his dignity as a man. Inordinate self-humiliation is not a virtue, but a sin (*per excessum*) against humility, which consists essentially in submission to God, and to men for God's sake,²⁰ in the service of truth and charity.²¹ Humility, therefore, keeps the pursuit of honor within the bounds of reason and, together with charity, is the foundation of the Christian life. This noble virtue was practiced in a preëminent and exemplary degree by Jesus Christ, "the truth, the way, and the life," who was able to say of Himself: "Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart."²²

Catholic ascetics neither condemns the striving after honor nor justifies carelessness in this regard, but merely forbids vainglory (*gloria vana*), which has for its end and purpose not God, but self.

Contempt of worldly distinctions and honors does not imply want of self-respect if it is inspired by a desire for eternal glory. This desire lives only in noble souls. St. Paul, who did not hesitate to say of himself that he had

20 St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 161, art. 1, ad 5.—St. Bernard, *De Gradibus Humilitatis*, c. 1, n. 2: "*Humilitas est virtus, qua homo verissimā sui agnitione sibi ipsi vilescit.*" (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 942).

21 Matth. XX, 28; XXIII, 11; Gal. V, 13.—St. Augustine says (*De Natura et Gratia*, c. 34, n. 38): "*Recte placet, ut in parte veritatis, non in parte falsitatis magis humilitas collocetur, . . . ne humilitas constituta in parte falsitatis perdat*

praemium veritatis." (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 265).

22 Matth. XI, 29; John XIV, 6.—Cfr. St. Augustine, *Ep.*, 118 (*al.* 56), c. 3, n. 22: "*Huic [Christo] te, mi Dioscure, ut totā pietate subdas velim, nec aliam tibi ad capessendam et obtinendam veritatem viam munias, quam quae munta est ab illo, qui gressum nostrorum tamquam Deus vidit infirmitatem. Ea est autem prima, humilitas; secunda, humilitas, tertia, humilitas, et quoties interrogares, hoc dicerem.*" (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 442).

labored more than all the rest and was "made a spectacle to the world, and to angels, and to men,"²³ nevertheless declared: "I am the least of the apostles, who am not worthy to be called an apostle."²⁴

β) The question has been raised whether a man may deprive himself of his good name (*seipsum infamare*). In answering this question the casuists draw a distinction. If one can defame himself without detriment to his vocational duties and without injury to others, they say the sacrifice is permissible because it violates neither justice, as man has full ownership of his good name (*dominium famae suae*), nor charity, because charity requires regard for external goods only in so far as they are necessary for one's own salvation or the salvation of others. According to Gury and others of this school, however, it would be grievously sinful to deprive oneself of one's good name if the latter were an indispensable requisite of one's official position or if the defamation would result in danger to one's own life or injury to the good name of others.²⁵

We cannot quite agree with this view, but maintain that defamation of one's own character is forbidden for reasons which may be briefly stated as follows:

a) To preserve one's honor and good name is a precept of the moral law of nature as well as of divine law, and the duty arising from both, while it differs in pro-

²³ 1 Cor. IV, 9.

²⁴ 1 Cor. XV, 9 sq.

²⁵ J. P. Gury, *Comp. Theol. Mor.*, Vol. I, n. 469: "*Quaeritur, an liceat seipsum infamare. Respondetur affirmative per se, si recta intentione fiat, secluso scandalo et aliorum damno. Ratio est, quia non est contra iustitiam, quum*

quisque sit famae suae dominus, nec contra caritatem, quia haec non obligat ad bona externa conservanda, nisi quantum id exigit salus propria vel proximi. Per accidens autem peccabis, et quidem graviter, si fama tua necessaria sit muneri tuo vel si tibi damnum vitae vel aliis infamiae ex hoc sequi deberet."

portion to the concrete conditions or circumstances of each, can never cease entirely.

b) Self-defamation no matter by what motives it is inspired or how useful it may appear to be, by its very definition presupposes the telling of a lie. Now, no one is allowed to attribute to himself sins or vices of which he is not guilty because to lie is forbidden absolutely and in all circumstances.

To reveal one's real but secret faults (*e. g.*, to a superior) is not self-defamation but an act of humiliation or the expression of a strong purpose of amending one's life and correcting the fault in question. Such an act of humility, far from injuring one's good name, is apt rather to enhance it.

For the rest, there is hardly a vocation in which men do not feel the need of occasional recognition and encouragement from their fellowmen.

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
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